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ABSTRACT PAGE
“Ambiguous Alliances” examines the revolutionary era in the Ohio Valley from a Native 
American perspective. Rather than simply considering them as British pawns or 
troublesome mischief-makers, this account describes how Wyandots, Shawnees, Ottawas, 
Delawares, Miamis, and their native neighbors made decisions about war and peace, 
established alliances with Europeans, Americans, and distant Indian nations, and charted 
specific strategies for their political and cultural survival. They also suffered devastating 
personal and property loss and encountered significant disruption to their societal routines. 
Yet much about their daily lives remained unchanged, and their communities continued to 
foster a strong Indian identity.
This dissertation explores native objectives for the period 1768-1795, specifically looking at 
what the various nations were hoping to accomplish in their relationships with the British 
and the Americans. While preserving land and sovereignty were the Indians’ clearest 
aims, this study also emphasizes that the underlying goal of protecting their rights and 
property was to retain their cultural distinctiveness. Furthermore, these twin objectives 
were inextricably linked. The Indians’ ability to remain viable diplomatic partners with the 
Europeans depended on the maintenance of their landed independence.
Along with analyzing native objectives, this dissertation discusses Indian strategies to 
attain these goals and looks at how the Revolution assisted or hampered their execution. 
Some tribes actively recruited British or American allies; some attempted to remain neutral; 
others endeavored to form a united Indian front; and still others alternately extended their 
allegiance to both parties in an effort to secure both autonomy and protection.
Despite its heavy emphasis on native alliances and military maneuvers, this work also 
examines the Revolution’s challenges to the rhythms of daily life. In addition to physical 
destruction, wartime agendas altered native economic patterns and sometimes even 
invaded cultural practices, threatening to constrict gender roles for women or to prevent 
nations from adopting captives to replace their deceased relatives. Although the era's 
disruptions brought emotional distress, physical displacement, and political ambiguity, the 
tribes persisted in sustaining both their daily existence and their national identities.
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1Introduction 
The Revolutionary Ohio Valley
At the turn of the eighteenth century, the Ohio Valley housed few permanent 
residents. A small number of Shawnee villages dotted the landscape in present-day 
Kentucky, several nations anchored themselves on the Wabash River, and scattered tribes 
visited the land around Lake Erie. Fifty years later, however, the region had become a 
bustling district. Delawares and Shawnees had moved in from eastern Pennsylvania, 
Wyandots had migrated south from Detroit to settle near Sandusky, several Shawnee 
bands had relocated north of the Ohio River, and disgruntled Senecas had begun to trickle 
down the Allegheny River and populate the river valleys of western Pennsylvania and 
eastern Ohio. In their wake, French and English traders arrived on the scene, eager to ply 
their wares and to link their Indian customers to a particular European empire.1
With all of these newcomers vying for resources and allegiances, war quickly 
erupted, pitting French, English, and Indian neighbors against each other in a scramble 
for Ohio Valley dominance. When the dust cleared and the Seven Years’ War reached its 
conclusion, the French government had been expelled from the region, even though many
1 Michael N. McConnell, A Country Between: The Upper Ohio Valley and Its Peoples, 1724-1774 
(Lincoln: University o f  Nebraska Press, 1992); Randolph C. Downes, Council Fires on the Upper Ohio: A 
Narrative o f  Indian Affairs in the Upper Ohio Valley until 1795 (Pittsburgh: University o f Pittsburgh Press, 
1940); Eric Hinderaker, Elusive Empires: Constructing Colonialism in the Ohio Valley, 1673-1800 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); R. Douglas Hurt, The Ohio Frontier: Crucible o f the Old 
Northwest, 1720-1830 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996); Helen Hombeck Tanner and 
Erminie Wheeler-Voegelin, Indians o f  Ohio and Indian prior to 1795, 2 vols. (New York, Garland, 1974);
C.A. Weslager, The Delaware Indian Westward Migration (Wallingford, PA: Middle Atlantic Press, 1978); 
Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650- 
1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Lucien Beckner, “Eskippakithiki: The Last Indian 
Town in Kentucky,” Filson Club History Quarterly, 6 (1932), 355-82; A. Gwynn Henderson, “Dispelling 
the Myth: Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Indian Life in Kentucky,” Register o f  the Kentucky 
Historical Society, 40 (1992), 1-25; Michael N. McConnell, “Peoples ‘In Between:’ The Iroquois and the 
Ohio Indians, 1720-1768,” in Daniel K. Richter and James Merrell, eds., Beyond the Covenant Chain: The 
Iroquois and Their Neighbors in Indian North America, 1600-1800 (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 
1987), 93-112.
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2of its traders and agents remained in the field. Meanwhile, most Indian nations opposed 
the new British regime, but they disagreed on the appropriate responses to its clumsy 
attempts to rule autocratically. Some feared British military and economic weapons and 
consequently remained quiet. But numerous other chiefs and warriors from the Ohio, 
Illinois, and Great Lakes regions rebelled against British authority in a series of attacks in 
1763-1764, loosely referred to as Pontiac’s War. Although British soldiers quelled the 
insurrection before the largest forts fell, the Indians’ hostility and distrust lingered. 
Officials who endeavored to impose their priorities unilaterally learned that they would 
have to adopt subtler policies to avoid continued violent conflict.2
Residual frustration among the Indians, who were freshly aggrieved by the steady 
stream of settlers pouring into contested territory in western Pennsylvania and Virginia, 
administrative ineptitude among the British, and unpredictable behavior among French 
traders and villagers created considerable chaos in the region after Pontiac’s War 
subsided. During the next decade, aggrandizing land companies, British agents, and 
distant Indian nations sought to advance their own interests at the expense of Ohio Valley 
residents. In response, Delawares and Shawnees complained to local agents, threatened 
encroaching settlers, and advocated collective action among area Indians, but tensions 
persisted. By the time irate colonists fired on the king’s troops on the eastern seaboard, 
some of the western Indians had already engaged in a large pitched battle against Virginia
2 Fred Anderson, Crucible o f  War: The Seven Years ’ War and the Fate o f  Empire in British North 
America, 1754-1766 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000); Gregory Evans Dowd, War under Heaven: 
Pontiac, the Indian Nations, & the British Empire (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002); Jack 
M. Sosin, Whitehall and the Wilderness: The Middle West in British Colonial Policy, 1760-1775 (Lincoln: 
University o f Nebraska Press, 1961); David Curtis Skaggs and Larry L. Nelson, eds., The Sixty Years ’ War 
fo r  the Great Lakes, 1754-1814 (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2001); McConnell, A 
Country Between', J. Martin West, ed., War for Empire in Western Pennsylvania (Ligonier, PA: Fort 
Ligonier Association, 1993); Downes, Council Fires on the Upper Ohio; White, Middle Ground.
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3militia, a skirmish that intensified fears among native groups that the British and 
Americans intended to take their land.
While several recent historians have carefully documented the impact o f  these 
mid-eighteenth-century upheavals on Native American communities, few have extended 
their analysis to include the revolutionary era.4 This reluctance to cross the Revolution’s 
threshold possibly stems from the common refrain surrounding much existing scholarship 
on native politics: Indian survival strategies were based upon setting European powers 
against each other. Although this theme accurately describes one segment of tribal 
diplomacy, focusing on it exclusively forces the story to end with the dissolution of 
France’s North American empire in 1763.
Regardless of the reason for its neglect, the effect of minimizing the western 
Indians’ revolutionary experience is to turn it into a disconnected event in which the 
British and Americans engaged in civil war, and the Indians were inevitably compelled to 
choose a side. This formula encourages the notion that the Revolution simplified native 
concerns and alliances. For example, Eric Hinderaker argues that the Revolution took the 
region’s complex pre-war politics and flattened the “Ohio Valley’s social and political 
contours,” by pushing all of the Indians into the British camp. Post-war studies tend to be
3 Thomas P. Abemethy, Western Lands and the American Revolution (New York: Russell & 
Russell, 1959); Kenneth P. Bailey, The Ohio Company o f Virginia and the Westward Movement, 1748- 
1792 (Glendale, CA: Arthur H. Clark, 1939); Dorothy V. Jones, License fo r  Empire: Colonialism by Treaty 
in Early America (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1982); Jack M. Sosin, The Revolutionary 
Frontier, 1763-1783 (New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1967); McConnell, A Country Between-, 
Randolph C. Downes, “Dunmore’s War: An Interpretation,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 21, no. 3 
(1934), 311-30; John W. Huston, “The British Evacuation o f Fort Pitt, 1772,” Western Pennsylvania 
Historical Magazine, 48 (1985), 317-29; Robert L. Kerby, “The Other War in 1774: Dunmore’s War,”
West Virginia History, 36 (1974), 1-16.
4 McConnell, A Country Between', Dowd, War Under Heaven; Anderson, Crucible o f  War. 
Notable exceptions include Colin G. Calloway, The American Revolution in Indian Country: Crisis and 
Diversity in Native American Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Hurt, Ohio 
Frontier, White, Middle Ground; Skaggs and Nelson, eds., Sixty Years War fo r the Great Lakes, although 
both White and Skaggs and Nelson are prevented from detailed analysis o f the Revolution by the broader 
scope o f their projects.
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4similarly reductionistic when discussing native affairs, often choosing to highlight 
American political development or British Indian Department maneuvers rather than 
connections to the preceding struggle. Likewise, general scholarship on the Revolution’s 
western front treats the Indians solely as British auxiliaries and ignores how native 
actions and initiatives largely determined British and American strategies for that theater 
of the war.5
Seeking to redress some of these oversights, this dissertation places an Indian 
perspective at the heart of its examination of the Revolution in the Ohio Valley. In this 
version of the story, Wyandots, Shawnees, Delawares, Miamis, and their native neighbors 
made decisions about war and peace, established alliances with Europeans, Americans, 
and distant Indian nations, and charted specific, often different, strategies for their 
political and cultural survival. They also suffered devastating personal and property loss 
and encountered significant disruption to their social routines. Yet much about their daily 
lives remained unchanged, and their communities continued to foster a strong Indian 
identity.
This native perspective contributes several new ideas to recent scholarship on the 
revolutionary Ohio Valley. First, it introduces an expanded periodization, 1768 to 1795, 
in an effort to connect the Revolution to its broader context and to emphasize that the war
5 Hinderaker, Elusive Empires, 189; Robert S. Allen, His Majesty’s Indian Allies: British Indian 
Policy in the Defense o f  Canada, 1774-1815 (Toronto: Dundum Press, 1992); Colin G. Calloway, Crown 
and Calumet: British-Indian Relations, 1783-1815 (Norman: University Press o f Oklahoma, 1987); 
Andrew R.L. Cayton, The Frontier Republic: Ideology and Politics in the Ohio Country, 1780-1825 (Kent, 
OH: Kent State University Press, 1986); Reginald Horsman, Expansion and American Indian Policy, 1783- 
1812 (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1967); Wiley Sword, President Washington's 
Indian War: The Struggle fo r the Old Northwest, 1790-1795 (Norman: University o f  Oklahoma Press, 
1985); Reginald Horsman, “The British Indian Department and the Resistance to General Anthony Wayne, 
1793-1795,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 49, no. 2 (1962), 269-90; Reuben Gold Thwaites, How 
George Rogers Clark Won the Northwest and Other Essays in Western History (Chicago: A.C. McClurg, 
1903), 3-71; George Waller, The American Revolution in the West (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1976).
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5did not begin in 1775 or end in 1783 for the Indians. It begins in 1768 for two reasons. 
First, at the Fort Stanwix Treaty in that year, the British adjusted their 1763 Proclamation 
line that limited settlement beyond the Appalachians and negotiated a boundary between 
Indian and white territory that would give them a huge swath of land in Pennsylvania and 
western Virginia, including most of Kentucky. The Ohio Valley tribes vigorously 
opposed this treaty, directing their anger against both the British and the Six Nations, 
who had claimed the authority to dispose of this land. Resentment over this issue lasted 
into the Revolution and continued to shape native ideas about a boundary line into the 
1790s.6
The second reason for beginning in 1768 is that the British regime was just 
establishing itself in the West, and the Indians were counseling together frequently to 
determine how to respond to it. During Pontiac’s War they tried the quick eradication 
response, which produced mixed results. They did not succeed in pushing the British out, 
but they did impress English authorities with their martial creativity and strength. Thus, 
by the latter half of the 1760s, the Indians did not consider themselves defeated, but knew 
that they would have to carve out a niche for themselves that seemed likely to include 
further opposition to the British. Figuring out how to approach the issue was the task at 
hand in 1768 and the years leading up to the Revolution.
The Treaty of Greenville in 1795 marks the end of this dissertation because that 
settlement forced the Indians to relinquish the Ohio River boundary that had been in
6 Clarence Edward Carter, ed., The Correspondence o f  General Thomas Gage with the Secretaries 
o f  State, 1763-1775,2 vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1931-33), 1: 209; James Sullivan, et al., 
eds., The Papers o f  Sir William Johnson, 14 vols. (Albany: State University o f  New York, 1921-65), 6: 
632-34; K.G. Davies, ed., Documents o f  the American Revolution, 1770-1783, 19 vols. (Dublin: Irish 
University Press, 1972-81), 2:22; Collections o f  the Michigan Pioneer and Historical Society, 40 vols. 
(Lansing, MI: Thorp & Godfrey, 1874-1929), 20: 182.
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6existence since the 1768 Treaty of Fort Stanwix. Now white settlers could legally sprawl 
up the Muskingum, Scioto, and Great Miami Rivers, wantonly threatening native hunting 
and trading patterns. The rapid expansion of these new immigrants prompted the Indians 
to redefine their relationship with their white neighbors and to devise new plans for 
preserving their sovereignty and autonomy.7
In addition to broadening the revolutionary period, Ambiguous Alliances, also 
stretches its geographic focus to include the entire Ohio Valley. Many studies restrict 
their coverage to smaller regions, but the Indian perspective seemed to demand a more 
extensive view. Delawares and Shawnees in eastern Ohio maintained ties to their 
relatives who had moved to the Wabash and Illinois countries; Ottawas on the Maumee 
River and Wyandots at Sandusky communicated with their kin close to Detroit and Lake 
Michigan; and Seneca chiefs from Allegheny frequently checked on their volatile and 
vagrant Mingo cousins. Although the Ohio, Wabash, Illinois, and Great Lakes Indians 
often differed in their responses to outside threats (just as there was internal dissension in 
nearly every Indian town), they frequently called upon each other for military assistance 
and kept up with rumors and news that traveled up and down the Ohio River. As 
encroaching settlers advanced across the entire length of the river, these shared 
grievances further strengthened regional identity.8
A third contribution to Native American and Ohio Valley research is a discussion 
of Indian objectives during this period, specifically asking what were the various nations
7 Walter Lowrie and Matthew St. Clair Clarke, eds., American State Papers: Documents, 
Legislative and Executive, o f  the C o n fess  o f  the United States, Class II, Indian Affairs, 2 vols.
(Washington D.C.: Gales & Seaton, 1832), 1: 564-83.
8 Helen Hombeck Tanner, ed., Atlas o f  Great Lakes Indian History (Norman, OK: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1987), 58-60, 80-91. For excellent regional studies, see McConnell, A Country Between', 
Downes, Council Fires on the Upper Ohio', Stephen Aron, How the West Was Lost: The Transformation o f  
Kentucky from  Daniel Boone to Henry Clay (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).
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7hoping to accomplish in their relationships with the British and Americans? The obvious 
answer to this question is that the Indians wanted to preserve their land and sovereignty, 
but this project complicates that answer in two ways. First, it focuses on one aspect of 
sovereignty, namely, the ability to remain viable partners on the diplomatic stage.
Having been connected to European markets for decades by the 1770s, few Indians 
advocated complete isolation, which meant that they had to figure out a way to 
accommodate the newcomers without being completely manipulated. Occasionally, war 
seemed like the best option to rein in overreaching whites; but more often, nations sought 
to cultivate alliances where their authority would be recognized, and they would be given 
the opportunity to express their concerns and opinions. As the revolutionary era grew 
more heated, however, such alliances became increasingly difficult to maintain. Second, 
this dissertation builds upon the Indians’ twin objectives of land and sovereignty by 
pointing out that the two were inextricably linked. The Indians’ ability to negotiate with 
Europeans depended on the maintenance of their landed independence.9
Along with analyzing native objectives, the dissertation revolves around two 
additional central questions: What tactics did the Indians employ to implement these 
goals, and how did the Revolution and its aftermath assist or hamper their execution? 
Because historians have generally assumed that the Indians eventually were forced to 
sign on with one of the belligerents, they obscure the evidence that native leaders were 
really conducting their own war. If Indian interests dovetailed with British aims, the two
9 Gregory Evans Dowd, A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle fo r  Unity, 
1745-1815 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992; Nancy Shoemaker, A Strange Likeness: 
Becoming Red and White in Eighteenth-Century North America (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2004); Francis Jennings, “The Imperial Revolution: The American Revolution as a Tripartite Struggle for 
Sovereignty,” in Jennings, ed., The American Indians and the American Revolution (Chicago: Newberry 
Library, 1983); James H. O’Donnell, “The World Turned Upside Down: the American Revolution as a 
Catastrophe for Native Americans,” in Jennings, ed., American Indians and the American Revolution.
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8could work together; but if Detroit commanders wanted the Indians to adopt an alternate 
strategy, they refused. Indeed, Ohio Valley nations were just as active in choosing and 
recruiting their allies as were the king’s officials. Aligning with a particular side was 
only one way to use the Revolution’s unpredictability for their own purposes. Some 
tribes explored neutrality; others endeavored to form a united Indian front; still others 
alternately extended their allegiance to both parties in an effort to secure both autonomy 
and protection. This diversity of native opinion on how best to preserve their diplomatic 
and geographic positions frequently created sizable rifts between local leaders.
Despite its heavy emphasis on native alliances and military maneuvers, this work 
also examines the Revolution’s challenges to the rhythms of daily life, a final offering to 
conversations about the Native Americans of the eighteenth-century Ohio Valley. While 
settlers who lost their lives and property at the hands of the Indians received considerable 
attention from their contemporaries as well as historians, the destruction in native 
communities has been largely overlooked. In addition to physical ruin, wartime agendas 
altered economic patterns and sometimes even invaded cultural practices, threatening to 
constrict gender roles for women or to prevent nations from adopting captives to replace 
their deceased relatives. Although these disruptions often brought “Misery” with “no 
consolation on earth,” the tribes persisted in sustaining both their daily existence and their 
national identities, albeit in new locations.10
By highlighting the Indians’ varied responses to their rapidly changing world 
between 1768 and 1795, Ambiguous Alliances casts the entire revolutionary scenario in a 
different light. While the West rarely “captured the attention or the imagination of rebel
10 “Cherokee women to Arent Schuyler De Peyster, June 15, 1782,” Records Relating to Indian 
Affairs, Ser. 2: Minutes o f  Indian Affairs, 1755-90, vol. 13, National Archives o f Canada.
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9leaders,” it nevertheless represented one of the fundamental conflicts between the British 
and the Americans. Colonial leaders charged crown officials with unwarranted 
restriction on settlers’ opportunity to expand westward. The king’s representatives, who 
themselves often disagreed on the appropriate frontier policy, responded that expansion 
had to be slow to prevent another costly war with the Indians, and furthermore, they 
expected the colonies to contribute to the cost of peacekeeping measures west of the 
Appalachians. The Ohio Valley nations exacerbated this dispute by acting just as the 
cautionary diplomats feared: attacking British outposts, terrorizing travelers, hunters, and 
outlying settlers, and generally preventing agents from establishing clear British 
jurisdiction in the West.11
This wrangling over the crisis in the West quickly began to influence other 
policies in Britain’s North American empire. Before anything could be resolved, both 
eastern leaders and imperial statesmen became embroiled in related political and 
economic controversies that ultimately fixed both parties’ attention on coastal affairs and 
pushed frontier concerns to the background. By the time the colonists declared their 
independence, the existence of two sizable armies maneuvering in the heavily populated 
East made the West’s open spaces seem less significant. Often overlooked in this 
eastern-centered Revolution narrative, however, is the fact that trans-Appalachian chaos 
acted as a catalyst for many of the British and American positions and ideas that 
splintered the empire, if  nothing else, ensuring that the war would begin in the 1770s 
rather than at a future point. Also overlooked is the evidence that this chaos was fueled 
largely by the Ohio Valley’s native residents, who refused to allow land speculators or
11 Patrick Griffin, American Leviathan: Empire, Nation, and Revolutionary Frontier (New York: 
Hill and Wang, 2007), 129; Sosin, Whitehall and the Wilderness; Hinderaker, Elusive Empires.
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imperial agents to dictate the basic parameters of their lives and fostered considerable 
discord between colonists and the crown in the process.12
As the Revolution progressed, most congressmen and military leaders resolutely 
maintained that the British were their exclusive enemy. When western officials and 
settlers complained of Indian depredations, their petitions were often used to denounce 
the British for unleashing “Assassins, Murderers & Villains” on unsuspecting frontier 
families, rather than acknowledging that the fledgling nation might have more than one 
war at its doorstep. The British also tended to view the action in the Ohio Valley as 
ancillary to the eastern theater, but, in time, both sides developed schemes for this region 
intended to secure distinct military advantages. Sadly for the English-speaking 
strategists, native opposition foiled nearly every one of these plans. British officers who 
attempted to commandeer Indian troops and direct them against specific American targets 
discovered that their artillery and ammunition were instead used to further native war 
aims. Likewise, American armies bound for Detroit repeatedly found both their water 
and land routes blocked by pan-Indian forces.13
In addition to altering the revolutionary drama to include native instigators and 
Indian resistance that forced both sides to adjust their western strategies, this dissertation 
emphasizes that the Ohio Valley nations initiated much of the violent conflict in the 
region during the Revolution’s early years. Far from acting as British pawns or reacting
12 Woody Holton makes a similar argument in Forced Founders: Indians, Debtors, Slaves, and the 
Making o f  the American Revolution in Virginia (Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina Press, 1999), 
suggesting that frustrated land speculators pushed Virginians into the Revolution when the Indians 
continued to resist their encroachments. Patrick Griffin disagrees, arguing that “neither common settlers 
nor Indians” charted the British course for its officials; rather leaders like Lord Dunmore co-opted both 
groups to gain control over the West. American Leviathan, 99.
13 Paul H. Smith, et al, eds., Letters o f  Delegates to Congress, 1774-1789,26 vols. (Washington
D.C.: Library o f Congress, 1976-2000), 2:7. For examples o f  Indians thwarting carefully laid plans, see 
MPHC, 9:582, 10: 377-79, 394-95,419, 509-18, 530,19: 528-34, 528-47, 655, 658.
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to strikes against their towns, several tribes and other disgruntled war chiefs undertook 
their own war without the approval of British or American officials. Taking advantage of 
the jurisdictional chaos in their region, these leaders sought to disrupt the trespassers’ 
communities even further in the hope that the outsiders would be expelled and native land 
and sovereignty protected. Although all of the Ohio Valley nations eventually expressed 
some support for this war effort and continued to resist illegal settlement for a decade 
after the Treaty of Paris was signed, they were ultimately subdued because of their 
inability to agree on the best response to the growing American threat. By identifying 
and describing the Indians’ diverse strategies for protecting their interests, this project 
details the rise and fall of their “Twenty Years War.”14
The material in this dissertation is arranged in five chapters, with the first three 
covering the period chronologically and the last two addressing themes for the entire 
revolutionary era. Chapter One tracks the growing native dissatisfaction with the British 
between 1768 and 1774, particularly looking at Indian efforts to form confederacies 
capable of chastising the audacious Europeans as they had in 1763. The succeeding two 
chapters delve into native strategies for exploiting the Revolution and its equally divisive 
aftermath in an attempt to secure their land and sovereignty, both of which seemed to be 
slipping away. Chapter Four changes course and considers British and American 
intentions for the West. While this topic might seem out of place, it underscores the 
reality that Indians did not make decisions in a vacuum. Their enemies assumed a variety 
of roles and sought to impose their own ideals on the region, but in many cases native
14 Colin G. Calloway uses this term in his article, ‘“We Have Always Been the Frontier:’ The 
American Revolution in Shawnee Country,” American Indian Quarterly, 16 (1992), 47.
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initiatives thwarted carefully laid plans from Philadelphia or London. The final chapter 
scrutinizes the experience of war in Indian towns, seeking to uncover the impact of nearly 
three decades of violent conflict on already struggling communities. Taken together, 
these chapters offer glimpses of tragedy and triumph, alliances and ambushes, authority 
and insecurity, and cultural and political loss and persistence, all part of the fraying fabric 
of native life in the revolutionary Ohio Valley.
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Chapter One:
Common Grievances
Sir William Johnson waited restlessly at Fort Stanwix in mid-October 1768. It 
had been nearly a year and a half since the Six Nations had agreed to extend the western 
boundaries of Pennsylvania and Maryland beyond the Allegheny Mountains. Despite 
considerable turmoil in Indian affairs during those intervening months, boundary-line 
plans dividing Indian and white territory remained intact. The Six Nations had 
reaffirmed their support for the land cession in April, and a month later Johnson informed 
his superior officer, Gen. Thomas Gage, that he hoped to convene the Shawnees, 
Delawares, Six Nations of New York, and Senecas living on the Ohio at the end of July 
to formally conclude this important business. By mid-October, however, Johnson had 
postponed the conference three times and was forced to concede that his multi-national 
congress might not materialize, since the principal Shawnee and Delaware chiefs had 
opted to visit some Mississippi tribes rather than trek to New York. Part optimist, part 
opportunist, Johnson chose to ignore these ill omens and forged ahead with his boundary- 
line enterprise.1
While Johnson tarried at Fort Stanwix and anticipated adding considerable 
acreage to Britain’s already-sprawling empire, a party of Wabash Indians signaled their 
displeasure at English trespassing. Encountering a group of hunters from Fort Chartres in 
the Illinois country, who had clearly surpassed their orders to procure meat for the 
garrison, the Indians killed most of the invaders, returning to St. Vincent with nine scalps
1 Clarence Edwin Carter, ed., The Correspondence o f  General Thomas Gage with the Secretaries 
ofState, 1763-1775 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1931) 1: 142, 173, 193,207; James Sullivan, et. 
al., eds., The Papers o f  Sir William Johnson, 14 vols. (Albany: State University o f New York, 1921-1963), 
6: 307,316, 333.
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and eight horseloads of peltry. The same party attacked some Virginia long hunters on 
the Green River in Kentucky shortly thereafter. Gage was outraged by these murders and 
refused to be mollified even after one of his Cherokee interpreters pointed out that the 
Fort Chartres soldiers had been instructed to hunt buffalo and instead had been gathering 
bear, beaver, and deer skins. To Gage the fall of 1768 was supposed to be a time of 
British expansion and a new era of peaceful relations with the western Indians. To the 
Ohio Valley residents, however, expansion and peace were irreconcilable, and they
<y
intended to make their claims evident to all observers.
The Wabash assault on intruding English hunters was not unexpected in October 
1768. Tension between Indians and whites had not subsided when the British officially 
expelled the French from the region west of the Appalachians after the Seven Years’
War. Having fought together with the French, many of the Ohio Indians maintained their 
alliance, registering their opposition to British rule by participating in Pontiac’s Rebellion 
and successfully capturing every fort beyond the mountains except Detroit, Niagara, and 
Pitt. In response the British marched two sizable armies into Indian territory, forced the 
most active belligerents to surrender, and brokered several peace agreements. By the 
time Cols. Henry Bouquet and John Bradstreet returned eastward with their troops, and 
Johnson and his deputy George Croghan inked their treaties in 1765 and 1766, the British 
were confident that they had secured control of the entire Ohio River basin. In their 
minds they had overawed the Indians with their military might and at the same time
2 Gage Papers, 1: 199-200.
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altered some of their policies, such as restricting trade to designated posts, that seemed to 
be the source of Native grievances. Surely a prosperous and peaceful reign lay ahead.3
The Indians were not convinced. While the army’s presence did create fear in 
Delaware, Shawnee, and other native villages, it also produced a new surge o f anger. 
That anger mixed potently with lingering confidence from the fact that they had indeed 
been cowed but not conquered. Their organization, military strategy, and creativity 
without the support of a formal European ally had perhaps alarmed the British more than 
the previous decade’s intercontinental clash. In 1767 Johnson fretted that the Indians •' 
seemed more discontent than they had for many years.4 The question for chiefs from 
Kaskaskia to Kuskuski was how to channel that discontent into a coherent response to 
British authority. To answer that question each nation needed to determine what they 
could expect from these outsiders who claimed to have dominion over their lands.
In the Illinois country both Indians and French habitants had the luxury of 
knowing that they could escape the British entirely by simply moving across the 
Mississippi River. Their remote location prevented the British from occupying Fort 
Chartres until 1765, and even then Indian resistance stymied the development of a strong 
English trading presence. By June 1768 Gage recommended that Fort Chartres be 
abandoned, despite the fact that it was his empire’s best-constructed fort in the North 
American interior. Its purposes, he told Secretary of State Hillsborough, were to exert 
some semblance of control over the Illinois inhabitants and to act as a supply depot for
3 Michael N. McConnell, A Country Between: The Upper Ohio Valley and Its Peoples, 1724-1774 
(Lincoln: University o f Nebraska Press, 1992), 182-206; Gregory Evans Dowd, War Under Heaven: 
Pontiac, the Indian Nations, & the British Empire (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002); 
Colin G. Calloway, The Scratch o f  a Pen: 1763 and the Transformation o f  North America (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2006).
4 Gage Papers, 1: 142.
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eastern trading companies. Since neither of these goals was being accomplished and the 
post’s maintenance depended on the unlikely prospect of remaining at peace with all the 
Indian nations flanking the Ohio who possessed the power to disrupt river traffic, Gage 
advocated withdrawal.5
The Illinois Indians were not privy to Whitehall’s deliberations, but they would 
have made the same assessment of the empire’s competence in their region. They 
recognized that bold statements about British dominance failed to match the reality of 
British instability. Plenty of French traders living in the area could supply them with 
necessary goods without subjecting them to trade restrictions or galling challenges to 
their sovereignty. Under these conditions, the British appeared to be unnecessary and 
vulnerable but still potentially dangerous, all good reasons to seek their expulsion.
Joining the Illinois and Kaskaskia Indians in their opposition to the English 
newcomers, the Miamis, Piankeshaws, Kickapoos, and Mascoutens on the Wabash River 
and the Potawatomis at St. Joseph were perhaps even more overt in their objections to 
British efforts to rule in their territory. As a precursor to the Wabash tribes’ attack on the 
Fort Chartres soldiers, several Potawatomis killed two English traders in May 1768. 
Although Gage blamed local French traders for stirring up the Indians against European 
competitors, the French insisted that the impetus for the attack came from the 
Potawatomis themselves, citing a recent council where the Indians declared that they 
would not allow any English traders in their midst.6
5 Gage Papers, 1: 177. For more information on the British in the Illinois country, see Eric 
Hinderaker, Elusive Empires: Constructing Colonialism in the Ohio Valley, 1673-1800 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997).
6 Gage Papers, 1:173-74.
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In the Illinois and Wabash countries, resistance to British attempts to establish a 
profitable and authoritative presence added a new layer of unrest to an already volatile 
region. Outsider native groups generally encountered similar hostility if they threatened 
any area residents, Indian or French. When a Seneca traveling from Illinois through 
Miami territory on the Upper Wabash killed his French companion during a quarrel, the 
local Miami Indians successfully persuaded their French neighbors to avenge the man’s 
death by executing the Seneca wayfarer. Scattered incidents such as this paled in 
comparison to the ongoing war with the Cherokees to the south. Shortly before the Fort 
Stanwix Treaty, a Cherokee party killed nineteen French and Indians in the Illinois 
country, captured several French prisoners, and also destroyed a group of eight 
Virginians and two or three Frenchmen near the Ohio River. The British interpreted 
these violent scenes as evidence that their governance was sorely needed to establish 
order and a peaceful society. The Miamis, Illinois, Piankeshaws, and other nations, 
however, viewed the British as new outsiders who threatened to disrupt local relations 
even further should they choose to throw their weight behind an adversary.7
East of the Illinois and Wabash regions where English traders, soldiers, and 
government officials were planted more thickly and firmly, the Indians lodged slightly 
different complaints. At Fort Pitt in the summer of 1767, numerous Shawnees,
Delawares, Mingos, and Senecas objected to the rapid encroachment of settlers onto land 
well beyond the 1763 line dividing Indian and white territory. The fertile valleys south of
7 Ibid., 143, 186. Richard White argues that internecine warfare tended to drive disputing Indians 
to seek a European mediator, thus continually reaffirming the alliance system and acknowledging the 
French and later the English to be “Fathers.” This does not seem to be the case in the Wabash-Cherokee 
conflict, even after the Cherokees strengthened their connection to the British. See Richard White, The 
Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), 299-305.
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Pittsburgh on tributaries of the Monongahela River had particularly attracted white 
farmers who not only violated Indian hunting grounds but interfered with the passage of 
various nations to and from war with southern tribes. As Gage explained in a letter to 
Secretary of State Shelburne, these Indians contended that “the Country Westward of the 
Allegany Mountains was their Property, that they never ceded it to the King, o r to any of 
his Subjects, but that the white People had settled there, contrary to solemn Engagements 
and in Violation of the Peace.” Furthermore, they suggested that since the British 
government had laws to control its people, they were convinced that if the leaders were
o
“sincerely inclined” to prevent settlement, they could bring it to a halt.
After scolding various authorities at Fort Pitt, several chiefs accompanied a 
detachment of soldiers and the commanding officer, Charles Edmonstone, to a  meeting 
with approximately a hundred of these recent invaders. Edmonstone declared them to be 
trespassing on Indian land, despite previous directions to remove, and ordered them to 
leave immediately. The chiefs added urgency to the situation, explaining that heretofore 
they had managed to restrain their young men who were eager to destroy the illegal 
settlements, but they could not guarantee their success much longer. The people 
promised to depart, and on the return trip to Fort Pitt, Edmonstone dispatched several 
parties to help them keep their promise by destroying “as many Hutts as they could find.” 
By January 1768, however, Gage reported that the “Intruders” had returned along with 
“some hundreds more.” Undoubtedly, the Indians were aware of their reappearance long 
before news of it crossed Gage’s desk.9
8 Gage Papers, 1: 147.
9 Ibid., 148, 157.
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Already angry that the British failed to remove the offending settlers or provide 
any redress for the growing number of murders committed by these same individuals, the 
Shawnees, Delawares, and other upper Ohio Indians began to fear that this inactivity 
indicated that the English were preparing for war. In early May 1768, Johnson’s deputy, 
George Croghan, met with a number of “Sulky and very much discontented” Shawnee 
chiefs and warriors who informed him that they and the Delawares intended to remain 
peaceful, although they were convinced the English were planning to attack.10
Faced with a British neighbor who appeared to be flexing its military muscles yet 
had proven unwilling or unable to enforce its own rules regarding settlement, the Indians 
pondered the best course of action. More cautious leaders opted to employ the 
established channels for addressing grievances, namely, meeting at recognized council 
fires and hammering out solutions. Others advocated retaliation for the death of their 
friends and relatives, most easily accomplished by attacking boats on the Ohio River.11
Between these two extremes was a more calculated response. As early as the fall 
of 1767, the Shawnees circulated belts inviting all the Ohio Valley tribes from the Great 
Lakes to the Mississippi to a conference at their towns on the Scioto River the following 
spring. Upon hearing of this congress scheduled and conducted beyond his control, 
Johnson sent Croghan from Philadelphia to the Ohio Country to figure out the root of the 
Indians’ grievances. Although he missed much of the private counseling between 
disgruntled nations, Croghan managed to bring together the Shawnees, Delawares,
10 Ibid., 175.
11 Ibid., 157-58.
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Mingos, and other Ohio tribes along with some commissioners from Pennsylvania at 
Pittsburgh in April 1768.12
Here the British learned three things that should have signaled future trouble: 
first, they discovered that in addition to objecting to encroaching settlers, the Shawnees 
insisted that the English forts be demolished; second, they were forced to acknowledge 
that the Indians had noticed their increased navigation on the Ohio and wanted such 
activity curbed; third, they received confirmation that the Shawnees and nations to the 
west were likely collaborating. Despite these ominous signs, the conference moderators 
declared the event successful in avoiding a general Indian war and ameliorating all the 
Indians’ concerns except the problem of illegal settlement, which they fully expected to 
be resolved at the upcoming boundary treaty at Fort Stanwix.13
Johnson, Croghan, Gage, and other British authorities who dealt with Indian 
affairs undoubtedly hoped that this optimistic appraisal of the 1768 Fort Pitt conference 
meant that private counseling in the woods would now be unnecessary. The Indians 
would be pleased to cultivate relationships with the English rather than seek out fellow 
native malcontents. Instead of keeping the British in the dark about their proceedings, the 
Indians would now welcome monitoring from crown officials. As soon as the boundary 
line separating Indian from white territory could be established, all grievances would be 
redressed and a flourishing trade would keep all parties satisfied.
Although Johnson waited at Fort Stanwix with these expectations in place, the 
Shawnees, Delawares, Miamis, Potawatomis, Illinois, and other nations in the greater
12 Ibid., 151-53, 165-66, 170,181.
13 Ibid., 181-82.
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Ohio Valley saw no reason to share his assumptions. The British had consistently failed 
to enforce the existing boundary line, so the promise of a redrawn map to protect Indian 
land sounded hollow. In addition to destroying Indian confidence in British reliability, 
their negligence regarding wandering settlers prompted many tribal leaders to question 
why they were so unsuccessful in controlling their populace. Perhaps the English were 
biding their time before attacking native villages and claiming land by force. For those 
tribes too remote to fear a military threat and still connected to alternative sources of 
trade goods, the British seemed to be superfluous peddlers at best and disruptive land 
jobbers at worst.
This skepticism of British motives and trustworthiness prompted most Ohio 
Valley leaders to skip the trip to Fort Stanwix. Johnson interpreted their reluctance to 
attend as fear of the Six Nations and dismissed their absence flippantly. When it looked 
in late August as though the principal Shawnee and Delaware chiefs would not return 
from their visit to the Mississippi tribes in time to come to New York, he told Gage that 
he saw no “particular Necessity of their being present, As the Six Nations are the 
undoubted Owners of the Lands, and considered as Such by the rest.”14
While the Shawnees and Delawares were deemed unessential to the treaty 
proceedings, the Illinois, Piankeshaws, Miamis, and other Wabash tribes were not even 
invited. In the spring Johnson had specifically hoped to meet with the Six Nations, 
Shawnees, Delawares, and Mingos because those were all the nations who “have either 
Claim or Pretensions to the Lands, which are to be ceded at the final Settlement o f the 
Boundary Line, between the Provinces and the Indian hunting Grounds.” At the time he
14Sullivan, e d Johnson Papers, 6: 307, 333; Gage Papers, 1: 193.
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had been charged by the Board of Trade to draw the line from the headwaters o f the 
Delaware River in New York, across the West Branch of the Susquehanna River in 
Pennsylvania, down the Allegheny River to the Ohio River, and from there to the 
Kanawha River in present-day West Virginia, a boundary that would have hardly affected 
the Wabash and Illinois tribes. Geography gave Johnson a convenient excuse to exclude 
the nations on the lower Ohio, but he was also aware that those people were decidedly 
anti-British and could have made his negotiations much more difficult.15
By the time Johnson finally opened the council in late October, over three 
thousand Indians had arrived. Affairs proceeded smoothly, largely because the tiny 
Delaware and Shawnee contingents were generally excluded from the transactions. 
Johnson focused his attention on the Six Nations representatives who were eager to 
affirm their claim to all the lands along the Ohio River and interested in keeping the 
boundary line far from their own territory, goals that Johnson also desired. For him the 
only incident marring the treaty was the arrival of intelligence regarding disaffection 
among the Wabash and Mississippi tribes and their potential alliance with France and 
Spain against the English.16
If Johnson worried about the Indian attack on the Fort Chartres soldiers or the 
rumors of a combined Indian, French, and Spanish attack, he did not allow his concerns 
to interfere with his boundary-line plans. In a bold move, he departed from his 
instructions from the Board of Trade and extended the line past the Kanawha River all
15 Gage Papers, 1: 173; Helen Hombeck Tanner, ed., Atlas o f  Great Lakes Indian History 
(Norman, OK: University o f Oklahoma Press, 1987), 57-60.
16 Tanner, ed., Atlas o f  Great Lakes Indian History, 57; “Treaty of Fort Stanwix Proceedings,” reel 
A-611, Frederick Haldimand Papers, National Archives o f  Canada; Hinderaker, Elusive Empires, 169; 
Gage Papers, 1: 207.
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the way to the Tennessee River, enabling the British to claim the entire region of 
“Kentucke” for white settlement. Although he insisted that the change resulted from the 
Six Nations’ desire to prove their undisputed right to the lands south of the Ohio River by 
ceding them to the crown, Johnson believed that the additional land would be necessary 
to contain the rapidly spreading colonists. Four years later he admitted that he had 
pushed for the land cession because he thought the British government would lose 
credibility when settlers persisted in ignoring its injunctions to refrain from crossing the 
Kanawha River. Regardless of the source of the revised boundary line, it now threatened 
to alienate the Illinois, Kaskaskias, Piankeshaws, Weas, Kickapoos, and other nations in 
the Wabash valley in addition to the Shawnees and Delawares.17
Since these tribes were already disgruntled, Johnson knew he would have to take 
special precautions to prevent the situation from worsening. Toward the end of the treaty 
proceedings, he addressed the Shawnee and Delaware delegations, warning them not to 
listen to bad stories or belts, particularly those that spoke of the French returning to 
power. He assured them that the British would always be able to conquer the French if 
they should attempt to regain their old territory, and exhorted the Shawnees and 
Delawares to inform him of the nations responsible for propagating anti-British 
messages. All they needed to do to preserve their health and happiness, he said, was to 
remember their “Engagements with the English,” avoid frontier conflicts, pay attention to 
the boundary line and acquaint their people of its course, keep the roads and waters open 
to white travelers, and live in peace with the Cherokees, the last being a secondary
17 Tanner, ed., Atlas o f  Great Lakes Indian History, 58-60; Gage Papers, 1; 209; K.G. Davies, ed., 
Documents o f  the American Revolution, 1770-1783,19 vols. (Shannon: Irish University Press, 1972), 5: 
213.
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purpose for the gathering at Fort Stanwix. At a meeting at Johnson Hall two weeks later, 
he added one more responsibility: they were to confront any of the western nations who 
actively opposed the king.18
Despite Johnson’s admonitions, none of the tribes along the Ohio River responded 
favorably to the Fort Stanwix treaty. The huge swath of land acquired by the English 
included valuable Delaware, Mingo, Munsee, and Seneca hunting ground in 
Pennsylvania and Virginia, Shawnee and Cherokee hunting ground in eastern Kentucky, 
and Piankeshaw, Wea, Kickapoo, Kaskaskia, and Illinois hunting ground below the falls 
of the Ohio, totaling far more acres than these nations had been led to believe. Although 
no active Indian villages lay within the land cession, many had only recently been 
vacated and re-established nearby, leaving the former territory still in use for hunting, 
fishing, and traveling for war, diplomacy, or trade.19
In addition to losing more land than they expected, these nations endured the 
insult of seeing payment for the territory given to the Six Nations. During the next few 
years, the Shawnees, Delawares, and Wabash Indians protested vigorously, directing their 
ire against both the British and the Six Nations, who had “shamefully taken all the money 
and goods to themselves and not shared any part thereof with them though the most part 
of the country which was sold was their hunting-ground down the Ohio.” Many Ohio 
Indians accused the Six Nations of being slaves to the white people, first the French and
18 “Treaty o f Fort Stanwix Proceedings,” reel A -611, Haldimand Papers', Sullivan, ed., Johnson 
Papers, 12: 632-34.
19 Tanner, ed., Atlas o f  Great Lakes Indian History, 58-59. For Indian settlements in Kentucky, 
see A. Gwynn Henderson, “Dispelling the Myth: Seventeenth and Eighteenth-Century Indian Life in 
Kentucky,” Register o f  the Kentucky Historical Society 90 (1992): 1-25, and Lucien Beckner, 
“Eskippakithiki: The Last Indian Town in Kentucky,” Filson Club History Quarterly 6, no. 4 (1932): 355- 
82.
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then the English, while at the same time pretending to be overlords of the Ohio Valley 
and fomenting dissent between the western Indians and the British.20
Animosity toward the Six Nations and the English combined with frustration over 
the loss of land created a stronger regional identity among the Ohio, Wabash, and Illinois 
tribes. While they certainly retained distinct cultural and economic concerns, they shared 
a sense of betrayal from the Onondaga council, a deepening suspicion of the British who 
had never appeared entirely trustworthy, and a fear that farmers’ cabins would continue 
to sprout along fertile waterways. Their commonalities extended beyond grievances and 
positions of weakness. On the positive side, they were linked by access to the Ohio 
River, living on lands that enabled them to control the flow of traffic. The British openly 
admitted that in the event of war with the Shawnees or Delawares, they would be unable 
to supply Fort Chartres. This power galvanized the tribes and contributed to their
9 1recognition of the entire area as integral to their interests.
The Fort Stanwix Treaty not only helped to forge a new regional identity but 
increased the urgency for the Ohio nations to decide how to respond to the British. In 
addition to creating controversy over conflicting land claims, the treaty’s outcome stirred 
up other existing issues. Foremost among Indian concerns was the horde of settlers that 
seemingly paid no regard to jurisdiction and now had received license to move even more 
brazenly onto land the Indians considered their own. These newcomers threatened native 
livelihood by building cabins and planting crops on land where game had been abundant 
and competing for the animals that still remained. Economic hostility paled in
™DAR, 2 :22  (quote), 24-25, 3: 85, 5: 60-61,135; “Johnson to Haldimand, June 30, 1773,” reel A- 
611, Haldimand Papers.
21 Gage Papers, 1: 177.
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comparison to the culture of Indian-hating that dominated frontier communities since the 
brutal wars of the 1750s and 1760s, creating an adversarial tone for most Indian-white 
relations and increasing the number of murders, thefts, and assaults on both sides.
Unlike the Six Nations in the North or the Cherokee, Creek, and Catawba in the 
South, the western Indians had no resident superintendent to mediate in the event of 
murder, robbery, or trespassing. Consequently, they felt particularly vulnerable as 
transient frontiersmen and surveyors seemed to operate outside the bounds of colonial 
government. At the Fort Stanwix Treaty the Ohio Indians witnessed an additional benefit 
to having a European advocate. To them it was no coincidence that Johnson, who lived
• •  ♦ • I ?among the Iroquois, chose to support the Six Nations version of land rights.
If uninvited settlers generated the most disgust in Indian villages, unscrupulous 
traders were not far behind. In addition to their usual schemes to swindle dependent 
customers, many traders in the late 1760s used the colonial non-importation agreements 
as a convenient excuse to raise their prices far beyond market value. Non-importation 
never seemed to prevent rum from reaching native towns, however, creating further 
opportunities for Indians to be cheated out of valuable land and peltry. Delegation after 
delegation complained to Johnson in New York or his deputies Croghan and Alexander 
McKee at Fort Pitt about these abuses in the trade, but few alterations seemed to be 
forthcoming. Although the Fort Stanwix Treaty dealt primarily with boundaries and 
alliances, it nevertheless revealed that many provincial governors and council members,
22 David L. Preston, “The Texture o f Contact: Indian and European Settler Communities on the 
Iroquoian Borderlands, 1720-1780” (Ph.D. diss., College o f  William and Mary, 2002), 226-44. Gage 
Papers, 1: 142-43, 152,239,260,268-69.
23Samuel Hazard, ed., Minutes o f  the Provincial Council o f  Pennsylvania, 16 vols. (Harrisburg; 
Theophilus Fenn & Co., 1838-1853) 10: 11; “Treaty o f Fort Stanwix Proceedings,” reel A -611, Haldimand 
Papers-, DAR, 3: 254-55, 5: 203-04.
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who had been entrusted with regulating the Indian trade, were more interested in 
acquiring land than in protecting the exchange interests of the land’s owners.24
Despite the litany of grievances against the British and the growing urgency to 
seek reparations, the question of how to respond to these injustices still lacked a definite 
answer. In the three years since Pontiac’s Rebellion had been formally silenced, 
discontented murmurings often permeated the forests, but trade was on the rise as well.
At Detroit in 1767, officers reported that Indians near the Great Lakes had brought in 
more peltry than they had for many years. Even the Wabash and Illinois tribes who dealt 
primarily with French traders faced the prospect of large British trading companies 
subsuming the independent operators living in Indian villages. Although there were 
benefits to English dominance of the market (like cheap goods), most tribes continued to 
distrust a partner that ignored their interests and insisted on declaring its sovereignty over 
peoples it could barely recognize.
Distrust, however, failed to dictate a particular response. Remembering the 
aftermath of Pontiac’s Rebellion and benefiting from a robust trade, many chiefs were 
reluctant to engage in violence against the British. Other leaders and prominent warriors 
believed that since the crown was abdicating its obligation to dispense justice, they had 
no means of redress for their grievances save retaliatory attacks on remote settlers or river 
travelers. As the number of frontier murders committed against Indians increased
24“Unknown Indian to George Croghan, March 7,1771,” Ser. 1, lot 668, Superintendent for Indian 
Affairs Papers, National Archives o f Canada; DAR, 2: 164-65,256-57,3: 252-55, 5: 32, 6: 121-27; 
“Johnson to Haldimand, June 30, 1773,” reel A-611, Haldimand Papers; Gage Papers, 1:268-69.
25Gage Papers, 1: 148; Louise Phelps Kellogg, The British Regime in Wisconsin and the 
Northwest (Madison, WI: State Historical Society o f Wisconsin, 1935).
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between 1764 and 1768, native resentment also swelled, only to be fueled even more by 
the Fort Stanwix Treaty.26
Instead of ushering in a new era of peaceful relations between Indians and whites, 
the treaty seemed to make disgruntled nations more vocal. Complaints regarding trade 
and the distribution of presents poured into Detroit, Fort Pitt, and Fort Chartres during the 
first half of 1769, often including veiled threats to attack white settlements should their 
pleas be ignored. At first Gage dismissed the news as simply native rhetoric designed to 
frighten the English into dispensing more gifts. But when word arrived in August that the 
famous Pontiac had been killed by an Illinois Indian, that four or five Illinois were killed 
by other nations, and five to six hundred Indians were milling about Fort Chartres waiting 
to witness the ramifications of Pontiac’s death, he began to be more concerned. Trouble 
in the Illinois country was compounded by the continuing hostility of the Wabash 
Indians, who boasted of having hundreds of warriors patrolling the Ohio River, some of 
whom had recently attacked another English trading vessel and captured its cargo 27
To the east warning signs of Indian unrest also seemed abundant. In September 
Gage reported to Hillsborough that Indians on the upper Ohio were unhappy. “The 
Cession Made of their Lands by the Six Nations at the Treaty of Fort-Stanwix, is generaly 
assigned as the Cause of their Discontent. I understand that the Six Nations took all the 
Purchase Money to themselves, that their Claim to the Lands of the Ohio Indians is 
derived from an Antient Right of Conquest; which tho’ acknowledged by the other 
Nations, they could not see their Lands disposed of to us, without Jealousy and disgust,
26Gage Papers, 1: 152,157.
21 Ibid., 227, 230,233.
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more particularly as they received little or no Share of the Money paid for them,” he 
explained. Even more ominous was the fact that these angry Shawnees, Mingos, and 
Delawares were rumored to have formed an alliance with the Wabash nations, although 
Gage believed that this confederacy might have been created as much to handle disputes 
among the Indians as to cause mischief for the English. “[T]here is Reason to believe,” 
he hinted, “that there is a Misunderstanding amongst the Nations, and it may be our 
Interest at present rather to encourage.”28
While Gage remained detached and confident about Indian affairs, his 
subordinates living near the tribes expressed considerably more anxiety. On January 1, 
1770, Croghan penned a nervous letter to Gage. The Indians “have been very constant in 
private councils and very reserved to their most intimate friends amongst the traders,” he 
fretted. Furthermore, they “have been purchasing up powder and lead all fall for their 
peltry, and likewise offering their horses for ammunition, which is very uncommon, and I 
think discovers a design of an open rupture in the spring. They purchased no goods from 
any of the traders but ammunition, of which they are laying up great quantities.” He also 
speculated that the Hurons, Ottawas, Chippewas, and Potawatomis were about to secure a 
peace agreement with the Cherokees, a move that potentially endangered the carefully 
cultivated Six Nations-Cherokee peace upon which the British based their hopes for 
frontier tranquility.29
Croghan’s fears were not unwarranted. Growing frustration and suspicion had 
prompted the Shawnees, Delawares, and Mingos to summon all those nations
28 Ibid., 235-36.
29DAR, 2: 21-22.
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sympathetic to their concerns about the British to a conference at the Shawnee towns on 
the Scioto River in the fall of 1770. Deputies trekked to the Hurons (Wyandots),
Ottawas, Chippewas, and Potawatomis living near Detroit, the Miamis, Piankeshaws, 
Kickapoos, and Mascoutens on the Wabash River, and the Cherokees and Creeks in the 
South. At each stop they expounded on the injustice of the Fort Stanwix Treaty and 
urged their fellow Indians to make peace with each other so they could collectively direct 
their ire toward the British.30
Particularly vital to the success of their mission was securing a peace between the 
Wabash tribes and the Cherokees. Given the prolonged animosity between these two 
groups and the frequent crossings of the Ohio River for the purpose of war with each 
other, this would have been a daunting task at any time, but recent events made the 
prospect even more remote. In 1768 the Cherokees had formally aligned themselves with 
the Six Nations. Calling upon this new alliance, Cherokee deputies traveled to New York 
in August 1769 and requested that Johnson summon the Six Nations and the Canadian 
confederacies to join them in attacking their enemies on the Wabash. At the formal 
council in November, the Iroquois chiefs deferred to Johnson, so the Cherokees presented 
their case to the superintendent, pointing out that British traders had been victims of 
Wabash warriors and arguing that the English had as much reason to go to war against 
these western tribes as they did. As a crown official charged with maintaining peaceful 
Indian relations, Johnson hesitated to condone war, but the Cherokee fervency in seeking 
the Wabash tribes’ destruction frightened him. If he refused assistance, they might turn 
their arms against the British. “It is a disagreeable circumstance that we must either
30 Ibid., 22,24-25, 87 ,105 ,147 ,169 .
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agree to permit these people to cut each other’s throats or risk their discharging their fury 
on our traders and defenceless frontiers,” he complained to Hillsborough. Johnson and 
the Six Nations managed to stall for nearly six more months before finally ignoring the
■j -I
poignant appeals to the true meaning of alliance and declining the Cherokee request.
While Johnson wrung his hands in New York, the Shawnees sought to reconcile 
the two groups with an eye toward challenging British authority. They began by 
beseeching the Indians near Detroit to make peace with both parties. That embassy 
yielded some success, despite the fact that the Cherokees’ open alliance with the 
suddenly unpopular Six Nations generated more sympathy for the Wabash cause. This 
apparent progress toward a united front was checked, however, when the principal 
Cherokee warriors rebuffed the Delaware and Shawnee mediators who visited their 
villages in the spring and urged them to make peace with the Wabash nations.32
In addition to brokering peace agreements between the southern and western 
nations, a second priority for the 1770 emissaries was to hide their movements and 
intentions from the British. On this count they had mixed success. Reports about 
mysterious Shawnee deputies turning up in various towns circulated rapidly, sparking a 
flurry of correspondence between British officials about potential threats to the frontier. 
When Indian agents attempted to uncover the purpose of the proposed congress, they 
never received a direct answer. Most assumed that the Shawnees and Delawares were 
leading a movement to create a western confederacy designed to “shake the fidelity of the
31 Ibid., 37-38, 164.
32 Ibid., 22,24,  87,95.
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Six Nations” to the English cause. Lest this sound dangerous, Gage assured his superiors 
that his Indian officers had declared the plan to be quite “impracticable.”33
By October the Scioto conference was over and intelligence regarding its 
proceedings began to trickle into British headquarters. Spies reported that “all the 
Western tribes over the Lakes and about Lake Michigan as well as the Oubache Indians 
had unanimously agreed to make peace with the Cherokees and other Southern nations.” 
Perhaps annoyed that his superintendents had been overly optimistic about the 
conference’s sure failure, Gage reproved John Stuart, the southern superintendent for 
Indian affairs. “You see that the Shawnese deputies have not worked in vain,”  he said. 
Indeed, this “scheme of the Shawnese to form a confederacy of all the Western and 
Southern nations is a notable piece of policy, for nothing less would enable them to 
withstand the Six Nations and their allies against whom they have been much exasperated 
on account of the boundary treaty held at Fort Stanwix.”34
This news of an apparently viable western confederacy agreeing to make peace 
with the Cherokees at the same time that the Six Nations had refused Cherokee overtures 
for assistance against the Wabash tribes alarmed British authorities. Reports from Fort 
Pitt that Indian visitors were civil but “reserved and sulky,” and persistent rumors that the 
Ohio Valley Indians were still counseling and sending belts after their conference caused 
apprehension that frontier diplomacy would be reduced to a struggle between the Six 
Nations confederacy and the fledgling Shawnee confederacy for Cherokee loyalty.35
33 Ibid., 87,105,147,164-69; Gage Papers, 1: 260.
34 DAR, 2: 204.
35 Ibid., 204, 237,253-54.
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In October and November 1770 the Cherokees seemed to be wavering. Because 
of their alliance with the Six Nations, they had refrained from raising objections to the 
Fort Stanwix Treaty, despite the fact that the Kentucky cession included their hunting 
grounds. Since they were already involved in a boundary dispute with Virginia and had 
now met opposition from their supposed allies, Gage worried that anger over the sale of 
their territory might finally push them into the Shawnee camp. His fears seemed to be 
confirmed in late October when Stuart reported to Virginia’s governor Botetourt about 
his efforts to redraw the boundary line between that colony and the Cherokees. “I beg 
leave to observe to your lordship that the bad effects of underhand machinations and 
private tampering with the Indians appeared throughout the whole course of the 
transaction. It is the first instance of any nation having shown a reluctancy to treat with 
me, it is the only one of my having failed in carrying a point with the Cherokees.”36
Fearing that the western Indians were “becoming better acquainted with their own 
strength and united capacity to preserve their importance and check our advance into 
their country,” Johnson hurried to deliver a counterblow to the belts and embassies sent 
from the Shawnees to the Cherokees. First, he sent Six Nations messengers to confront 
the Wabash nations about their hostility toward the Cherokees, a promise he had made in 
August to placate the Cherokees after refusing to join them in war. He directed another 
group of Iroquois ambassadors to the Scioto River to compile a comprehensive report on 
the recent gathering and to present the British in a positive light. Finally, he 
acknowledged the Six Nations’ own desire to repair the damaged relationship with the
36 Ibid., 204,237 (quote).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
34
Cherokees and permitted their warriors to march southward, rendezvous in the Cherokee 
towns, and assault “any people that nation shall desire them to strike.”37
The increased traffic to Cherokee villages created considerable consternation for 
various British administrators. Leaders at Fort Pitt marveled at the sizable Iroquois 
contingents and worried that they intended to attack the Cherokees or perhaps fall under 
the influence of the western confederacy. Alexander Cameron, Stuart’s deputy among 
the Cherokees, struggled to distinguish the “Northerns” from the “Westerns,” claiming 
that some of these outsiders had encouraged attacks on white settlers. Stuart responded 
by chiding him to pay more careful attention to exactly which Indians were in council 
and encouraging him to do all he could to bolster the connection to the northern tribes 
and alienate the western nations. Back in New York, Johnson continued to emphasize the 
“serious nature” of a potential native union, arguing that if the individual tribes could 
cripple the empire a few years before, surely such a “formidable alliance” would forecast 
doom for the crown, especially given the current weak state of defense.38
In March 1771 Johnson’s deputy Croghan solicited information from a Shawnee 
chief that drew British attention back to the Ohio Valley. At first the man was reluctant 
to divulge his secret, but he eventually admitted that “tis true we have all agreed last Fall 
to strike the English, it has been a long time in agitation, now Nine Years since we first 
thought of it.” He went on to recount the various grievances of the past decade: 
missionaries suspected of stealing their land, settlers on their hunting grounds, and the 
French and the Six Nations concluding treaties without the consent of all the tribes.
37 Ibid., 166, 254 (second quote); 3: 39-41 (first quote at 40).
38 Ibid., 2: 253-54, 3: 38 ,40 (quote), 43. On February 28, 1771 Georgia’s governor James Wright 
reported that there had been seventy northern and western emissaries visiting the Cherokees. Gage Papers, 
1:293.
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Then he added a new wrinkle to the intelligence regarding the 1770 Scioto conference: 
the impetus for the gathering last fall actually came from the Six Nations, who sent belts 
to the Shawnees and Delawares urging them to unite all the western and southern nations. 
If all the parties were united in four years, the Six Nations would join the alliance and 
“drive the English out of the country over the Great Mountain.”
When this account reached Johnson later in the year, he confronted Iroquois 
leaders who flatly denied the whole story. By October Gage was relating to Hillsborough 
that apparently some disgruntled members of the Six Nations had distributed belts in the 
name of the entire Onondaga council. Upon further inquiry and the return of his deputies 
from the Ohio, Johnson concluded in April 1772 that the Shawnees and a renegade 
Seneca chief named Gaustarax had mutually incited trouble on the frontier by denouncing 
the Fort Stanwix treaty and calling for united action against the British. Since Gaustarax 
was now dead and most of the rogue belts had been collected, the matter seemed to be 
resolved. Indeed, after the Shawnees had agreed to hold another conference to acquaint 
the various tribes of the Six Nations’ genuine sentiments, Johnson believed the affair to 
be closed.40
This complicated episode consumed significant British time and attention, 
masking the fact that it was merely one subplot within the increasingly chaotic state of 
Indian relations. In their efforts to determine a coherent policy for the new regions 
supposedly under their authority, English administrators labeled the competition for 
Cherokee loyalty and the Shawnee attempts to form an alliance as the defining diplomatic
39“Unknown Indian to Croghan, March 7, 1771,” Ser. 1, lot 668, S1AP.
40 DAR, 3: 154-55,201,253,5:59-61.
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issues of the early 1770s. Although reports frequently reached their ears of intimate 
assemblies gathering throughout the Ohio Valley, they focused on the problems they 
could understand and assumed that Indian grievances fell into those categories rather than 
entertaining the notion that Indian affairs might be spiraling out of their control entirely. 
If they were aware that the private counseling in the woods pertained more often to local 
grievances than the construction of alliances on a grand scale, they were not inclined to 
admit it.
Thoughts regarding Cherokee fidelity or Shawnee confederacies occupied a 
central place in native minds as well, but as subordinate points under the overarching 
question of how to counter British attempts to control their territory. Despite Shawnee 
ventures to forge a unified response based on common interests, most nations opted to 
weigh their choices slowly. Even those tribes firmly committed to violent resistance 
recognized the need for careful planning if they were going to risk a major assault. The 
bold pronouncements at the 1770 Scioto conference needed time to germinate before the 
intruders could be driven back over the mountains.
Tired of waiting for the requisite support to launch an attack on white settlements 
or forts, various nations along the Wabash River continued the hostilities against the 
English that had been their custom since the 1760s. Their easiest targets were still 
passing boats and reckless traders, but they increasingly took aim at the fledgling British 
community around Fort Chartres. In the summer of 1771, a group of Kickapoos killed 
several people in Illinois and took another man prisoner who somehow managed to 
inform the commandant at Detroit that the Wabash Indians were “fully bent for war 
against the English.” Several Potawatomis from St. Joseph followed up these altercations
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with an offensive of their own near the fort, and both groups persisted in their ban of 
English traders and dogged patrol of the Ohio River.41
By autumn Gage had determined that these nations were the foremost public 
enemies. “I fear that we shall find it indispensably necessary to fall upon means to 
reduce the Pouteatamies and Oubache Indians to peace by forcible measures. As long as 
their disposition is hostile the communication with Fort Chartres will be precarious and 
many of our traders to be murdered and pillaged in other parts of the country,” he 
emphasized. Hillsborough responded by ordering the abandonment of Fort Chartres and 
Fort Pitt, a move that the Indians viewed as a victory regardless of the crown’s complete 
rationale for the decision and the fact that temporary headquarters still remained in 
Illinois. In addition to defying the English, the Wabash nations rebuffed several Six 
Nations emissaries in 1772, citing Iroquois attacks on some of their people the previous 
year. The Onondaga council never took challenges to its authority lightly and threatened 
to make war on these western Indians. Johnson condoned their zeal, but no attacks 
materialized.42
While the Kickapoos, Miamis, Piankeshaws, and Potawatomis resolutely opposed 
any British foothold in their region and rejected invitations to meet with Indians they 
deemed puppets of the Europeans, they never truly embraced the alliance promoted by 
the Shawnees. Despite their agreement at the 1770 conference to quell hostilities with 
the southern Indians, they were reportedly attacking the Cherokees along with the British 
as early as February 1772. Later that year they refused peace belts from the Cherokees
41 Ibid., 3: 200-01; Gage Papers, 1: 338.
42 DAR, 3: 201,244-46, 5: 203,212, 6: 122-24, 127; “Johnson to Haldimand, June 30, 1773,” reel 
A -611, Haldimand Papers', Public Record Office, C.O.5, vol. 90, fos. 114-117d.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
38
delivered by representatives of the Six Nations and several southern nations. According 
to the unsuccessful emissaries, the Wabash tribes actually “cut their belts of whampum to 
j pieces and burnt them in presence of the messengers whom they ordered instantly to 
depart.”43
Above all the Wabash tribes seemed interested in maintaining their lifestyle 
exactly as it had been in recent decades, relying on the French for trade goods and 
dominating the local waterways. Cultural preservation obviously meant overt resistance 
to the British newcomers and hostility toward native groups who appeared too ensnared 
by English interests, but it also created suspicion of other innovations. For example, they 
largely ignored the Shawnee alliance because, though it was intended to protect the Ohio 
Valley from deleterious English influences, it was nevertheless a product of a changing 
world that encouraged additional adaptations such as making peace between traditional 
enemies. Undoubtedly the Wabash Indians distrusted the Cherokees in part because of 
that nation’s earlier ties to the British, but their destruction of the peace belts also 
revealed a deep-seated aversion to substantial change of any kind.
The Wabash nations may have suspected that the Cherokees were attached to the 
British, but in reality the latter were deeply divided about how to respond to the European 
power. Shawnee ambassadors frequently entered Cherokee and Creek villages in 1771 
and 1772, often distributing belts calling for attacks on white settlers and urging local 
chiefs to spread the word to other southern nations. Leading chiefs like Oconostota and 
Attakullaculla assured Stuart that they intended to maintain their alliance with the 
English, but mysterious visitors, unexplained absences, and dubious explanations for the
43 DAR, 3: 32, 6: 158-59.
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meaning of various belts convinced him that dangerous machinations were afoot.
Secretly, he hoped that the Cherokees and Creeks would attack each other, thus 
neutralizing two potential enemies. But in 1773 he learned that they were meeting 
together, along with deputies from other nations, to “conceal measures for chastising the 
insolence of [the] western tribes and bringing them to reason.”44
If the Cherokee response was difficult to discern because of regional intrigue, the 
Illinois Indians faced an even more complicated situation. The Shawnees definitely 
counted them as loyal confederates, but their nearer neighbors, the Kickapoos, 
occasionally targeted them in attacks generally directed toward the English. To make 
matters even more complex, the British sought to remove the French settlers in the 
Illinois country, a threat that would have displaced the Illinois’s source of trade goods 
and forced them to re-evaluate their alliances. When the inhabitants resisted the idea of 
moving, plans for developing a British government for the Illinois country passed 
between the interested parties, but none of them made circumstances any clearer for the 
native population.45
Like the Cherokees and Illinois, the Shawnees and Delawares also experienced 
division and uncertainty, although they often concealed it effectively. From 1771 to 1773 
they pursued the same strategy that they had inaugurated after the Fort Stanwix Treaty: 
negotiating politely with British authorities about specific grievances while maneuvering 
behind the scenes to unite their neighbors in opposition to encroaching settlers and
44 Gage Papers, 1: 293; DAR, 3: 39, 43, 5: 34, 6: 158-59.
45 DAR, 5: 59, 70-71, 97-98, 6: 31; Gage Papers, 1: 353; The situation in the Illinois country was 
complicated even further by a skirmish between some Chickasaw Indians passing through the region on 
their way to war and some troops at Fort Chartres in 1772, prompting the commanding officer to abandon 
the fort even earlier than his instructions dictated. Public Record Office, C.0.5, vol. 90, fos. 57-68d.
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English presumptions of rulership. Following up on the success of the 1770 Scioto 
conference, Shawnee deputies traversed the land west of the Appalachians, even traveling 
as far as the Arkansas River to meet with Spanish and French representatives, who 
warned them that the English intended to take all of their territory.46
The chiefs who remained in their towns also played their part well. As word of 
the potentially hostile intent of the 1770 gathering leaked to British leaders, they 
entertained several delegations of Six Nations ambassadors, who charged them with 
fraternizing with enemies and breaking their promises to both the Iroquois and the 
English. Sorting out the matter of Gaustarax’s belts demanded additional time from 
Shawnee leaders, as did their mediating role in delivering messages from the Six Nations 
to the Wabash tribes when the latter refused to receive the original messengers. On each 
of these occasions, the chiefs responded cordially and with apparent deference to the 
outsiders’ authority.47
In June 1773 the chiefs sent six men to ask Alexander McKee and Kayashuta, 
Johnson’s Iroquois vice-regent for the upper Ohio Valley, about a surveyor who had 
recently visited their towns and spread the word about some anticipated new white 
settlements on the Ohio sanctioned by the Virginia governor. While this news was 
troublesome to the Shawnees, they sought an explanation and verification before 
becoming too agitated. They also seized the opportunity to warn the British that the new 
settlers might quickly be exposed to the wrath of the “foolish” Wabash people, “which 
might have an evil tendency to the chain of friendship.” By giving this caution, they
46 DAR, 6:224.
47 Ibid., 5: 59-61,203.
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hoped to absolve themselves of any blame should relationships turn sour and the 
country’s peace be disrupted. Once again their actions merited approval from the English 
and their allies. Kayashuta explained that the king intended to establish a new colony on 
a portion of the land purchased at Fort Stanwix and then hastened to applaud “their 
Wisdom in coming to inquire at this place, where they cou’d always hear their Father, the 
King of Great Britain’s Intentions towards them from Sir William Johnson...He hoped 
they wou’d continue to give every Intelligence and Assistance in their power to preserve 
the Friendship subsisting between their Brethren the White People & them.” By 
September Johnson referred to the Shawnees as the “most attentive” to the Six Nations 
councils of any nation to the south, even though they were deeply concerned about
A Q
Virginians pushing into Indian territory.
While the Shawnee chiefs cultivated the appearance of good relations with the 
British, their emissaries sought to consolidate native power if not actually turn it against 
white settlements. Even within the towns on the Scioto, opinions about how to respond 
to the English seemed divided. When the Rev. David Jones passed through Pickawee, 
Blue Jacket’s Town, and Chillicothe in January 1773, he encountered considerable 
hostility and suspicion that a group of Europeans meeting together meant that they were 
conspiring to take the town. Several chiefs welcomed him, but they could not prevent his 
being drummed out of town by Shawnee warriors who opposed the introduction of 
English cultural values into their living spaces.49
48 “Alexander McKee’s report, June 28, 1773,” reel A-611, HaldimandPapers', DAR, 6: 166-67,
224-25.
49 David Jones, A Journal o f  Two Visits made to some Nations o f  Indians on the West Side o f  the 
River Ohio, in the Years 1772 and 1773 (Burlington, NJ: Isaac Collins, 1774), rpt. Horatio Gates Jones, ed. 
(New York: Joseph Sabin, 1865), 45-70.
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Although the Shawnees garnered more attention from the British, the Delawares 
shared many of the same experiences, grievances, and mixed responses. Living near Fort 
Pitt, they often had the opportunity to address their concerns in a diplomatic forum. In 
December 1771 they were even granted an audience with the Pennsylvania governor and 
Council in Philadelphia, where they urgently requested a council fire to be rekindled at 
Fort Pitt and an English deputy to be stationed there to settle disputes and restrain 
disorderly young men. They recounted the history of English-Delaware interactions 
since the British “drove the French away and built forts,” recalling that white settlers had 
poured into the region shortly thereafter. Despite their objections to the trespassers, the 
English did not remove them. Wishing to avoid disputes, the Delawares agreed to a 
boundary line, but even more people arrived who also seemed to ignore the laws that the 
English claimed to have established. “Therefore, brethren, unless you can fall upon some 
method of governing your people who live between the Great Mountains and the Ohio 
River and who are now very numerous, it will be out of the Indians’ power to govern 
their young men, for we assure you the black clouds begin to gather fast in this country.” 
They wanted to live in peace and friendship with the English, but they recognized the 
newcomers’ land hunger and feared that they intended to “come over the River Ohio and 
drive us from our villages,” they explained to Governor Penn before adding, “nor do we 
see you brethren take any care to stop them.”50
Similar solicitations, admonishments, and assurances of goodwill followed from 
the Delaware council in the ensuing years, at the same time as Delaware representatives
50 Hazard, ed., Minutes o f  the Provincial Council o f  Pennsylvania, 10: 10-11, 61-62; DAR, 3: 254-
55.
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accompanied Shawnee ambassadors intent upon forging an anti-British alliance. Clearly 
competing ideas for how to best deal with the English dominated their councils as they 
did in Shawnee circles. Rev. David McClure discovered in 1772 that, although some 
leaders seemed interested in English husbandry, education, and religion, most were too 
upset by encroaching Europeans to even tolerate ideas that advocated dramatic change in 
their lives. Fractured public opinion within Delaware towns accompanied by occasional 
outbursts of violence prompted McClure to depart earlier than expected. David Jones 
arrived a few months later on his return from the Shawnee towns and also encountered 
both hostility and curiosity regarding the British. These divided councils did not prove 
life-threatening for Jones as they had in the Scioto villages, but they did splinter 
communities. In September 1773 chief Custaloga moved with one hundred of his people 
beyond the falls of the Ohio to join the Wabash tribes in an effort to be more formidable 
to the English.51
Divided nations, contradictory messages, secret negotiations, unreliable rumors, 
competing alliances, and old and new conflicts combined with actual violent encounters 
to create a bewildering picture of the Ohio Valley. This frontier chaos provoked mixed 
responses from Whitehall. Secretary of State Hillsborough instructed Johnson in 1771 to 
avoid “intermingling in any of the confederacies; let the disputes and quarrels fall out as 
they may.” He suspected that the French were behind the Indians’ discontent, and that 
they would like nothing better than to entangle the British in another battle for an
51 Franklin B. Dexter, ed., Diary o f  D avid McClure Doctor o f  Divinity 1748-1820 (New York: 
Knickerbocker Press, 1899), 61-85; Jones, Journal o f  Two Visits, 84-105; DAR, 6: 224.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
44
American empire. Furthermore, he argued that the colonies really had nothing to fear 
from a proposed native confederacy because the “natural aversions” between the different 
nations would prevent them from forming a powerful or effective union. Even if some 
alliances were forged, he was confident that the Indians realized they were dependent on 
the British for trade goods and would be hesitant to cut themselves off entirely.52
Johnson, Gage, and Stuart agreed with Hillsborough that they needed to be careful 
about avoiding military action, but they objected to his dismissive attitude regarding 
native threats. Johnson called an alliance between the northern and southern Indians “a 
matter of the most serious nature,” since a few years before only half of their number had 
crippled the British empire severely. The three overseers of Indian affairs bombarded 
Hillsborough with letters detailing the genuine hostility of the Wabash nations, the 
persistence of the Shawnee deputies, and the continued existence of aggravating 
circumstances, like encroaching white settlers, that made resolution of Indian grievances 
difficult. By July 1772 they had convinced him that the situation was grave indeed. 
“Every day discovers more and more the fatal policy of departing from the line 
prescribed by the proclamation of 1763; and the extension of it on the ground of a cession 
made by the Six Nations of lands, their right to which is denied by other nations equally 
powerful and more numerous,” he lamented. Instead of strengthening Britain and its 
colonies, the additional land had only encouraged far-flung settlements and “will most 
probably have the effect to produce a general Indian war.”53
52 For violent encounters in the region between 1771 and 1773 see, DAR, 3: 200-01, 5: 32, 97-98, 
136,212, 6: 120,158-59,225; Pennsylvania Archives, 1: 431-32; “Indian Council at Detroit, May 9-10, 
1773, Haldimand to Johnson, Dec. 22, 1773,” reel A-611, HaldimandPapers. For Hillsborough’s 
assessment see, DAR, 3: 23, 92-94.
53 DAR, 3: 40-41, 5: 135.
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As an alternative to Hillsborough’s non-intervention plan, Johnson opted to 
involve himself in Ohio Valley affairs through Six Nations mediators. He resolutely 
maintained that the Shawnees and Delawares were dependents of the Iroquois, a claim 
that enabled him to exhort the Onondaga council to act as regional policemen. Assuring 
Gage, Hillsborough, and Dartmouth (Hillsborough’s successor) that the only way to 
secure peace in the region was through the Six Nations, he sent ambassadors far and wide 
with instructions to infiltrate secret gatherings, chide rebellious nations, and above all, 
bring back the Senecas who had moved to the Ohio and generally place all their 
dependents under closer supervision. In his mind the worst aspect of the proposed 
alliance was the Shawnee and Delaware attempt to “shake off their dependency on the 
Six Nations.” Even more terrifying was the possibility that these two nations would 
endeavor to alienate the Iroquois from the English and draw them into their confederacy 
as well. Although he admitted that this scheme seemed unlikely, he gladly took any 
precaution that strengthened his bond with the Six Nations.54
Gage generally yielded to Johnson’s judgment on Indian affairs, but in responding 
to the particularly turbulent Ohio Valley situation, he had some suggestions o f his own. 
Recognizing that native grievances were not unfounded (settlers had moved onto Indian 
territory despite vast stretches of unsettled land nearer the coast, trade was often unfair, 
colonial courts rendered no justice, the Six Nations had been awarded all of the goods at 
the Fort Stanwix Treaty), he proposed that a deputy Indian agent be placed in the heart of 
open opposition to the British, the Wabash country. The Delawares had recently
54Hazard, ed., Minutes o f  the Provincial Council ofPennsylvania, 10:21; DAR, 5 :3 2 ,4 4 , 59, 212- 
13,247-48, 6: 121-27; “Johnson to Haldimand, June 30, 1773,” reel A-611, Haldimand Papers (quote); 
“Dartmouth to Johnson, Feb. 3 ,1773,”Ser. 1, lot 670, “Johnson to the Six Nations, Oct. 21 ,1773,” Ser. 1, 
lot 678, SIAP.
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requested such a representative to establish order in their region, but Gage believed that 
English interests would be better served by placing a deputy at the Wabash rather than at 
Fort Pitt. “I conceive the main principles of our Indian policy should be to gain the 
affections of every nation and tribe and to know how to manage the jealousies and 
animosities subsisting between nation and nation so that we may never want allies to 
revenge our quarrels if at any time we are attacked. Parties of Indians joined by a few 
light troops from neighbouring forts and attacking our enemies in their own way, would 
be the readiest means of restoring peace which is all we want of Indians. To carry on a 
regular expensive war against savages in the woods with bodies of regular troops I think 
should never be attempted but when we are indispensably obliged to do it and through the 
want of better means,” he related.55
While Gage, Johnson, Hillsborough, and Dartmouth might have advocated 
different strategies for managing the Ohio Valley chaos, they all agreed on who was 
primarily responsible for its development: the French. Rumors that the French and 
Spanish were animating the western Indians against the English had circulated since the 
1760s, but they grew more persistent between 1769 and 1774 as more nations expressed 
outrage and suspicion about British rule. After the Fort Stanwix debacle, reports 
indicated that the French were encouraging war against the British by promising to build 
forts for the Indians and telling them that the English were attempting to take their land
55“Guy Johnson to Haldimand, Aug. 26, 1773,” “William Johnson to Haldimand, Sept. 1773,” reel 
A-611, Haldimand Papers', Hazard, ed., Minutes o f  the Provincial Council o f  Pennsylvania, 10: 10-11; 
DAR, 3: 253-54, 5: 32 ,44 (quote), 60, 97-98, 6: 225,237-38.
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by using the Six Nations’ influence. This account promised to direct native anger toward 
the crown and to create a rift between the Six Nations and the British.56
Taking these rumors to heart, Johnson spotted French intrigue behind every 
movement of the western Indians. Surely the Shawnees would not have initiated a 
campaign to unite all the Ohio Valley nations if French agents had not been bestowing 
presents and spreading stories about English perfidy, he reasoned. To support this 
contention, he pointed to the presence of a belt from the French that had been collected 
along with the rogue wampum distributed by Gaustarax and the Shawnees and the 
occasional visits of Shawnee ambassadors to the Mississippi.57
When Dartmouth became Secretary of State, he joined in Johnson’s fear of 
conspiracy and undoubtedly supported him when he reported to the interim commander- 
in-chief, Frederick Haldimand, on Indian affairs in January 1774. “I know it does not 
appear probable to the Public that the French have any Agents at present, or Interest 
themselves in Indian Affairs,” he said, but he had reliable “intelligence of very large 
presents, part of which I have [seen] delivered to them by persons who gave them in the 
name of the French King, and in such quantitys as cannot be supposed to have been given 
by individuals to draw a Trade.” He was convinced that the French intended the presents 
to promote “a good Understanding with them, that in case of a War they might make use 
of their services to distress our Frontiers, or perhaps for a more material purpose.”58
56 “Guy Carleton to William Johnson, March 27,1767,” Collections o f  the State Historical Society 
o f  Wisconsin, 12 (1892), 23-27; DAR, 2: 253, 3: 201, 6: 240-41.
51 DAR, 3: 41, 5: 212, 6:224.
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Perhaps Johnson felt the need to paint a grim picture for Haldimand because Gage 
never seemed to credit the notion that the French were actively seeking to recapture their 
North American empire. As early as February 1769, he insisted that he heard nothing to 
make him believe that the French or Spanish governments had encouraged war against 
the English or the Six Nations, an argument he maintained during his entire tenure as 
commander-in-chief. After all, he reasoned, it was just as much in their interests to keep 
the Indians under control as it was for the British. The real culprits “infesting” the 
country with anti-English propaganda were the “parcel of French vagabonds” settled in 
Illinois and near post St. Vincent on the Wabash. These traders desperately sought to 
protect their economic positions by keeping both British traders and the British 
government at bay. Although he knew it would generate considerable opposition from 
Indians and Europeans, he acknowledged that the only way to bring peace and British 
rule to the Illinois and Wabash regions was to evacuate these recalcitrant settlers.59
Association with French traders and representatives across the Mississippi tainted 
the Shawnees, whose tireless efforts to promote unity among the Indians already made 
them suspicious. Despite Johnson’s belief in September 1773 that the Shawnees 
appeared to be heeding the Six Nations’ advice, four months later he declared that they 
were not to be trusted, accusing them of “altering the purport of Belts & speeches to 
accommodate them to their own purposes.” Heightened anxiety about the Shawnees 
probably stemmed from an attack on the supply party of a group of families (Daniel 
Boone and William Russell the most prominent patriarchs among them) attempting to 
settle Kentucky in October 1773. Accusations flew around the frontier with the
59 Gage Papers, 1: 217; DAR, 3: 201, 5: 43-45 (quote), 61, 97-98, 6: 133.
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Cherokees, Delawares, and Shawnees all being fingered. Having recently returned from 
a meeting with French and Spanish representatives, the Shawnees looked especially 
guilty to British eyes.60
At the end of February 1774, a trader reported to Alexander McKee that a party of 
Shawnee warriors had just returned from the backwoods of Virginia after killing “six 
white men and two Negroes” and taking many horses, a clear reference to the widely 
known attack on the Kentucky-bound travelers. McKee immediately dashed off a 
scathing letter to some Shawnee chiefs at Croghan’s house, charging the nation with the 
crime, the warriors with foolish mischief, and the chiefs at Scioto with incompetence. He 
instructed them to hurry home and use their “utmost strength and Influence to put a Stop 
to such Flagrant Outrages.” A week later they met in council with McKee and expressed 
sorrow for the deceased but reminded him that the story of their culpability might not be 
true. They were now returning home and would investigate. Before leaving they 
promised to do all they could to “preserve the peace and tranquility of this country,” but 
they exhorted McKee and his “great men” to halt the flood of settlers down the Ohio and 
into native hunting grounds as the only means to truly quiet all disturbances. Having 
resided near Fort Pitt for the past few months, they told McKee that their fears regarding 
the English intention to make war on them and to take their land had only been 
confirmed.61
60 DAR, 6: 225, 8: 58; “Johnson to Haldimand, Jan. 26, 1774,” reel A -611, Haldimand Papers.
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The unchecked spread of colonists and the alleged lack of hospitality from 
Croghan were not the only reasons the Shawnees suspected the British of martial designs. 
On January 1,1774 John Connolly waltzed into Pittsburgh and announced that the 
Virginia governor, Lord Dunmore, had appointed him commander of the militia in the 
land west of the Laurel Ridge. Fulfilling his duty, he called for a militia muster on 
January 25. This bold move touched off a bitter jurisdictional conflict between Virginia 
and Pennsylvania that lingered through the Revolution. Arrests, forced marches, 
imprisonment, riots, threats, and a general disregard for authority characterized the 
political climate throughout 1774, complemented by icy exchanges between Governors 
Penn and Dunmore. In the midst of this feud, the Shawnees visiting Croghan faced real 
danger. As if the large number of armed men “making a Warlike appearance” was not 
threatening enough, the raucous crowd that attended Connolly on January 25 fired across 
the river at the Shawnee camps. Although the Indians escaped unscathed, they were 
justified in believing that the British sought their destruction. Indeed, two months later 
Pennsylvania justice of the peace Aeneas McKay told Governor Penn that “the Indians 
are greatly alarmed at seeing parties of armed men patroling through our streets Daily, 
not knowing but there is hostility intended against them and their country.”62
With fear and tension simmering during the early months of 1774, even a small 
spark could have ignited the frontier. Indeed, when the explosion occurred in late April,
62 Pennsylvania Archives, 3: 486 (quote), 511-512, 528; Hazard, ed., Minutes o f  the Provincial 
Council o f  Pennsylvania, 10: 140-91; DAR, 8: 66-67,113-14. For more information on the Pennsylvania 
and Virginia boundary dispute, see volume four o f the Pennsylvania Archives. For the controversy’s 
impact on the Revolution, see Anne Ousterhout, A State Divided: Opposition in Pennsylvania to the 
American Revolution (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987).
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it touched off cycles of violence that resonated throughout the entire Ohio Valley for the 
next decade, convincing Indians that the Virginians (a name they often generically used 
for all Americans during the Revolution) were bent on taking their land and completely 
subduing native peoples. The catalytic sequence of events began in mid-April when a 
group of Cherokees attacked a canoe heading from Pittsburgh to the Shawnee towns, 
killing one man, wounding another, and stealing the entire cargo. Two weeks later 
Richard Butler, the trader living at the Scioto towns whose goods had been plundered, 
authorized another party consisting of two white men, a Delaware, and a Shawnee to 
retrieve the stolen property. This group encountered Michael Cresap, an “adventurer” 
from Maryland who reportedly boasted that “he would put every Indian he mett with on 
the River to Death.” Cresap and his cronies killed and scalped both Indians and claimed 
the trade goods for themselves. The following day they continued their assault on Ohio 
Valley residents, skirmishing with a party of Shawnees near the Big Kanawha River with 
loss of life on both sides.
The final blow to the region’s tenuous peace came the next day when Daniel 
Greathouse and other “ill disposed and factious Men” gathered at Joshua Baker’s 
plantation across the Ohio River from Yellow Creek, the site of a Mingo town. These 
men lured several Indians to their side of the water and proceeded to murder and scalp 
them all. When several Mingos arrived to check on their friends, they were treated in the 
same manner. Finally a larger party started to cross the river, but recognizing the ambush 
placed for them on the shore, they turned around, only to be fired on with mortal
63 “Extracts from a Journal o f  Indian Transactions,” Chalmers Papers’, Pennsylvania Archives, 4: 
512, 569.
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accuracy; two lone survivors returned to their town safely. Altogether ten were killed, 
including several family members of the Mingo chief Logan and the wife of the trader 
John Gibson. Fearing immediate reprisal for their “dastardly” conduct, Greathouse and 
his companions fled the scene.64
Word of these atrocities quickly spread up and down the Ohio River. Hearing the 
news and understanding that the entire region could be engulfed in war unless they acted 
quickly, McKee, Croghan, and Connolly swung into action. They dispatched Simon 
Girty, a local trader and interpreter, to the Delaware towns to summon chiefs White Eyes 
and Captain Pipe. White Eyes, Captain Pipe, and the brother of the Delaware man killed 
by Cresap arrived at Fort Pitt a few days later and joined Kayashuta, the White Mingo, 
and several other Six Nations chiefs who were at the fort preparing for an embassy to the 
Wabash nations. Connolly, McKee, and Croghan condoled with their guests, expressing 
sorrow at the recent violence and assuring them that these acts were “intirely owing to the 
Folly and Indiscretion of our Young People” and not sanctioned by the Virginia 
government. They hoped that a war could be avoided and asked if  some of these chiefs 
would be willing to take this message of goodwill to the Shawnees and other more distant 
tribes. White Eyes responded for the group, promising to uphold the cause o f  peace and 
volunteering to relay the speech himself. In the ensuing days the remaining Delaware 
and Six Nations chiefs affirmed their desire to maintain the chain of friendship, but they
64 “Extracts from a Journal o f Indian Transactions,” Chalmers Papers; Reuben Gold Thwaites and 
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did ask that the white people in authority would do all they could to prevent future rash 
hostilities.65
Believing that Indian affairs were contained for the moment, Connolly turned his 
attention to the local inhabitants. He knew that many would abandon the frontier because 
of this new threat, so to inspire their confidence, he ordered out the militia and put them 
to work repairing the fort and impressing provisions, horses, and tools, ignoring for the 
moment the fact that his military preparations would look suspicious to the watchful 
Indians. During the next two weeks, he discovered that many of the local residents who 
opted to remain on their settlements were preparing to attack the Shawnee towns. Others 
threatened the Delaware and Six Nations chiefs staying at Croghan’s house, and 
Greathouse and his henchmen vowed to kill any Indians who crossed the Ohio. Connolly 
tried to stamp out each of these fires, but his constituents still seemed eager for 
bloodshed.66
While Connolly, McKee, and Croghan scurried around Fort Pitt, the Delaware 
leaders at Newcomerstown also scrambled to bring coherence to the delicate situation. 
Their first priorities were to alert some of their absent hunters about recent events and the 
possible hostility from the Virginians and to protect the white traders living among them 
who could have made easy targets for angry Mingos or Shawnees. As for their own 
response, they determined to continue their normal activities, provided the English were
65“Extracts from a Journal o f Indian Transactions,” (quote) and “Extract from my Journal from the 
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sincere about their promises to pursue justice. They also joined in efforts to pacify the 
Shawnees, especially those who lived in the towns near them on the Muskingum River 
who had many connections with the offended Mingos.67
For both the Delawares and the British leaders at Fort Pitt, everything rested on 
the Shawnee reaction to the recent atrocities. Unfortunately for those who wanted to 
settle the matter quickly, Shawnee opinion was deeply divided. One of the Delaware 
representatives in Pittsburgh reported that en route to the meeting he had encountered the 
Shawnee chief Cornstalk leaving Yellow Creek with some of the wounded survivors. 
Cornstalk rejoiced when he heard that the Delawares intended to remain peaceful, 
believing that enough sorrow had already passed with additional violence only making 
things worse. He also passed along the information that if he had not been present at 
Yellow Creek, the Mingos would have immediately crossed the river and commenced 
hostilities. While this news sounded hopeful, it was tempered when another Shawnee 
chief, Hardman, declared that “his heart cannot be good, until he has sent one party at 
least, against the Virginians, to take satisfaction for what has happened.”68
This rift in Shawnee opinion was revealed at Fort Pitt in the last days of May. On 
May 20 Cornstalk sent word to McKee that although the recent murders of one of their 
leaders and other close associates irritated them very much, the Shawnee “all determined 
to be quiet till we knew what you meant.” They had been planning to begin their usual 
hunting, but these troublesome events stopped them. The traders in their midst “were 
very much endangered by such doings, from the Persons Injured,” but the Shawnees were
67 Pennsylvania Archives, 4:495-97; “Extract from my Journal,” Chalmers Papers.
68 “Extract from my Journal,” and “Extracts from a Journal o f Indian Transactions,” (quote), 
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committed to protecting them. Cornstalk sent his brother to escort the traders back to 
their people, hoping that such actions would demonstrate his people’s good intentions.
As a final word, he asked that McKee forward his peaceful message to Connolly and the 
governors of Virginia and Pennsylvania, imploring them to prevent future atrocities. “I 
have with great Trouble and pains prevailed on the foolish People amongst us to sit still 
and do no harm till we see whether it is the intention of the white people in general to fall 
on us,” he said, promising to continue these efforts in the hopes that everything would be 
settled.69
Five days later White Eyes returned to Pittsburgh with a different answer from the 
Shawnees to Connolly’s message. “We have received your speeches by White Eyes,” 
they said, and “we look upon it all to be lies...But as it is the first time you have spoke to 
us we listen to you and expect that what we may hear from you will be more confined to 
truth than what we usually hear from the white people.” They proceeded to enumerate 
some of their reasons for distrusting Connolly’s word, particularly highlighting that his 
“peaceful” speech came while he was mustering warriors and sending men to build forts 
along the river. “It is you who are frequently passing up and down the Ohio, and making 
settlements upon it,” they pointed out, shifting the blame for the recent disturbances onto 
Virginia’s shoulders. “[A]s you have requested us to listen to you, we will do it, but in 
the same manner that you appear to attend to us...You tell us not to take any notice of 
what your people have done to us. We desire you likewise not to take any notice of what 
our young men may now be doing.” When they receive convincing “peaceable tidings 
from Virginia,” they will advise their warriors to remain at home. On one final point
69 Pennsylvania Archives, 4: 497-98.
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their response was the same as Cornstalk’s: the traders would be conducted safely to 
Pittsburgh.70
Unfortunately for the Shawnees, Connolly received the “insolent” message first, 
which also happened to arrive at Fort Pitt about the same time as the news that a party of 
Mingos had launched retaliatory attacks, aided by a small group of Shawnee warriors. In 
the next few weeks men such as the Moravian missionary David Zeisberger insisted that 
“the Shawanes are far from being unanimous for War,” with only those at Wakatomica 
on the Muskingum, whose own people had been killed, promoting hostilities. On June 5 
a trader named Conner, who had been living at the Shawnee Snakes Town on the 
Muskingum, reported that the Shawnees had taken great pains to protect the traders and 
their goods. Furthermore, word reached Croghan that the Shawnees were now quiet. 
“Their Chiefs have been strong enough to prevail over their rash and foolish men who 
wanted to take revenge upon the White People for their Loss,” Delaware messengers 
informed him. Only thirteen warriors could not be restrained, and the Shawnees hoped 
that the English would not blame them for any evil these men might commit.71
Despite these entreaties on their behalf, Connolly seemed bent on taking the war 
to the Shawnees. The same day he received the request for more evidence of his desire 
for peace, he dispatched a party of soldiers to Wheeling with instructions to treat any 
Indians on the east side of the Ohio as enemies. When the traders with their Shawnee 
escort arrived in Pittsburgh, he ordered a party of men to ambush the Indians on their 
return trip, a plan that was barely thwarted only by the traders’ decisive actions. He even
70 “Extract from my Journal,” Chalmers Papers (first quote); O’Callaghan, ed., Documents 
Relative to the Colonial History o f  the State o f New York, 8: 465-66 (successive quotes).
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sent a slightly conciliatory letter to Arthur St. Clair, Pennsylvania’s leading government 
official in the disputed territory, outlining his plan to “overawe” the Indians with new 
forts that could conveniently act as a base for taking the war into Shawnee country and
n ')asking for Pennsylvania’s support.
While St. Clair responded very cautiously (the Indians seemed to be 
distinguishing the Virginians from the Pennsylvanians and he did not want to draw his 
state into a war needlessly), Virginia’s governor Dunmore enthusiastically endorsed all of 
Connolly’s propositions. He offered a few military suggestions, including the 
admonition to take as many women and children prisoners as possible. If the Indians 
pressed for peace, he directed Connolly to “not grant it to them on any Terms till they 
were effectually chastised for their Insolence, and then on no Terms without bringing in 
six of their Heads as Hostages...and that they Trade with us only for what they may 
want.”73
St. Clair interpreted Connolly and Dunmore’s determination to attack the 
Shawnees as part of the plan to assert Virginia authority in the Ohio Country. Although a 
premeditated Indian war concocted in Williamsburg seems unlikely, both men were 
undoubtedly influenced by the growing British suspicion of the Shawnees. No tribe had 
worked harder to generate regional opposition to the Fort Stanwix treaty and the crown’s 
unsatisfactory governance of frontier affairs. The Wabash tribes may have been more 
openly hostile, but the Shawnees threatened to create trouble on a larger scale by stirring 
up many nations. Having dubbed the Shawnees the more dangerous opponent, the
72 “Extract from a Journal o f  Indian Transactions,” Chalmers Papers', Pennsylvania Archives, 4: 
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Virginians targeted Shawnee towns rather than the Mingos who were behind most of the 
early attacks.74
During June 1774 McKee, St. Clair, and other observers remained hopeful that a 
war could be averted, especially after White Eyes announced at a large conference that 
every tribe he met with, including the Cherokees, Wyandots, and Shawnees, wanted to 
“adhere to their antient Friendship” with the British. A few days later the Pennsylvania 
trader John Montgomery shared more promising news with Governor Penn. The Mingo 
chief Logan had returned from war with thirteen scalps and a prisoner and declared 
himself satisfied for the loss of his relatives. He agreed to “sit still” until he heard from 
the Long Knife, a reference to the Virginians.75
Those who hoped with Montgomery that “the storm will soon blow over” 
witnessed their dreams destroyed in July and August. Watching the Virginians assemble 
two sizable armies (at Wheeling and Greenbriar) and fortify existing military structures 
and hearing only threats from Connolly rather than the “peaceable tidings” they had 
requested, several parties of Shawnees moved into settler communities, attacking in 
Greenbriar and the area south of Pittsburgh. Dunmore, who was traveling to Pittsburgh 
to oversee war affairs himself, ordered the militia to retaliate by striking the Shawnee
74 Ibid., 502. St. Clair was not the only who attributed questionable motives to Connolly and 
Dunmore. Michael Cresap insisted that he acted as he did because Connolly led him to believe that a war 
with the Shawnee had already begun. Petitions from Westmoreland County (Pennsylvania’s jurisdictional 
authority in the west) complained that Connolly had initiated the Indian war. In July, Croghan accused 
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towns on the Muskingum, a mission that flattened Wakatomica, killed several Indians, 
and decimated cornfields and three- or four-hundred bushels of harvested com.76
With the war now at hand, the Shawnees sought allies to strengthen their cause. 
As early as mid-May, word circulated that Shawnee belts could be found in the Wyandot 
and other Great Lakes villages, but little tangible support seemed to be forthcoming from 
that direction. Meanwhile the Miamis, Kickapoos, and Mascoutens had all insulted a 
group of Johnson’s Six Nations emissaries, but anti-British behavior did not always 
translate into support for other native causes. In August, Captain Pipe, Kayashuta, and 
the White Mingo reported that the Wyandots, Ottawas, and other Great Lakes Indians 
were generally disposed toward the English, but lately they had been wavering because 
their contact with the British had been nonexistent. St. Clair worried that the militia 
assault on Wakatomica (underway as he heard this latest intelligence) would push them 
into the Shawnee camp.77
Despite the close association between the Shawnees and Delawares over the 
years, the council at Newcomerstown continued to espouse its friendship with the 
Virginians, with White Eyes even volunteering to recruit for Connolly. Such open 
avowals of support for the enemy even prompted the Shawnees to move away from their 
towns near the Delawares. Privately, however, many Delawares nursed sympathy for 
their former neighbors, especially after frontiersmen murdered one of their own and 
harassed numerous others. Soon Shawnee war parties included a growing number of
76 Pennsylvania Archives, 4: 534, 541, 548; Thwaites and Kellogg, Documentary History o f  
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Delawares. By the end of July even the Delaware council informed leaders at Pittsburgh 
that it was relinquishing the role of mediator, refusing to be a mouthpiece for the British 
any longer.78
The most powerful ally the Shawnees hoped to recruit was the Iroquois.
Although ill will had characterized their relationship in recent years, the Shawnees 
recognized that the Six Nations had a deeply vested interest in the murders at Yellow 
Creek. To the Onondaga council, the Mingo were one people with them, being primarily 
Seneca who had relocated to the Ohio Country. Indeed, the sordid affair did create 
considerable unrest in the New York communities, resulting in their bargaining with 
Johnson for the release of two Seneca prisoners as compensation for their loss and to 
demonstrate the sincerity of British expressions of condolence.79
Johnson was prepared to concede this point because he was more concerned about 
thwarting any future Shawnee efforts to enlist the Six Nations as allies. Having 
pronounced the Shawnees “refractory” and bent on “evil designs” months before the 
April assassinations, he was already engaged in subverting their efforts to unite the 
Indians west of the Appalachians. He had directed both the Six Nations and the 
Cherokees to neutralize Shawnee speeches about the perfidy of the British or the need for 
unification. Consequently, when the question of Six Nations participation in the war 
arose, they repeatedly informed the Shawnees that they were “unanimous for peace” and 
discouraged the Shawnees from prolonging offensive actions.80
78 Pennsylvania Archives, 4: 503-04, 541, 552-53.
79 “Johnson to Haldimand, June 9, 1774,” reel A-611, Haldimand Papers.
80 “Johnson to Haldimand, March 19, 1774,” “Haldimand to Johnson, April 7, 1774,” reel A-611, 
Haldimand Papers', “Guy Johnson to Kayashuta, Oct. 5, 1774,” “Six Nations resolution, Nov. 17, 1774,” 
Records Relating to Indian Affairs, Ser. 2, “Minutes o f Indian Affairs, 1755-1790,” vol. 11, National 
Archives o f  Canada.
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Like the Delawares, however, the Iroquois were hardly united in their refusal to 
offer assistance. Gage told Dartmouth that although the Six Nations had not joined the 
Shawnees, it had been difficult for the Indian agents to secure this promise. If the 
Virginians seemed inclined to “extirpate the Shawnee,” he doubted that it would be 
“possible to prevent all the Nations from declaring War.” Guy Johnson, the new Indian 
superintendent following William Johnson’s death in August, told Dartmouth in early 
October that the Six Nations and many of the Ohio Indians were willing to advance the 
cause of peace with the Shawnees, but only if the English did nothing further to provoke 
unrest. He also fretted that by amassing such a large body of troops (reportedly 3,000), 
the Virginians were creating fear on the entire frontier that the war was not simply a local 
chastisement of the Shawnees but an assault on Indian territory in general.81
By the time the western division of the Virginia army reached Point Pleasant at 
the mouth of the Kanawha River in October, the Shawnees had assembled a formidable 
force of their own. Their unification efforts of the past decade paid dividends, as 
Delaware, Mingo, Ottawa, Wyandot, and Miami representatives joined their ranks, 
swelling their numbers to an estimated 800-1,000. The confident Virginians, also 
numbering between 800 and 1,000 with more reinforcements behind them, certainly did 
not expect to encounter such a sizable body. Recognizing that surprise was their best ally 
and that the current numerical situation afforded their best chance of success, the 
Shawnees took the offensive, crossing the Ohio and attacking Andrew Lewis’s army. 
Fighting lasted all day on October 10 until, with night falling and the casualties 
mounting, the Shawnees eventually withdrew. Shortly thereafter they applied to
81 Public Record Office, C.O.5, vol. 92, fos. 20-21d (quote); DAR, 8” 208-09.
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Dunmore, making his way overland toward their towns with the other wing o f  the 
Virginia army, for a peaceful settlement to the war.82
Dunmore convened the conference at his camp near the Scioto River and 
proceeded to dictate the terms of peace. In exchange for removing his militia, he 
demanded that the Indians return all their prisoners, horses, and stolen goods, refrain 
from hunting on the Kentucky side of the Ohio, ignore all the boats moving down the 
river, agree to the king’s trade regulations, and deliver some hostages to the Virginians to 
prove their sincere desire for harmony. He happily informed Dartmouth after his return 
to Williamsburg that the Shawnees “agreed to everything with the greatest alacrity, and 
gave the most Solemn assurances o f their quiet and peac[e]able deportment for the 
future.”83
Conveniently absent from his report was the Mingos’ refusal to comply with the 
treaty’s conditions. Angered by their non-compliance (some chiefs such as Logan had 
refused to appear at the conference in the first place) and suspecting that they intended to 
sneak away with their prisoners and stolen horses, Dunmore ordered William Crawford 
to exact punishment. Taking 240 men, Crawford surrounded the Salt-Lick Town. Most 
of the Mingos escaped in the dark, but the invaders managed to kill six, take fourteen
82 Thwaites and Kellogg, Documentary History o f  Dunmore's War, 270-75,295-97, 330-32,346- 
47; “Guy Johnson to Kayashuta, Oct. 5 ,1774,” RG 1 0 ,11: 4. In 1772 David McClure estimated that the 
Shawnees could raise about 250 fighting men. While this number probably reflects only the Shawnees at 
the Scioto and not those living on the Muskingum, it nevertheless demonstrates that for the Indian army at 
Point Pleasant to number 800 warriors, outside allies had to be present. The notion that the Shawnees faced 
the Virginians alone probably comes from the fact that the Six Nations refused to participate, the Delawares 
officially backed the colonists, and the British persistently referred to the war as one against the Shawnees. 
Dexter, Diary o f  D avid McClure, 93; Gregory Evans Dowd, A Spirited Resistance: The North American 
Struggle fo r  Unity, 1745-1815 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 45; Randolph C. 
Downes, Council Fires on the Upper Ohio: A Narrative o f  Indian Affairs in the Upper Ohio Valley until 
1795,2nd paperback ed. (Pittsburgh: University o f  Pittsburgh Press, 1977), 157-78.
8 Thwaites and Kellogg, Documentary History o f  Dunmore’s War, 386.
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prisoners, plunder goods worth four hundred pounds sterling, and finally bum the village. 
Dunmore retained eleven of these prisoners, promising to return them when the Mingos 
agreed to abide by his peace terms.
Despite resistance from the Mingos, Dunmore believed that the congress had gone 
well and that “all our differences were Settled.” Moreover, he was convinced that the 
war had served several useful purposes. “It has impressed an Idea of the power of the 
White People, upon the minds of the Indians, which they did not before entertain; and 
there is reason to believe, it has extinguished the rancour which raged so violently in our 
People against the Indians: and I think there is a greater probability that these Scenes of 
distress will never be renewed, than ever was before,” he declared optimistically.85
Not every British observer shared the same impression. Richard Butler, one of 
the traders rescued by the Shawnees, maintained that they had been forced into this war 
through a series of frontier depredations tolerated (and sometimes initiated) by 
government officials. There are “so little pains taken to restrain the common People 
whose prejudice leads them to greater lengths than ought to be shown by civilized 
People.. .Their Superiors take too little if any pains, and I do really think [are] much to 
blame themselves in the whole Affair,” he complained. The Shawnees had exhibited no 
hostile intentions at the beginning of the year, but Butler felt that the atrocities they 
encountered were “sufficient to bring on a war with a Christian instead of a Savage 
People.”86
84 Butterfield, Washington-Crawford Letters, 54-56; Thwaites and Kellogg, Documentary History 
o f  Dunmore’s War, 303-04; Pennsylvania Archives, 4: 586-87.
85 Thwaites and Kellogg, Documentary History o f  Dunmore's War, 386-87.
86 Pennsylvania Archives, 4: 569-70.
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If Dunmore’s War and its conclusion left Butler feeling unsettled, it generated 
even more unrest within Indian communities. As the primary target of Virginia’s 
aggression, the Shawnees lamented the loss of people and property and worried about the 
fate of their hostages. Despite Dunmore’s confident assertion that they had quickly 
agreed to his terms, they harbored deep-seated anger at his refusal to acknowledge their 
sovereignty and his insistence on orchestrating the resolution to a war that they believed 
had been thrust upon them without provocation. Their resentment toward the Six Nations 
also increased with this latest instance of the Iroquois apparently choosing English 
interests over native security. The Mingos shared these Shawnee sentiments, particularly 
after Crawford’s attack while peace was being negotiated. This last incident insured 
Mingo hostility toward the colonists for the next two decades.
Restlessness was not confined to Shawnee and Mingo towns, however. Most 
Ohio Valley nations feared that the military might turn on them next. Although the army 
withdrew from the land above the Ohio River, it left garrisons at several strategic points, 
all of which appeared threatening to the Indians. Furthermore, the settlers still seemed to 
operate without governmental restraint, so episodes like those perpetrated by Cresap and 
Greathouse might very well recur. Even the Six Nations were visibly disturbed by the 
“unreasonable conduct of the Virginians” after they heard the report of Dunmore’s 
conference and his treatment of the Mingos while proceedings were underway. They 
assured Guy Johnson in January 1775 that they were committed to the English, but they 
admitted that they had considered other options upon first hearing the news. We “looked 
upon it to be high time for us to shew our power & the strength of our Alliances to these 
People who have used us so ill on account of our fidelity for had it not been for our
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sitting still & following your advice,” they warned, “they would have felt our power long 
ago.”87
Dunmore’s troops marched out of the Ohio Country approximately ten years after 
Henry Bouquet’s forces followed a similar path. In the intervening decade the Ohio 
Valley nations had deliberated over their responses to the new British regime. As 
unwelcome farmers and trade injustices multiplied and the Fort Stanwix Treaty 
sanctioned diplomatic exploitation, these tribes recognized the urgency to defend their 
cultural and territorial prerogatives. Many joined the Shawnees in their efforts to unite 
the entire region in opposition to the English. Others preferred more immediate 
retribution, while yet another group trusted the crown’s established system of governance 
to ensure harmony on the frontier.
In the wake of Dunmore’s War, the Indians were forced to determine new 
responses to the British. Unlike the aftermath of Pontiac’s Rebellion, when Indians and 
Europeans were both adjusting to their new relationship and taking time to complete their 
assessment of each other, the conclusion of 1774’s warfare brought little peace or 
security to the region. The Shawnees, Mingos, Delawares, Wyandots, Miamis, and their 
neighbors now faced threats to both person and property from soldiers as well as settlers. 
To survive in this tumultuous environment, they anchored themselves by beginning to 
focus on their overarching objective of preserving land and sovereignty rather than a 
series of specific grievances. In the process the regional identity that had begun to take 
shape after the Fort Stanwix Treaty received another boost. Although many Ohio Valley 
nations continued to pursue their own agendas, the prospect of fending off foreign
87“Six Nations Council, Dec. 3, 7,1774, Jan. 20,1775,” RG 10, 11:26,31-32, 37-39 (quote).
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invaders drew others together. Unification over grievances promised to be transformed 
into unification over land.
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Chapter Two: 
Responses to the Revolution
At the end of July 1775, the Shawnee chief Chenusaw arrived at his towns in the 
Scioto Valley after a frightening and exhausting two-month journey from Williamsburg. 
Having been taken hostage by the Virginians at the conclusion of Dunmore’s War along 
with fellow leaders Wissecapoway, Newa, and Cutemwha, he had been absent for eight 
months. Although his return was likely heralded by the Shawnee people, he brought 
alarming news that dampened any celebratory spirits. “The People of Virginia were all 
determined upon War with the Indians,” he declared, “except the Governor who was for 
peace but was obliged to fly on board o f a ship to save his own life.” All of these war 
preparations directly endangered the hostages who, he claimed, were threatened with 
enslavement and deportation. When Cutemwha recognized some of his relatives among 
the Indian scalps being flaunted in Williamsburg, Chenusaw and his comrades 
determined to escape. One day into their flight, they were recaptured. Chenusaw 
managed to wriggle free and headed for the Ohio Country without a gun or other 
supplies, but he was sure that Cutemwha and Newa had been killed.1
1 Reuben Gold Thwaites and Louise Phelps Kellogg, The Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 1775- 
1777 (Madison: Wisconsin Historical Society, 1908), 57-58; William J. Van Schreeven, Robert L. Scribner, 
and Brent Tartar eds., Revolutionary Virginia: The Road to Independence, 1 vols. (Charlottesville: 
University Press o f Virginia, 1973-1983), 3: 151; For a physical description o f the Shawnee hostages, see 
Nicholas Cresswell, The Journal o f  Nicholas Cresswell, 1774-1777 (New York: The Dial Press, 1924), 49- 
50; Woody Holton quotes an early-nineteenth-century historian saying that Dunmore “armed his servants, 
together with the Shawanese hostages” in his book Forced Founders: Indians, Debtors, Slaves, and the 
Making o f the American Revolution in Virginia (Chapel Hill: University o f  North Carolina Press, 1999), 
148. I have not found any documentary evidence o f such a move by Dunmore, but it would seem to 
support Chenusaw’s notion that the people were threatening the Indians, especially those associated with 
the governor.
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These ill tidings confirmed what many Shawnees already believed: the Virginians 
had either forgotten their promise to establish a permanent peace, or they had intended to 
deceive the Indians and harm their hostages since the November agreement ending 
hostilities. Fear for their chiefs’ safety combined with anger at Dunmore’s imperious 
tone the preceding fall to generate considerable unrest in the Shawnee towns during the 
first half of 1775. Early in the year, the Shawnee chief Cornstalk reported that he was 
managing to maintain peaceful relations, but his efforts were being undermined by 
traders from Pennsylvania who endeavored to convince the Indians that “Lord 
Dunmore’s view in bringing the hostages to Williamsburg, was to deceive them, and that, 
whenever it was in his power to raise another Army, he would immediately take every 
advantage in order to cut them off.”
Seeking to acquire allies in the event that this warning was true, the Shawnees 
implored the Six Nations to join them for a treaty. Given the bad blood between the 
Shawnees and the Iroquois over the Fort Stanwix land cession and the Six Nations’ 
refusal to provide military assistance against Dunmore the previous fall, this request 
reflected a degree of desperation. When the Onondaga council refused the summons, 
under strict counsel from Indian agent Guy Johnson, the Shawnees warned that they 
should not feel too comfortable. If the Virginians were as aggrandizing as the reports
2 American Archives, Ser. 4, 1: 1226. The feud between Pennsylvania and Virginia over territory 
west of the Laurel Ridge had resumed its vitriolic and often violent character after Dunmore’s War. See 
Pennsylvania Archives, 4: 603-47.
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indicated, their army would not hesitate to march into New York and attack the Iroquois, 
just as they had fought at Point Pleasant and the Scioto River the previous year.3
The Shawnees were not alone in their suspicion that peace had not genuinely 
returned to the Ohio Country. While Chenusaw and his associates had been carted to 
Williamsburg, twelve Mingo hostages were detained at Fort Pitt, following the attack on 
their towns during Dunmore’s ceasefire negotiations. This clear violation of treaty 
proceedings earned the Virginians considerable enmity from both the Mingos and their 
Six Nations relatives in New York, but it also encouraged Mingo resentment toward their 
Indian neighbors. In February John Connolly solicited advice from his superiors in the 
east about how to handle the Mingo prisoners, who had begun to “think their Nation 
rather more severely dealt with than the Shawanese.” A few months later Cornstalk 
complained that the Mingos “behave in a very unbecoming manner Frequently 
upbraiding the Shawanees, in cowardly making the Peace; & call them big knife 
People.”4
Several Mingos also chose this time to kill three Delawares, perhaps in retaliation 
for the latter’s neutrality the previous summer and fall. The Shawnees joined in 
criticizing the Delawares, calling them “Dogs or Servants of the white people.” Despite 
these attacks, the Delawares had actually come to share many of the Mingo and Shawnee
3 “Six Nations Council, Jan. 20-27, Feb. 11-13, 1775, R G 1 0 ,11: 37-51, 57-69. In August the 
Seneca Kayashuta complained that the “Shawnee People had something bad in their hearts A s they Always 
Cast Up the Selling o f  the land to him; & the Cornstalk Spoke Very ill o f him.” Edward G. Williams, ed., 
“The Journal o f  Richard Butler, 1775,” Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine 46 (1963), 394-95.
4 American Archives, Ser. 4 ,1:1222; Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 15. Morgan describes the 
Mingos as being 60-70 families “composed o f most o f  the different Tribes o f  the Six Nations & a few of  
the Lake Indians but principally o f the Sennecas.” Colonel George Morgan Letterbooks, 1:13, Carnegie 
Library o f Pittsburgh.
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sentiments regarding the Europeans. Some even “repented that they had not joined the 
Shawanese in the war, since they found the white people were not to be depended on.”5
Sensing that the Indians’ mounting frustration and distrust might easily erupt into 
widespread frontier violence, Connolly and Alexander McKee met with several Shawnee, 
Mingo, and Delaware chiefs in May. Connolly assured them that Dunmore had not 
forgotten them and desired to conduct a formal peace treaty very soon. Knowing that the 
volatile political situation in the east would prevent the governor from personally 
traveling to Fort Pitt, he presented the idea of a representative acting in his place. McKee 
exhorted them to demonstrate their desire for good will and to satisfy “the uneasiness of 
your People because of the hostages” by going to Fort Pitt when the treaty date was 
established, urging them to disregard any “misrepresentations” of the Virginians’ 
character that may have reached their ears.6
Although McKee and Connolly may have eliminated some concerns, they failed 
to realize that the Indians’ “uneasiness” resulted only partially from diplomatic 
blundering. Equally troubling to nations along the entire Ohio River corridor were the 
surveyors, road builders, and settlers who seemed to be steadily drifting into valleys and 
hollows long recognized to be Indian territory. The army predicted to appear with 
Dunmore apparently could assume guises other than militiamen when it came to claim 
native land.
In 1775 the most recent threat was a group of North Carolina land speculators led 
by Richard Henderson, who had illegally purchased land between the Kentucky and
5 American Archives, Ser. 4, 1: 1226,2: 1208; Journal o f  Richard Butler, 46: 395.
6 Revolutionary Virginia, 3: 148-55, (at 153).
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Cumberland Rivers from the Cherokees and commissioned a road to be cut through the 
Cumberland Gap to the Kentucky River. Henderson’s action angered hundreds o f people 
from Dunmore to the settlers who had already claimed acres in the disputed region, but it 
intrigued others, creating “a Buzzel...amongst People about Kentucke.” “To hear people 
speak of it,” wrote the backcountry parson John Brown, “one Would think it was a new 
found Paradise.” Families who found Kentucky too remote opted for the growing 
settlements along the Ohio River’s tributaries in present-day West Virginia.7
These transients hardly encountered a warm welcome from their new neighbors. 
Some Indians registered their grievances through colonial channels, complaining to 
provincial officials that not only were “Great Numbers” of Virginians planting 
themselves on native hunting grounds in Kentucky, but some had even crossed the Ohio, 
killing and driving away the game nearer their towns. Other parties took matters into 
their own hands. A group of Shawnees from the Piqua division attacked Daniel Boone 
and his workmen who were employed in cutting Henderson’s wilderness road and 
followed up this victory by killing two men from another westward-bound group. Two 
months later Cornstalk informed Captain William Russell at Fort Blair on the Great 
Kanawha River that the Piquas intended to be “troublesome to the new settlements 
whenever they can.” Meanwhile, several Delaware warriors plundered the residents of
7 Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 1-6, 10. The controversy surrounding the Henderson purchase 
can be followed in the documentary record from many sources. Dunmore certainly had speculative plans 
for the lands in question himself, so he complained loudly to British officials. Backcountry leaders who 
likely would have attempted a similar scheme if  it had been legal for individuals to purchase land from the 
Indians joined the chorus denouncing Henderson, as did actual settlers in Kentucky who found their titles to 
land questioned by Henderson’s group. Perhaps the best source for all of these varied complaints is 
William P. Palmer, ed., Calendar o f  Virginia State Papers and Other Manuscripts, 11 vols. (Richmond: 
Virginia State Library, 1875), vol. 1.
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the Kanawha Valley, a small band of Cherokees stole horses and killed some newcomers 
to the Kentucky River, and the Wabash nations created enough doubt for Henderson to 
contemplate holding a treaty with them, complete with sizable presents, in exchange for 
permission to develop the grant he had supposedly purchased from the Cherokees.8
Such actions did not stem the tide of settlement entirely, but they did instill 
considerable fear in the minds of frontier travelers. The British adventurer and land 
speculator Nicholas Cresswell hoped to acquire a fortune by investing in Illinois lands, 
but journeying the length of the Ohio River proved to be an impossible task. Upon 
reaching the fledgling Harrodsburg settlement in early June, his party heard the news that 
the Indians had killed four men near the town. “This has struck such a panic that I cannot 
get anyone to go down the Ohio with me on any account,” he lamented. On the return 
trip upriver the group lived in constant fear of ambush. Settlers in less exposed regions, 
like the area around Fort Pitt, also fretted that another Indian war was imminent, 
appealing to Pennsylvania or Virginia authorities for aid.9
As native anxiety regarding encroaching colonists and duplicitous officials 
swelled along with white fears of reprisal, word of battles between British troops and 
Bostonians reached Indian towns at the end of May. This news seemed to surprise the 
Indians, given the insistence from white traders, magistrates, and Indian agents that all 
the people living in the area were subjects of the king. Nevertheless, they generally
8 Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 3, 9, 14-15, 61. The editors point out that while Henderson’s 
company may have considered treating with the Wabash nations, there is no record o f actual 
communication. See p. 3, note 8.
9 Journal o f  Nicholas Cresswell, 82, 89-93 \ American Archives, Ser. 4 ,2 : 1208-09; Pennsylvania 
Archives, 4: 609-10, 647.
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perceived it as one more example of how affairs seemed to be amiss rather than a 
revolutionary question worthy of attention for its own sake. The pressing issues were 
still Virginia’s failure to adequately resolve the previous year’s conflict, the detention of 
Indian chiefs, and the frequent incursions onto their land by roaming Europeans.10
When peace overtures finally arrived in the summer, they came separately from 
Dunmore and the Virginia House of Burgesses, suggesting that the reported rift in the 
east might have implications for the frontier as well. Acting as Dunmore’s agent, 
Connolly called the aggrieved tribes together in mid-June, promising to establish a formal 
peace and to free the Mingo prisoners. The Six Nations arrived punctually and condoled 
with Connolly and Indian trader and former agent George Croghan on June 21. To the 
Indians’ astonishment, however, they discovered the following day that Connolly had 
been arrested by Pennsylvania magistrates for his assumption of authority under Virginia 
auspices. While Connolly attempted to scrounge together bail, the “principal men of the 
area,” including most of the West Augusta Committee of Safety, stepped into the 
diplomatic void.11
Fortunately for Connolly, the other Indian nations had not yet reached Fort Pitt, 
giving him time to secure his release before the treaty proceedings began. A week later 
the Shawnees and most of the Mingos were still conspicuously absent, so Connolly 
delayed three more days before launching talks with the Six Nations and Delawares.
10 Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 15; Although the Indians clearly distinguished between the 
Pennsylvanians and the Virginians, leaders like Connolly and Pennsylvania Governor John Penn both 
emphasized the authority o f the king over all the English and Indian people, particularly during Dunmore’s 
War. See American Archives, Ser. 4, 1: 674-76.
11 Revolutionary Virginia, 3: 213-15. In retaliation for Connolly’s detention, Virginia sheriffs 
arrested three Pennsylvania magistrates and took them to Wheeling until Connolly was released. See 
Pennsylvania Archives, 4: 637.
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Without the previous year’s primary combatants, however, the entire exchange turned 
into a denunciation of the Mingos, who were instructed to remove to New York and 
“settle themselves under the Eyes of their Chiefs.” The remaining nations received
19general affirmation for their neutrality.
In the end Connolly released the Mingo hostages, praised the Delawares for their 
part in brightening the chain of friendship, and warned both groups to avoid crossing the 
Ohio River to hunt. The Senecas and Delawares, in turn, aired their complaints regarding 
trade, requested blacksmiths and interpreters to serve their people, agreed to carry the 
news of peace to westerly nations like the Shawnees and Wyandots, and asked that the 
other end of the friendship chain be placed in King George’s hand. Connolly promised to 
forward the messages and belts to London, seizing the opportunity to reiterate that the 
king “as you rightly judge governs us all as one People,” has a “sincere love for all his 
White as well as his Indian Friends,” and seeks the happiness of them all.13
Although Connolly dominated Virginia’s end of the negotiations, the West 
Augusta Committee attended the entire conference, suggesting that in 1775 the dispute 
between Virginia and Pennsylvania remained a greater factor in regional identity than the 
growing schism between crown and colonists. In a final speech to the Indians, the 
committee expressed support for Connolly’s behavior on the occasion, even though he 
was connected to the vilified Dunmore, apparently indicating that the lines separating 
loyalists and patriots had not yet hardened given the external threat of both native and
12 Revolutionary Virginia, 3: 238-66.
13 Ibid., 3: 241-66, (at 265).
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Pennsylvania resistance. Nevertheless, committee members concluded the meetings with 
a speech that resembled many future American messages to the Indians:
“We consider you in the same Circumstances with ourselves; the great Creator of 
all things made us both a free People and we are determined with all the Powers 
he hath given us to preserve our Lives our Liberties and our Propertys against 
every one who shall attempt to deprive us of them. Be assured Bretheren that we 
will also exert ourselves to maintain you in undisturbed Possession of your natural 
rights and we expect the same brotherly friendship from you by your not 
interfering in any of our disputes.”14
White Eyes, the principal orator for the Delawares, and Kayashuta, the Onondaga 
Council’s designated representative for the Mingos, joined Connolly and the West 
Augusta Committee in viewing the gathering as a success and looked forward to a 
general treaty involving more nations now that they had been charged with extending the 
chain of friendship through the Ohio Country and beyond. The Mingos, however, left 
Fort Pitt quite convinced that the Virginians did not intend to leave their lives, liberties, 
and properties in “undisturbed Possession.” Three weeks after they returned home,
James Wood arrived in one of their towns with the message that the Virginia House of 
Burgesses was inviting them to a treaty. Wood barely managed to deliver his speech 
before he realized that many of the warriors, including some of the prisoners recently 
released from Connolly’s custody, were painted black and intended to kill him. The
u Ibid., 3:266.
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Mingo chief Logan and some of the women effected his escape by hiding him in the 
woods, but the experience scared him enough that he skipped his next scheduled Mingo 
visit, choosing to simply drop off a string of wampum and the speech rather than risk an 
encounter with the “drunk and very troublesome” chief Pluggy.15
A month later Richard Butler and Kayashuta, following a similar route and 
bearing a similar message to Wood’s but acting on behalf of Congress and Pennsylvania, 
uncovered more explanations for the Mingos’ anger. In response to the invitation to treat 
at Fort Pitt, Connessaway replied, “it was hard to Expect them to go to A Council Fire 
with the Tomhock Sticking in their heads.” They had met with Connolly two months 
before but “Came home Again in the Same State,” to their great disappointment. Pluggy 
added that he had tried hard to establish peace with the Virginians, meeting with 
Dunmore twice and even thinking that the conference on the plains of Scioto the previous 
fall had resolved matters. Upon his return home, however, he was “Distressed to the 
heart to See his blood relations lieing dead that he then Saw he Could not depend On the 
faith of A treaty As All that had been Said had Sliped out of his hands Although he 
Meant to hold it fast; therefore he would have No More to Say to Councils.” Before 
Butler and Kayashuta moved on, the Mingos declared that their speeches were good and 
promised to attend the treaty. When pressed about the actual number of attendees, 
though, they hesitated to make a commitment.16
15 Revolutionary Virginia, 3: 263-65; Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 48-50, 56. White Eyes 
serves as a good example o f how both sides attempted to gain Indian loyalty by focusing on individual 
leaders. See Pennsylvania Archives, 4: 637, Revolutionary Virginia, 3: 382-83,4:40-42, and Revolution on 
the Upper Ohio, 39-41. For more discussion o f the British and American competition for allies, see chapter 
four, 18-24.
16Journal o f  Richard Butler, 47: 38-41, 144.
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Like the Mingos, the Shawnees continued to nurse resentment toward the 
Virginians even after they met belatedly with Connolly at Fort Pitt. By the time the 
Shawnees arrived, the Six Nations and Mingos had dispersed, but the Delawares and 
Connolly were still in the vicinity. On the surface the speeches seemed to project good 
will from both sides, but the Shawnees inserted a few subtle barbs that suggested 
lingering frustration. Nimwha accused the Delawares of being “silly,” and having a 
“thick fog before their eyes,” that prevented them from acting in the Shawnees’ best 
interest. All of the chiefs signed a letter addressed to the “Virginians and all the English” 
that reminded the newcomers that they had “derived great Advantages from the Lands 
which you obtained from our Forefathers,” and they trusted that the Virginians would use 
this wealth for good and not evil.17
The Shawnee delegation to Connolly’s conference reached home about the same 
time that Chenusaw burst onto the scene with his troubling report, and James Wood 
arrived with a different version of events in the east. Wood believed that he successfully 
disabused the Shawnees of Chenusaw’s misrepresentations and explained to them the 
true nature of the colonists’ dispute with Dunmore, assuring them that Cutemwha and 
Newa were fine and eager for them to attend the proposed treaty. Despite formal pledges 
to Wood and later Butler to “think of Nothing but what is good” and to assemble at Fort 
Pitt, the Shawnee towns were in turmoil. When he was not asking Wood probing 
questions about the number of men from Virginia engaged in fighting the British, 
principal chief Kishanosity was complaining about white expansion onto Shawnee
17 Revolutionary Virginia, 7: 767, 771.
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hunting grounds and threatening to go to Kentucky himself to resolve the matter. Butler
learned from a Maquachake headwoman that her division of the Shawnees was the only
one committed to peace; the Piquas and Chillicothes seemed ready to take up the hatchet,
perhaps even directing some of their ire against their fellow Shawnees. This secret
information corroborated the report from the trader James Bavard who told Wood that the
Shawnees were “Constantly Counseling and that the Women all seemed very uneasy in
1 8Expectations that there would be War.”
Wood and Butler attributed this unrest to the fact that they were not alone on the 
campaign trail to forge strong alliances with Ohio’s Indians. Rumors circulated in 
Pittsburgh that the Shawnees had been late to Connolly’s treaty because they were 
meeting with two Frenchmen. A few days into Wood’s embassy he learned from the 
Delawares (first from some women and then officially from the Delaware council) that an 
English officer and the French trader Duperon Baby from Detroit had convened a general 
meeting among the Wyandots. They warned the Indians that the Virginians were plotting 
to take their land by a two-pronged invasion, via the Great Lakes and the Ohio River, and 
that under no circumstances should they attend any treaties initiated by those 
untrustworthy people. Furthermore, they shared that “the French [who] were thrown 
down the last War by the English...were now got up again and much Stronger than ever 
and would Assist their Childeren as they formerly did.” Wood encountered this report in 
the Wyandot and Shawnee towns as well, although these Indians denied hearing the 
promise of French aid. Despite these efforts from Detroit to prevent any association
18 Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 57-63; Journal o f  Richard Butler, 47: 144-49.
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between Indians and colonists, Wood boasted on his return to Fort Pitt that “his superior 
eloquence prevailed and all the different nations he has been at will certainly attend the 
Treaty.” 19
Other observers failed to share Wood’s optimism. Congressional Indian 
commissioner James Wilson arrived in Pittsburgh a week after Wood and reported that 
“alarm had spread over the Frontiers of this Province [Pennsylvania] and Virginia.” 
Although he believed the settlers’ panic to be unwarranted, he did concede that “some of 
the Wyandots and Mingoes have not ‘such friendly Dispositions as are to be wished for,’ 
and the Shawnees appear to be disregarding an invitation to meet with the Virginians.” 
Consequently, he dispatched Butler and Kayashuta to secure the wavering nations. Like 
Wood, they immediately encountered the intelligence that the Detroit commandant (and 
allegedly Guy Johnson) had instructed the tribes to avoid treaties with anyone but 
themselves. The Wyandots attempted to clarify that he had not given them a “blody belt 
and tomhock to Strike the Virginians” but rather a belt to “Open their Eyes to See the 
Virginians” in case the Big Knives came to attack them. This distinction was lost on 
Butler, however, who continued to blame British authorities for encouraging the Indians 
to do “Injury to the Publick in general.”20
19 Revolutionary Virginia, 3: 247; Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 36, 44,47-48, 54, 62 (at 44); 
Journal o f  Nicholas Cresswell, 100. Although Wood’s hosts largely denied receiving an offer o f French 
aid, another Virginia ambassador, a Mohawk named the Doctor, and his interpreter, Simon Girty, reported 
considerable French enthusiasm among the Six Nations in the Allegheny region. They testified that Guy 
Johnson had invited the Senecas to Niagara where he warned them o f the devious Bigknife who, despite 
promises to the contrary, would take Indian land and fail to deliver trade goods. Johnson also supposedly 
reminded them o f their French father who had been watching for his chance to protect his children from 
just such impositions and was now prepared to send his ships to fight. Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 67- 
70.
20Paul H. Smith, ed., Letters o f  Delegates to Congress, 1774-1789,26 vols. (Washington: Library 
of Congress, 1976-2000) 1: 706; Journal ofRichard Butler, 47: 33 ,36 ,38 .
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While Butler and Wood searched for signs of British and French tampering, the 
Indians sought to piece together the strands of information that had reached their villages 
from a variety of sources. Detroit’s representatives had instructed them to ignore any 
friendly overtures from the colonists who spoke from the lips and not the heart. Their 
French father was rumored to be awake and prepared to give them assistance. Guy 
Johnson had sent word that they should “sit still” until he came to Detroit to meet with 
them. Meanwhile, the Virginians and the “Counsellors round the [new] Great Council 
fire at Philadelphia” had invited them to a treaty, but at the same time, a former Shawnee 
prisoner had warned Cornstalk that he “Expected Verry soon A great Body of the big 
knife people” to cross the Ohio at the Great Kanawha and advance into their country. 
Perhaps, the Indians reasoned, “the white People intended to Call them To A Treaty, 
[only to have] the Army...go in their Absence and Cut of[f] their Town[s] Women and 
Children and Cut up the Com.”21
To determine an appropriate response to this conglomeration of information, the 
various Ohio nations spent considerable time counseling together, soliciting advice from 
more distant tribes, and entertaining native visitors who could potentially contribute to 
the conversation. Although the Wyandots, Mingos, Ottawas, and the Piqua and 
Chillicothe divisions of the Shawnees tended to be more suspicious of colonial motives 
than other groups, all of the Ohio Indians believed they needed a better understanding of 
the cause of the dispute between the English before they could plot their course of action. 
Seizing the opportunity afforded by Wood’s and Butler’s appearances, they quizzed both
21 Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 67-70; Journal o f Richard Butler, 46: 393,47: 32-33.
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men about the fighting in Boston, the reason for the civil war, and the expectations either 
side might have for Indian assistance. Most of these conversations also included follow- 
up questions about the settlements, forts, and garrisons being planted in Kentucky. 
Perhaps Butler’s “evasive” answers or Wood’s dogged insistence of Virginia’s rights 
failed to satisfy the Indians’ anxious curiosity. More likely, the Indians wanted to 
thoroughly explore every diplomatic option that could potentially affect their world. In 
any case, chiefs from the Wyandots, Mingos, Ottawas, Shawnees, Delawares, and Six 
Nations made their way to Pittsburgh in the fall of 1775. Their attendance did not 
necessarily signify trust, however: the Ottawas, Mingos, and Wyandots each sent two 
men toward the Ohio River to watch for any signs of an American army.22
If the 1775 conference was intended to eliminate native uneasiness, it failed 
miserably. Despite the assurances that unruly settlers would be brought to justice and 
that no armed contingent was preparing to invade Indian country, the White Mingo 
complained that he had been fired on by “two Men Cloathed in White hunting Shirts” on 
his way to Fort Pitt. Treaty commissioners scrambled to resolve that situation and 
diligently performed appropriate introductory and condolence ceremonies with all the 
tribes, but their firm reiteration that Kentucky belonged exclusively to Virginia and their 
insistence that the Shawnees had failed to comply with Dunmore’s conditions o f peace, 
rankled Cornstalk and his fellow chiefs.23
22 Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 51-53; Journal o f  Richard Butler, 47: 32, 36-37. Although most 
Ohio nations were eventually represented at the 1775 conference, the Shawnees, Mingos, Wyandots, and 
Ottawas each had at least one false start, where the delegation hesitated and sometimes even turned back 
before sending men on to Pittsburgh. See Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 70-71; Journal o f  Richard Butler, 
47: 149-51.
23 Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 30-33, 81-84,99.
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Twice Cornstalk proclaimed that his people had painstakingly returned all their 
white captives from years past (except children with one Indian parent and those too 
feeble to leave the village) and all stolen property and hinted that the Shawnees were not 
the “only Nation who had stolen their Horses.” He even invited any interested colonists 
to come to the Shawnee towns and search for people or possessions alleged to be missing, 
but the commissioners continued to maintain that the Shawnees were in violation of the 
terms of peace and would have to leave their hostages with the Virginians. Tensions rose 
higher when Kayashuta offered to mediate, emphasizing that since “the Six Nations are 
the head of all the other Tribes here present,” he had the authority to intervene in 
Shawnee affairs. Given the smoldering resentment that many Shawnees harbored toward 
the Iroquois, Kayashuta’s arrogant declaration probably seemed as great a threat to 
Shawnee autonomy as did Virginia’s hostage-takers. Feeling pressure from all sides, the 
Shawnee chief Nimwha promised to comply with every demand, hoping that the peace 
treaty could thereby be concluded and international observers like Kayashuta and White 
Eyes could be held at bay.24
This wrangling over the terms of peace for Dunmore’s War overshadowed 
Congress’s message of friendship and did nothing to calm the “bad Wind” that Cornstalk 
believed was blowing through the Ohio towns. “I know not from whence it has Arisen,” 
he declared during the conference’s first week, “but I desire the White People will search 
into it.” By the time he returned home, he likely still entertained questions about the 
contentious spirit’s origins, but he suspected its connection to the dispute between the
24 Ibid., 103-05, 113-25 (at 104,123).
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colonists and their “ Fathers evil Counsellors beyond the Great Water.” The 
congressional and Virginia representatives offered few explanations for the causes of the 
quarrel, choosing instead to repeatedly stress that the thirteen colonies had become “so 
firmly United and Inseparably bound together by one lasting Chain of Freindship, that we 
are no more to be Considered as Distinct Nations, but as one great and Strong Man, who 
if Molested in any one of his Members, will not fail to Exert the Combined force of his 
whole Body to Punish the Offender.”25
The treaty negotiators hoped that this veiled threat would do three things: prevent 
a repetition of Dunmore’s War where the Indians singled out the Virginians as their 
enemy, convince the assembled nations that the Americans were formidable, and 
consequently, persuade the Indians that they should remain neutral. Ironically, this 
declaration of American strength and unity coincided with the message crafted by British 
commander Richard Lemoult at Detroit. He also emphasized colonial union, claiming 
that it had turned all colonists into violent, land-grabbing Virginians. Rather than 
counseling the nations to “Stay at home,” he urged them to keep watch because the 
collective “Virginians” would soon be making an attempt to steal Indian land.26
Cornstalk and other leaders undoubtedly recognized that to chart a course among 
these bitter antagonists would be difficult, especially since “the bad Wind” had already 
induced some of their warriors to bum the abandoned Fort Blair at the Great Kanawha 
River and to threaten the new Kentucky settlements. Most conference attendees left Fort 
Pitt mulling over their options with both hope and trepidation. The rift between king and
25 Ibid., 9 2 ,95-96.
26 Journal o f  Richard Butler, 47: 38; Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 95.
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colonist promised to establish competing sources of trade goods, political clout, and 
military muscle, all of which could benefit Ohio Valley customers and tribal leaders 
eager to strengthen their own and their nations’ diplomatic positions. At the same time, 
however, warring Europeans always seemed to make their way into Indian territory, a 
fact that resulted not only in destruction of villages, crops, and lives, but somehow in the 
loss of native land as well.27
While the impending revolution promised to affect Indian societies for good, ill, 
or both, the scattered Shawnees, Wyandots, and Mingos who torched the property of 
foreign invaders demonstrated that they did not intend to be passive observers whose 
behavior would be determined by either the British or the Americans. Other Ohio Valley 
Indians responded differently to the war’s developments, but they all shared a 
fundamental objective that guided their actions, speeches, and alliances. An obvious part 
of this common goal was to preserve their land from intruding settlers. But perhaps even 
more vital to their sensibilities was the need to maintain their position at the negotiating 
table with their powerful English and colonial neighbors.
Although native groups prized landed independence, few voices among them 
advocated complete dissociation from Europeans at this stage in Indian-white relations. 
Trade goods had become nearly indispensable to most villages, and certain cultural
D
practices had been transformed by the influx of new technology. Nevertheless, the
27Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 93,111,117-18; Letters o f  Delegates to Congress, 2:447-48; 
Revolutionary Virginia, 3: 250.
28 For more on the transformation o f native cultures because o f trade, see James Axtell, “The First 
Consumer Revolution,” in Beyond 1492: Encounters in Colonial North America (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1992), 125-51; Daniel Richter, Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History o f  
Early America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 41-68; Colin G. Calloway, New Worlds 
For All: Indians, Europeans, and the Remaking o f Early America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
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Ohio Valley nations desperately sought to protect their political and cultural autonomy, 
recognizing that as long as they retained leverage in important matters, they could 
genuinely engage in inter-cultural negotiations. With populations dwindling while the 
number of settlers exploded, their greatest hope for influencing diplomatic relations lay in 
the huge swath of land under their control. Thus, the two objectives were linked: 
preservation of land meant preservation of their status as viable political brokers.
Dunmore’s War offered an example of how both goals could easily be threatened. 
Not only had the Virginia governor unilaterally decreed the terms of the peace treaty 
(eliminating native negotiating power), those very stipulations further alienated the 
Shawnees from a significant tract of land. Consequently, the renewed possibility of war 
in their region a year later prompted the Ohio Valley tribes to consider carefully the 
strategy that would enable them to swing the balance of power back to their side. 
Throughout the Revolution, most groups contrived several plans to accomplish their 
designs, but rarely did they opt for the same course of action at the same time for the 
same reasons.
Unification
As the conflict between the British and the Americans intensified throughout 
1775 and 1776, many Indian nations concluded that their best chance to correct abuses 
from encroaching settlers and devious traders had arrived. While the Europeans were 
engaged in their own battles, the Indians could unite to drive the multiplying whites far
Press, 1997), 42-67; Peter C. Mancall, Deadly Medicine: Indians and Alcohol in Early America (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1995); Axtell, The Indians’ New South: Cultural Change in the Colonial 
Southeast (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1997), 45-71.
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from their hunting grounds. If unification could transcend regional boundaries, success 
seemed well within their grasp.
To achieve this aim, a delegation of Shawnees, accompanied by several Mingos, 
Mohawks, Ottawas, Delawares, and other Six Nations representatives visited the 
Cherokees in the summer of 1776 and argued the case for combined action. Speaking on 
an enormous war belt, the Shawnee leader reminded his hosts “that in a very few years 
their nation, from being a great people, [had been] reduced to a handful.” Previously they 
had “possessed lands almost to the seashore [but now] the red people who were once 
masters of the whole country hardly possessed ground enough to stand on.” Seemingly 
minor forts quickly swarmed with armed men, closely followed by towns and 
settlements. “It was plain,” he insisted, that the colonists intended “to extirpate them, and 
that he thought it better to die like men than to dwindle away by inches.” Death could 
perhaps be avoided entirely if all the aggrieved parties worked together. An Ottawa 
spokesman lamented that in the past, Indians “were constantly at war, one nation against 
another, and reduced by degrees while their common enemies were taking the advantage 
of their situation.” He and the rest of the delegation “were willing, and they hoped every 
nation would be the same, to drop all their former quarrels and to join in one common 
cause.”29
Conveniently, the Revolution offered a prime opportunity to pursue this attack. 
Pressing matters in the east distracted the Americans, and although they had proven 
capable of unified action against their mother country, they rarely managed to agree on
29 DAR, 12: 198-207 (at 202).
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frontier affairs. Procuring supplies had become more difficult since the war began, but 
the multi-tribal delegation was confident that their former fathers, the French, could 
provide them with arms, ammunition, and provisions. If the French failed, surely the 
British would join them in this effort to conquer a common enemy. In fact, after 
speaking to the assembled chiefs and warriors, several deputies urged Henry Stuart and 
Alexander Cameron, British Indian agents among the Cherokees, to also take up the 
hatchet. Even if the British only provided staple resources, the strength of a true pan- 
Indian attack promised to accomplish both native objectives: they would retain their land, 
perhaps even reclaiming some that had been lost, and their united power would ensure 
that their voice would carry weight during future negotiations.30
The militant segment of the Cherokees, led by the young but influential chief 
Dragging Canoe, already advocated violent retaliation against avaricious settlers and land 
speculators on the Watauga and Nolachucky Rivers near the Cherokee towns. Many of 
the older chiefs, such as Dragging Canoe’s father Attakullaculla, worked with Cameron 
and Stuart to prevent hostilities, even sending letters to the offending trespassers asking 
them to return eastward. These peace efforts were stymied, however, when the 
Wataugans seized the first messenger and incarcerated him for two weeks. Although 
Cameron hastened to send out a second representative, the damage had been done. When 
the northern Indians arrived in the midst of these volatile circumstances with their own 
tales of white perfidy, they fueled Dragging Canoe’s eagerness to attack. Many older
30 Ibid., 202-04.
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chiefs were still reluctant to engage in battle, but eventually Stuart concluded that “it was
<3 -I
in vain to talk any more of peace.”
Despite Dragging Canoe’s enthusiasm and the delegation’s promise to take their 
compelling message to all the southern tribes and the nations on the Wabash River, the 
Shawnee mission failed in 1776. Lacking unity within their own nation, the Cherokees 
attacked prematurely (only a few weeks after accepting the Shawnee war belt) and faced 
the wrath of Virginia, Georgia, and both Carolinas, who proceeded to flatten several 
sizable Cherokee towns. Dissenting Shawnees also opposed the deputation’s efforts. 
Cornstalk reportedly warned settlers in Kentucky that the famous Mingo, Logan, with 
fourteen others would be passing through their region en route to the Cherokees, hinting 
that they would do well to destroy the entire party. Together, these setbacks darkened the 
northern Indians’ grand vision of a unified native force pushing the Americans back over 
the mountains.32
Yet the idea of unification as a strategic response to the Revolution remained very 
much alive in the minds of Indians and frontier whites. Jarret Williams, an American 
trader among the Cherokees, reported the news of a Cherokee-Shawnee alliance as he 
warned the backcountry settlements of the Cherokees’ impending attack. This 
intelligence circulated rapidly throughout the entire Ohio Valley from July to October,
31 Alexander Cameron to John Stuart, July 9, 1776, PRO, CO 5:77, f. 126-199d; DAR, 12: 207;
For fuller accounts o f  the struggle between Dragging Canoe and the other chiefs, see Colin G. Calloway, 
The American Revolution in Indian Country: Crisis and Diversity in Native American Communities 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 194-99, and Gregory Evans Dowd, A Spirited Resistance: 
The North American Indian Struggle fo r  Unity, 1715-1845 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1992), 47-53.
32 Dowd, A Spirited Resistance, 52-54; Calloway, American Revolution in Indian Country, 196-99; 
DAR, 12: 199,205.
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prompting a flurry of nervous correspondence between fort commanders and county 
lieutenants, who envisioned a “general confederacy” of all the Ohio and Great Lakes 
Indians launching attacks along with the Cherokees. The Shawnees who delivered the 
war belt in the southern towns contributed to these fears by killing two men and capturing 
three daughters of Kentucky colonels Daniel Boone and Richard Callaway on their way 
home. Indeed, the Shawnees became so connected with the idea of Indian unification in 
the minds of most whites that the non-militant Shawnee leaders devoted considerable 
time to refuting the notion. Before the October 1776 treaty at Fort Pitt (attended by 
Mohawks, Senecas, Delawares, and Shawnees), several Shawnee chiefs pulled American 
Indian agent George Morgan aside to tell him that it was the Six Nations who brought the 
tomahawk to their towns before proceeding to the Cherokees, “in order to induce us and 
them to strike the Virginians.”33
As the war proceeded and the Americans’ failure to stem the tide of immigrants 
into contested territory encouraged more frequent raids into western Pennsylvania, 
western Virginia, and Kentucky, frontier fears of pan-Indian confederacies only grew 
stronger. But few observers credited the Indians with generating unity on their own, 
choosing instead to emphasize that the British directed their affairs from Detroit.
Traders, emissaries, or prisoners who spent time in Indian villages witnessed a  different 
story. Escaped prisoner William Hancock announced that while he was held captive at 
the Shawnee town of Chillicothe in July 1778, “there was a Grand-Council held with the
33 American Archives, Ser. 5, 1:111-12; Morgan Letterbooks, 2: 21; Revolution on the Upper 
Ohio, 174, 179-83, 186-90,199; George Morgan Letterbook, MG-19, Accession File, Folder 1, 74, 
Pennsylvania State Archives; For more information on the Shawnees’ capture o f the Boone and Callaway 
girls, see Faragher, Daniel Boone, 131-40.
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principal Indians from different Nations” to plot an attack on the expanding settlement at 
Boonesborough, Kentucky. Although the native army that laid siege to Boonesborough 
in September utilized artillery and explosives from the British and even included a small 
contingent of Detroit militia, the entire offensive was initiated and masterminded by the 
Shawnees and their allies.34
The Shawnees were certainly not alone in their efforts to promote Indian unity. In 
September 1778, after the Virginian George Rogers Clark and his militia had overrun 
Kaskaskia and Cahokia in the Illinois country and Vincennes along the Wabash River, 
many local Indians wavered between making peace with Clark (who promised ample 
trade and seemed to be a formidable military figure) and joining together to check his 
advance through their territory. At this juncture, speeches arrived from the Chickasaws 
for all the Indians along the Wabash River, exhorting them to tell the Virginians “to 
withdraw from your lands.” After citing themselves as an example of people who lost 
their lands to white invaders, they promised to assist any native people eager to defend 
their property. “You know that for a long time we have worked, that all the brown skins
34 For fears regarding confederacies among the Indians and the general attribution o f  those 
confederacies to the work of Governor Hamilton at Detroit, see Reuben Gold Thwaites and Louise P. 
Kellogg, eds., Frontier Defense on the Upper Ohio, 1777-1778 (Madison: Wisconsin State Historical 
Society, 1912), 25, 38,42. For Hancock’s deposition, see Louise P. Kellogg, ed., Frontier Advance on the 
Upper Ohio, 1778-1779 (Madison: Wisconsin State Historical Society, 1916), 114. The Shawnees launched 
this attack on Boonesborough partly because the settlement continued to grow rapidly and partly as a 
retaliatory gesture for the murder o f their chief Cornstalk in November 1777 at Fort Randolph near the 
conjunction o f the Great Kanhawa and Ohio Rivers. Cornstalk was a leading advocate o f neutrality, but his 
death at the hands o f frontier soldiers solidified the majority o f the Shawnees in staunch opposition to the 
Americans. The September 1778 siege o f Boonesborough lasted a week, after which the army broke up 
and harassed surrounding stations, “inflicting more loss of life and property with these traditional tactics 
than they had done during the whole o f the siege.” Faragher, Daniel Boone, 198. See Faragher, Daniel 
Boone, 182-98 for more on the siege as well as George W. Ranck, “Boonesborough: Its Founding, Pioneer 
Struggles, Indian Experiences, Transylvania Days, and Revolutionary Annals,” Filson Club Publications, 
no. 16 (Louisville: John P. Morton & Co., 1901), 75-102.
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should act as a single man to preserve our lands. We have made peace with all the 
nations; you are the only ones who will be deaf...we hope my brothers that you will listen 
to us.”35
Appeals to racial solidarity increased among the Indians as continental forces and 
state militias smashed their way across the Ohio River with greater frequency in the war’s 
later years. After Clark’s advance into Illinois in 1778, his capture of Detroit’s lieutenant 
governor, Henry Hamilton, at Vincennes in 1779, and the 1778-1779 American campaign 
from Fort Pitt that planted Forts McIntosh and Laurens in Delaware territory, the Indians 
suspected an invading army every spring. In April 1780 and 1781 the Mingos,
Wyandots, Delawares, and Shawnees clustered around Sandusky entreated the Ottawas, 
Potawatomies, Chippewas, and Hurons living nearer Detroit and the Great Lakes to join 
them in repulsing the “great body of Rebels” expected to be on the march soon. Calling 
themselves representatives of the “Confederacy on the Ohio,” they reminded their 
“ancient... Allies” that “we are all of one blood and ought to be of one mind as we are all 
of the same colour.” Eight months later in December 1781 the Delaware chief 
Buckonghelas informed Detroit’s commanding officer Major Arent Schuyler De Peyster 
that the British war belt he had just accepted from the Wyandots was “not only for war 
but serves amongst us brown skins as a token of alliance and amity.” Clearly, native
“Xfsalliances were visible before both Indian and white audiences.
The impetus for native unification gained more momentum in 1782 and 1783 as 
tribes realized that the British and Americans were engaging in peace negotiations
35 MPHC, 10: 297-98.
36 “Council at Detroit, April 26, 1780,” RG 1 0 ,13: 3; MPHC, 10: 473, 544.
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without their input. In a repeat of their 1776 embassy, several Delawares, Shawnees, 
Mingos, and Mohawks headed south to “establish a firm league and confederacy amongst 
the different tribes of indians in an alliance for their mutual safety and defence.” 
Representatives from the Cherokees had already united with the Sandusky nations in 
1780, so twelve hundred Cherokee warriors joined the delegation in seeking to recruit the 
Creeks, Choctaws, and Chickasaws. News of this mission frightened Americans because 
of its military threat and the British because of the enormous challenge of supplying such 
a large assembly of Indians when funds were growing scarce. Although the January 1783 
convention in St. Augustine yielded no dramatic assaults on the American backcountry, it 
did encourage Indian unity. In September, Creek and Cherokee delegates could be found 
at Sandusky with the Ohio and Great Lakes nations, pledging “that there may be never 
hereafter a separation between us, let there be Peace or War, it shall never disunite us, for 
our Interests are alike, nor should anything ever be done but by the voice of the whole.”37 
Despite the limited success of the 1782-1783 pan-Indian efforts, no diplomatic 
maneuvers during the Revolution matched the elaborate offensive vision of 1776. For the 
next decade the idea of unification survived in native minds and surfaced occasionally in 
response to specific threats. But it generally focused on defensive goals and failed to 
create a sustained resistance to European attempts to strip the Ohio Valley Indians of 
their land and sovereignty.
37 “Gov. Tonyn to Guy Carleton, Dec. 23,1782,” “Lieutenant Colonel Brown to Guy Carleton, 
Jan. 12,1783,” reel M-359, British Headquarters Papers, NAC; R G 10, 12: 254-57; James Alton James, 
ed., George Rogers Clark Papers, vol. 19 of Collections o f  the Illinois Historical Society (Springfield, IL: 
Illinois State Historical Library, 1912), 62-63,189; MPHC, 20: 179-80.
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Several factors conspired against unification as a principal strategic response to 
the Revolution. Geographic positions frequently altered native perceptions o f the 
European threat. Those villages in direct competition with white settlers pressed for 
immediate redress of grievances, while those farther from daily contact felt less inclined 
to enact drastic measures. Internecine strife, as evidenced by Cornstalk’s betrayal of his 
fellow Shawnees on the 1776 delegation to the Cherokees, proved to be another obstacle 
to genuine unity among the nations. Struggles between local leaders seemed particularly 
acute in the many multi-tribal towns that dotted the Ohio Valley by the 1770s and 1780s. 
Almost every Indian group had a faction that advocated a response to the Revolution 
radically different from the main body’s chosen course of action.38
Conflict within nations only exacerbated the tensions between various tribes. 
Traditional enmities ran deep, but sometimes, recent disagreements could incite equally 
virulent hostilities and distrust. For instance, in the summer of 1780 while two large 
armies of confederated Indians were attacking St. Louis in the west and Kentucky in the 
south, the Miamis were targeting the Potawatomies along the Wabash River. A year later 
the Wabash nations were more interested in punishing the Piankeshaws for selling a piece 
of land than they were in preparing for the widely- rumored invasion of George Rogers 
Clark. The Sioux and the Chippewas feuded intermittently during the Revolution years, 
destabilizing potential harmony among the Wisconsin Indians. Many Ohio tribes still 
resented that the Six Nations claimed sovereignty over them and their lands, prompting
38 DAR, 12: 205; See Michael N. McConnell, A Country Between: The Upper Ohio Valley and Its 
Peoples, 1 724-1774 (Lincoln: University o f  Nebraska Press, 1992) for more details on the multi-national 
character o f the Ohio Valley.
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White Eyes to vehemently denounce the Iroquois representatives at the 1776 treaty 
council at Fort Pitt and other Ohio leaders to be skeptical of Kayashuta’s efforts to form 
an “alliance” at Detroit in 1780. In short, few nations or individuals were willing to 
commit to a confederation whose benefits to a rival might far outstrip the benefits to 
themselves. Such a move would certainly weaken their national or personal positions at 
the political and economic bargaining table.39
Neutrality
If unification against colonial expansion carried great risk, neutrality initially 
promised to yield safe returns during the Revolution. For the first two years of the 
conflict, agents at Detroit and Fort Pitt encouraged Indians “to Stay at home, to take Care 
of your Women and children, and follow other Usual Occupations.” This advice 
appeared to ensure that troops would refrain from trespassing on native land, thus 
protecting persons and property and offering no insidious foothold to a military presence 
that would inevitably attract farms and settlements. In theory, neutrality also prevented 
the Indians’ fate from being determined by outsiders. Being on good terms with both 
sides should guarantee that they would be friendly with the winner. Control over tribal 
land and negotiating status might not be stronger, but at least it would be unscathed.40
39 MPHC, 9: 361,475, 585,10: 273,404,406, 569; RG 1 0 ,13: 25-27; Colin G. Calloway, ed., 
Revolution and Confederation, vol. 18 of Early American Indian Documents: Treaties and Laws, 1607- 
1789, ed. Alden T. Vaughan (Bethesda, MD: University Publications o f America, 1994), 139,141; Louise 
Phelps Kellogg, ed., Frontier Retreat on the Upper Ohio, 1779-1781 (Madison: Wisconsin Historical 
Society, 1917), 193.
40 Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 95-96, 164-66; The management o f Indian affairs was one o f  
the highest priorities for the new Continental Congress in 1775 (see chapter four for more details). See C. 
Worthington Ford, et al., eds., Journals o f  the Continental Congress, 1774-1789, 34 vols. (Washington 
D.C.: US Government, 1904-1937), 2: 123, 152-53, 174-76, 5: 452 andLDC, 1: 452, 5: 33-34 for 
delegates’ opinions on the question o f whether to enlist Indian allies or encourage them to remain neutral. 
For more on the debate about which side enlisted Indians first, see Barbara Graymont, The Iroquois in the 
American Revolution (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1972) and DAR, 11: 56.
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Since Congress’s first admonition to “sit still” came during the official treaty to 
resolve Dunmore’s War, many Indians present at Fort Pitt in October 1775 equated 
neutrality in the Revolution and compliance with the previous war’s peace terms. Having 
been expressly rebuked for their resistance to the return of all white prisoners, the 
Shawnee faction led by Cornstalk spent the winter of 1775-1776 rounding up all the 
prisoners they could find among their own people and even some among the Mingos. 
When they sent the prisoners to Fort Pitt in the spring, they were careful to note their 
conformity to the peace agreement in the same breath they mentioned their determination 
to not “meddle in your Quarrel.” They also made it very clear, however, that their 
neutrality was conditional. “We will be glad if  you send no Army to Detroit, nor suffer 
any to cross the Ohio,” they emphasized, pointedly mentioning that the Americans had 
promised that none of their people would “cross the Ohio or settle on any of our Lands.” 
Just in case the Americans believed that they were choosing to “sit still” because 
Congress had prodded them in that direction, they were also quick to call attention to the 
fact that the commandants at Detroit had said the same thing.41
Throughout 1776 and 1777 Cornstalk and the Maquachake division of the 
Shawnees continued to seek peace and avoid becoming embroiled in war of any kind. 
George Morgan visited several Shawnee towns as one of his first official acts as Indian 
agent in June 1776 and renewed the chain of friendship, even noting that the Shawnee
41 Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 152,175; 1776 Morgan Letterbook, 5-7; At the 1776 treaty at 
Fort Pitt, Kayashuta echoed the Shawnee sentiment that he and his fellow Senecas would remain neutral as 
long as the Americans “mind fighting your Enemies along the sea side, but not come into our Country to 
fight.” He also reiterated the Americans’ statement that they “did not at all desire our Lands.” Calloway, 
Revolution and Confederation, 135-36.
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chiefs seemed to be having a favorable impact on the Mingos. In time, however, the 
Chillicothe, Piqua, and Kispoki Shawnees increasingly opted for hostility toward the 
encroaching Americans, leading Cornstalk and Nimwha to consider moving nearer the 
Delaware towns where the leaders also embraced neutrality.42
Before this move took place, general suspicions of the Shawnees induced Capt. 
Matthew Arbuckle, commander at Fort Randolph, to detain two friendly Shawnee 
messengers in September 1777 and to announce that he intended to confine “as many as 
fall into my hands” until he received instructions to act differently. A week later 
Cornstalk sent his son, Elinipsico, to inquire about the prisoners; a while later Cornstalk 
himself arrived to remedy the situation. Arbuckle imprisoned him and his fellow 
ambassadors Red Hawk and Petalla. On November 9, Elinipsico returned to Fort 
Randolph, this time to investigate his father’s condition. The day after his arrival, a party 
of Indians hiding near the fort killed one of the militiamen stationed on the Kanhawa. In 
revenge, the man’s company pounced upon the four Shawnees, shooting Cornstalk, 
Elinipsico, and Red Hawk and “shamefully mangling” Petalla. Although several 
Maquachake leaders continued to pursue neutrality, these cold-blooded murders 
galvanized the majority of the Shawnees as well as other Ohio tribes to increase their 
attacks on the American frontier. Gen. Edward Hand, in charge of continental military 
affairs in the west, George Morgan, Virginia governor Patrick Henry, and Virginia militia
42 1776 Morgan Letterbook, 23-36; Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 204; Frontier Defense, 166. 
For more information on the divisions among the Shawnees and the difficulty of maintaining a neutral 
stance, see Calloway, American Revolution in Indian Country, 158-81.
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lieutenants William Preston and William Fleming all attempted to conciliate the 
Shawnees but to little avail.43
If participation in Dunmore’s War cast a lingering shadow over Shawnee 
declarations of neutrality during the Revolution, the Delawares frequently drew upon 
their cooperation with the Americans in 1774 to bolster their credibility during the next 
contest. “We will mind our Business and not join either side, though the people of 
Niagara and Detroit persuade us ever so much,” they announced at the 1776 Fort Pitt 
conference. Almost immediately, however, they discovered that neutrality to the 
Americans meant complete dissociation from the British and any British sympathizers. 
The Delawares were not to supply British garrisons with necessary provisions nor were 
they to offer hospitality to passing bands that might have hostile intentions toward the 
American settlements. As friends of the colonies, they were to report any suspicious 
activity or intelligence, recruit tribes with British leanings, and eventually, allow free 
passage through their territory for a colonial army to attack Detroit. Moravian 
missionaries living near the principal Delaware town of Coshocton supported this agenda, 
encouraging the Delaware council to share inside information and even presuming to 
speak on behalf of the Delawares regarding important matters such as bringing an 
American army to Coshocton for defense. “Captain White Eyes in his speech hath not 
spoken quite so plain, for which he hath reason enough,” David Zeisberger confided to
43 Frontier Defense, 126-27, 149-50, 157-63, 172-73, 188-89,207-09,234-37,240, 258-61. 
Arbuckle’s suspicions o f  Cornstalk and the Shawnees were in place at least a year before Cornstalk was 
murdered on his watch. Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 186-87.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
98
George Morgan during an exchange about Delaware defense, “but I can tell you that he 
wisheth an army might come out now—the sooner the better.”44
Zeisberger’s request for an army mirrored plans that various American 
constituencies already wanted to set in motion. As the Wyandots and Mingos increased 
the frequency and destructiveness of their attacks in 1777, General Hand wrestled with 
how to maintain good relations with the Delawares while sending troops against the 
offending towns. He hoped to deploy several scouting parties to roam around Indian 
territory, but he feared the consequences of encounters with friendly Delawares, a likely 
occurrence given that they resided on the lands nearest most major American forts. 
Indeed, White Eyes had stressed that “if an Army should march in the Indian Country it 
should take its march above & below our Towns that our Women & Children might 
remain quiet & not be too much frightened.”45
Despite Hand’s reported desire to protect the neutral Delawares, their lives and 
lands were constantly threatened. Angry settlers sought to kill Delaware travelers to Fort 
Pitt in retaliation for attacks perpetrated by other Indians. Even Hand led an expedition 
in February 1778 that ambushed two parties of Delaware women, killing four women, an 
old man, and a boy. The confused Delaware council complained to Morgan and the 
Indian commissioners that “you told me that all the Nations should see what a lasting 
Friendship we have with one another, but instead of proving this you struck the
44 Calloway, Revolution and Confederation, 132, 134-35 (quote); Morgan Letter books, 1: 13, 22, 
48, 50, 52, 80-89,2: 5, 9, 13-14, 3: 18-21, 26-28,43, 55-57, 65, 68, 70; Frontier Defense, 29, 86-92, 100,
112, 115-16; Frontier Advance, 119 (quote).
45 Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 236-38; Morgan Letterbooks, 1: 74-77; Frontier Defense, 48-49, 
97 (quote); Mary C. Darlington, ed., Fort P itt and Letters from the Frontier (Pittsburgh: J.R. Weldin & Co., 
1892, rpt. Amo Press, 1971), 229-30.
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Tomhawk in my Head, of which others will be glad & mock at me.” It took all o f 
Morgan’s diplomatic skill to restore peaceful relations, but several months later the 
commissioners and the new western military commander, Gen. Lachlan McIntosh, 
attempted to trick the Delawares into moving from a neutral policy to outright alliance 
with the Americans. The nation protested and many leaders abandoned the American 
interest entirely, especially after several frontiersmen murdered White Eyes, the 
Americans’ staunchest supporter. The remnant abandoned the pretense of neutrality.46
Withstanding the colonists’ breaches of neutrality might have been easier for the 
Delawares if their Indian neighbors had also respected their position. On several 
occasions the Wyandots berated them for adhering too closely to the Americans. In July 
1778 White Eyes sent a frantic letter to Morgan describing a recent conference at Detroit 
where “the Nations have agreed to fall upon the Delawares, & the Wiandots are to make 
the beginning.” Undoubtedly, this belligerent assembly recognized that Delaware leaders 
often aided the commander at Fort Pitt and hindered their assaults on American 
settlements, thus making the Delawares a legitimate military target. Nevertheless, such 
threats to Delaware security pushed them away from their preferred neutral stance.47
As neutrality was being abandoned in the upper Ohio Valley, George Rogers 
Clark was introducing it in the Illinois country. Although Clark spent most of his first 
few months in Kaskaskia and Cahokia threatening the Indians, ridiculing the British, and 
explaining the causes of the Revolution, he managed to secure at least a temporary peace
46 Frontier Defense, 35, 215-20,269-70; Morgan Letterbooks, 3: 38-43; Frontier Advance, 138- 
45; George Morgan Collections, Mss 17, 241, 45, Library o f Congress.
7 Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 203,218-19,244; Frontier Defense, 27, 29,164-65; Frontier 
Advance, 84, 94-95,117-20 (at 117-18); MPHC, 9: 448-50.
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with many nations from the Illinois, Wabash, and St. Joseph River regions. When several 
influential chiefs and warriors offered to take up the hatchet on behalf of the Big Knife, 
though, he responded that “we never wished the Indians to fight for us all we wished 
them to do was for them to set still and look on.” In April 1779, after the Virginians’ 
hold on the Illinois country was strengthened by the defeat of Hamilton at Vincennes, 
Joseph Bowman, manager of Indian affairs at Cahokia, counseled the Potawatomis from 
Chicago to “stay quietly at home, to hunt, to support their wives and children, to treat 
well the French and traders who honestly come to them for their welfare,” and to ignore 
bad messages that “incite you to war.” Americans never asked Indians to go to war for 
them, he assured the Potawatomis, seeking to distance himself from the English who 
relied upon Indian auxiliaries.48
Although Bowman and Clark advised the Indians to remain neutral, they soon 
imitated their eastern counterparts by placing additional expectations on those who had 
made peace with them. For example, Clark made it clear that while he did not need 
native soldiers, he would value any intelligence or prisoners that his new friends might 
bring him. This strategy played directly into British hands. Despite some concerns that 
the Indians’ allegiance to Britain had noticeably “cooled” after Hamilton’s defeat in 
1779, leaders such as De Peyster believed that the Indians were incapable of observing 
neutrality and sought to demonstrate to them that the Americans were not asking them to
48 George Rogers Clark Papers, 8: 123-29, 146-49, 172,239,241,243-61, 311-13 (at 257,312). 
While both George Morgan and George Rogers Clark advocated neutrality, Morgan and the Indian 
commissioners for the Middle Department did so because they knew the British had a better developed 
network o f Indian agents, a more reliable source o f trade goods and presents, and a greater likelihood of 
securing Indian allies if  the Indians were encouraged to choose a side. Clark seems to have counseled 
neutrality more from a desire to prevent his soldiers and his quest to capture Detroit from being sullied by 
Indian assistance.
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sit still but rather to aid them in opposing the British and other Indians. Consequently, 
when the Potawatomis near St. Joseph insisted that they would not entertain “men who 
would destroy the peace” from either side, British agent Thomas Bennet brought them 
back into the fold by arguing that the Americans were simply waiting for the opportunity 
to involve them in war and thus repay the “evils” committed against settlements in 
Kentucky.49
As American influence waned in the Illinois country, the weaknesses of neutrality 
as a viable response to the Revolution again were on display. Both the British and the 
Americans insisted that they be the sole provider of trade goods and supplies. The 
Americans’ inability to stock necessary articles often drove the Indians into the arms of 
the British, while the British used their economic advantage to coerce recalcitrant Indians 
into assisting them. Tribes in the west seeking to take a neutral stance often found 
themselves threatened by other native groups, just as the Wyandots had harassed the 
Delawares. Finally, the notion of neutrality that had become warped and eventually 
abandoned by the Americans at Fort Pitt was also transformed in the Illinois and Wabash 
regions. By January 1780, Thomas Jefferson urged Clark to encourage the Indians 
friendly toward the Americans to take up the hatchet against “enemy Indians” such as the 
Shawnees. Toward the end of the war, it was no secret that neither the British nor the 
Americans accepted the idea of Indians living peacefully with both sides. When the 
Chickasaws came to make peace with the Americans in Kentucky, they were careful to 
specify that “Youl Observe at the Same time Our making A Peace with you doth Not
49 George Rogers Clark Papers, 8: 257; MPHC, 9: 382-83, 10: 348-53 (at 350).
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Intitle Us to Fall out With Our Fathers the Inglish.” Without this qualification, they knew 
the Kentuckians would expect them to turn the tomahawk against the British.50
Choosing an Ally
As neutrality ceased to be a sustainable option for most nations after the war’s 
early years, many leaders reasoned that choosing an ally might be the safest way to 
survive the conflict with their lands and sovereignty intact. Faced with the uncertain 
prospect of heavily armed belligerents in their backyard, some Indian groups determined 
that gaining access to similar weapons might be their only effective means of defense, a 
task most easily accomplished through a reliable ally. Others correctly surmised that war 
could devastate food supplies, a predicament that a partner with access to trade goods 
could ameliorate. In exchange for this steady source of arms, provisions, and general life 
necessities, an ally might demand military service, but the goods themselves offered the 
opportunity to make autonomous decisions. Even if many native groups viewed 
themselves as independent operators, siding with the winner promised a share of the 
plunder and ensured that one outside threat would be neutralized at least for a time.
Since both the British and the Americans actively sought to enlist allies for their cause, 
many Indians also found that they could secure anything they wanted. De Peyster 
complained in 1780 that “the Indians...make their own demands...the refusal of a triffle, if 
not done with caution, may turn a whole war party.”51
50 George Rogers Clark Papers, 8: 390-91, 394 (and 382-84 for Potawatomis and Sioux 
threatening Sauks and Foxes for refusing to attack the Americans), 553,606, 19: 74 (quote); MPHC, 10: 
424. Although the British and Americans both demanded to be the Indians’ sole supplier, many nations 
resisted this monopoly as much as they could. For example, in July 1778 the Ouittanons, Kickapoos, and 
Mascoutens told Hamilton that just because they acquired rum from the Spanish, they did not consider the 
Spanish to “have their hearts.” MPHC, 9:457.
51 MPHC, 10: 400.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
103
Deciding which combatant to select as a trustworthy ally depended on which one 
seemed most capable of furthering the Indians’ main objectives. Many native leaders 
throughout the entire Ohio River valley fondly remembered the French and remained 
deeply distrustful of both the British and the Americans. During a century of close 
interaction with French fur traders and government agents, the Indians rarely felt that 
their lands were threatened or their political voices silenced. In less than half that time, 
the British had gobbled up vast tracts of land beyond the Appalachian range and dictated 
peace terms in every major conflict. Despite British efforts to distance themselves from 
the treasonous Americans, the Indians were not fooled into thinking that the people who 
were protected by the king in 1774 were somehow intrinsically different from the people 
who rebelled against the king in 1775.52
Knowing that many nations held residual loyalty for the French, both the colonists 
and the British sought to emphasize their connections to Onontio, the Indian name for the 
French governor. Having been Onontio’s enemy for most of the past century, the British 
could not credibly identify a close association with France, but they did have an extensive 
network of Indian agents living among the various tribes, most of whom were of French 
descent. When these men, accompanied by English officers, announced early in the war 
that the French king was rising up to assist his children against the encroaching white 
settlers, the British cause appeared more favorable to the Indians. The Americans 
worried about this relationship until Congress’s official alliance with France in  1778 gave
52 Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indian, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 
1650-1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Eric Hinderaker, Elusive Empires: 
Constructing Colonialism in the Ohio Valley, 1673-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
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them their own French card to play. Clark informed all the Indians in the Illinois and 
Wabash regions that “their old Father the King of France was come to Life again and had 
Joined the Big Knife.” The king was “Mad at them for Fighting for the English” and 
advised them to make peace with the Americans as soon as possible. From 1779 to 1781, 
the French officer Daniel Maurice Godefroy de Linctot traversed the Ohio Valley 
between Fort Pitt and Cahokia, drumming up support for the Americans and creating 
considerable alarm for the British.53
Eventually the French inhabitants living around Kaskaskia, Vincennes, and 
Detroit trumped British and American efforts to recruit the Indians based on a tenuous 
connection to France. Many of these residents regarded the British as inveterate enemies, 
so they initially welcomed colonial troops to their communities. After two years of 
American occupancy, however, they complained to Luzerne, the French minister, that the 
Virginians were domineering, forcing them into hostile relations with local Indians and 
reducing them to poverty. Before lodging this official complaint, French officers at 
Vincennes began to spread the word among the Wabash and Ohio Indians that the French 
king was returning to power and intended to retake all of Canada. Both the “English and 
the Virginians would be subject to him,” and he would single-handedly prevent the 
Virginians from “extirpating” all the Indians as they had threatened. By February 1781 
the Piankeshaws living near Vincennes had embraced this position and actively joined the
53 White, The Middle Ground, xi; Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 44; George Rogers Clark 
Papers, 8: 130, 234,239; Frontier Retreat, 176; Pennsylvania Archives, 12: 231.
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French inhabitants in attempting to pry various tribes from their alliances with the British 
and orchestrating an assault on Detroit.54
The Piankeshaws and Vincennes residents soon discovered that the British had 
their own means of persuasion. After listening to the Piankeshaw and Ouittanon 
speeches, the Miamis simply responded, “if you continue to listen to them [the French] 
you will be miserable. You see that your wives & your children are in want, you are 
forced to cover yourselves with animals skins, we, on the contrary, we are glorious to 
see...covered with jewelry. You have neither powder nor shot nor arms, what will you 
do?” De Peyster must have been pleased to learn of this exchange because it mimicked 
the point that he had been highlighting since Clark took control of the Illinois country. 
The “Rebels may perhaps be able to make a shew of presents at first,” he stressed, but 
they would be incapable of supplying the Indians’ needs for an extended period. At both 
Michilimackinac and Detroit he threatened to withhold trade goods from nations that 
“misbehaved” by either refusing to cooperate with the British or openly associating with 
the Americans. Richard Lemoult, commandant at Detroit between Governor Hamilton 
and De Peyster, also issued warnings to secure wavering tribes, although his were more 
martial. “I have fought before now with you & have conquered, & am able to fight you 
again, and even both you and the Americans together,” he declared.55
While the British expended “immense sums...to secure [the Indians’] affections” 
and tossed out some military threats, they recognized that encroaching American settlers 
were their best allies in acquiring native allegiance. Capitalizing on existing Indian
54 George Rogers Clark Papers, 8: 44445; RG 1 0 ,12: 133-34; MPHC, 19: 594.
55 MPHC, 19: 595,9: 371-72; Frontier Advance, 363.
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suspicions, the British fostered the image of “haughty Violent and bloody” frontiersmen 
who “plundered, burnt and murdered without mercy” in their attempts to seize Indian 
lands. “The rebels not contented to act against their sovereign have also acted against the 
Indian nations and want to dispossess them of their Lands,” Hamilton informed a group 
of 683 Indians in 1778, also reminding them that “the King never tried to take any of 
your Lands.” A year later Lemoult assured the Wyandots that the Americans only 
intended to deceive them with their promises of friendship. They actually planned to take 
as much Indian land as possible, since they needed it to “defray part of the Expenses of 
their War.”56
George Morgan and the Indian commissioners at Fort Pitt countered these 
accusations with boasts of strength and clumsy endeavors to set themselves up as 
protectors against raging British tyranny. If “those People with whom we are Contending 
shou’d Subdue us, your Lands your Trade your Liberty and all that is dear to you must 
fall with us, for if they wou’d Distroy our flesh and Spill our Blood which is the same 
with theirs; what can you who are no way related to or Connected with them Expect?” 
they asked. “We live upon the same Ground with you, & the same Island is our common 
Mother,” Morgan stressed to the Senecas in 1776. Unlike the lying and cheating British 
who “want to involve you in war” without concern “if [the Indians] should all be killed or 
drove from their Country,” “we desire to sit down under the same Tree of Peace with
56 Frontier Retreat, 122; Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 129; MPHC, 9: 455,10: 340.
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you,” he added. The British must be weak if they needed the Indians to fight their battles 
for them.57
Clark was not interested in sitting blissfully under the tree of peace with any 
Indians, but he did emphasize some of the same points that Morgan and the 
commissioners did in his efforts to draw nations away from the British. He recited 
several accounts of the current conflict between the king and colonies, blaming the 
monarch for oppressing the settlers either by exacting poverty-inducing tribute or by 
refusing to allow them to manufacture cloth and ammunition. In both versions he 
included the warning that the British intended to subject the Indians to the same injustices 
as soon as the Americans were under control. He also took great pains to discredit the 
British charges that the Virginians planned to take all the Indian lands, promising that he 
had no designs on their lands, that he would defend the lands from anyone who tried to 
take them by force, and that he would leave the country as soon as the English were
t o
driven out.
Unconvinced by these rhetorical devices, most chiefs and warriors deemed the 
British the more stable ally, largely because they seemed to have an abundance of 
resources. Next to the well-developed British Indian department, the colonists appeared 
to bungle everything, and most nations found Congress’s inability to provide supplies or 
to give generous gifts at treaties very unimpressive and generally unbecoming of a
57 Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 95; Calloway, Revolution and Confederation, 128; Morgan 
Letterbooks, 2: 35-36, 1: 80-81; Frontier Advance, 236-37.
58 George Rogers Clark Papers, 8: 124-25, 146-47, 244-45. Clark preferred intimidation to “soft 
speeches,” believing that the latter made the Indians exaggerate their own importance, 124-28,243. This 
approach prompted De Peyster to counter with the accusation that the Americans used intimidation because 
they had no presents, MPHC, 9: 389.
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trustworthy ally. Both Daniel Brodhead, continental commander at Fort Pitt from 1779 
to 1781, and Clark insisted that if they could only procure a few more goods, they could 
secure the allegiance of many more tribes.59
Despite the British edge in supply, the Americans attracted some allies because of 
their scattered demonstrations of military might. Before the Revolution began, the 
Delawares, Shawnees, and Mingos had encountered colonial armies in their territories 
and were not eager to repeat the experience. After Clark’s invasion of Illinois, fear of a 
large American army sweeping through their lands haunted every Indian nation along the 
Ohio. In July 1779 a frustrated Alexander McKee informed his superiors that many 
Shawnees, Delawares, and Wyandots were listening to the Americans and worrying 
about their growing power. “All means are taken to...encourage them to fight,” he said, 
but “they believe not further than they can see and fear acts stronger on them than all the 
arguments that can be made use of to convince them of the Enemy’s ill designs against 
their Lands.” The news of Congress’s alliance with France and Clark’s dramatic capture 
of Governor Hamilton at Vincennes both made the Americans look more attractive as 
well. By the last few years of the war, however, the threat of American military 
domination was nullified by the pressing demands of subsistence, and most nations who 
had wavered returned to the British fold.60
59 Frontier Advance, 38-40, 54, 57, 162-65; Frontier Retreat, 76, 104.
60 MPHC, 9: 417 (quote), 19: 497. Most British and American diplomats believed that the Indians 
chose an ally based solely on which side was “winning.” Consequently, both sides frequently recounted 
the battles in the East, always portraying their side as the dominant force about to conclude the war at any 
moment. Such assumptions presupposed that the Indians had no agenda o f their own to use as a standard 
for evaluating potential allies. While military success was certainly a factor in their decision, most Indians 
weighed ability to supply much more heavily. LDC, 2: 229; Morgan Letterbooks, 3: 68-70, 73, 82-83; 
Frontier Defense, 137, 282; MPHC, 9: 455.
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Although establishing a reliable source for their staple goods and military 
firepower enabled the Indians to protect their land, many tribes discovered that alliance 
also generated considerable problems. Despite the tendency of colonial government and 
military leaders to blame the British for stirring up the Indians, they targeted nearby 
native villages, which proved to be much more accessible than Detroit. Virginia, 
Kentucky, and Pennsylvania militia (often accompanied by continental forces) crossed 
the Ohio at least ten times on official expeditions against Indian towns during the war. At 
least four additional invasions, supposedly aimed at British forts, ended up as skirmishes 
with local Indians, and countless other occasions witnessed unauthorized scouting parties 
engaging in hostilities with warriors determined to rid the northwest side of the Ohio of 
all trespassers. Those battles that resulted in complete destruction of Indian crops, food 
stores, and homes taxed even the British ability to re-supply.61
In addition to the destruction of property, choosing an ally often resulted in the 
disintegration of nations. For example, the Delaware council declared its neutrality at the 
beginning of the war, but immediately several bands split off and eventually joined hands 
with the British. By 1778, when the Americans dubiously persuaded the Delawares to 
become outright allies, even more warriors had drifted away. This trickle became a 
steady stream until 1781 when Brodhead, always suspicious of Delaware loyalty, 
destroyed their principal town, Coshocton, and forced the council to turn to Detroit for its 
necessities. Even after this attack, a remnant of Delawares led by Killbuck still cast their 
lot with the Americans.
61 Tanner, ed., Atlas o f  Great Lakes Indian History, 71-72; MPHC, 10: 538.
62 Frontier Retreat, 157-58, 166, 161-63,176,190-91, 220,272-73, 302, 315-16, 399.
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A final problem resulting from alliance appeared during the peace settlement as 
representatives of the king and Congress met to conclude their hostilities. Most western 
land remained in Indian hands, but affiliation with the English had actually worked 
against the native objective to maintain an independent voice in diplomatic affairs. 
American negotiators viewed the Indians as British pawns whose fate would be decided 
along with that of the Mother Country. For the British, admitting the Indians to the 
negotiating table would have been a concession that the land did not belong to them and 
that the Indians had been operating freely throughout the war. Consequently, no tribes 
participated in the revolutionary settlement; instead, they found that the Americans 
planned to dictate peace terms just like they had after Dunmore’s War.
Military Strategy
While most Ohio Valley nations were deliberating over their responses to the 
Revolution and often finding themselves with internal divisions to match the chaotic 
world around them, the Mingos purposefully and conjointly took the offensive. In 1775 
they had grudgingly attended the conference at Fort Pitt where the Americans urged them 
to “stay at home” and atone for their misdeeds in 1774. By the spring of 1776, however, 
they were creating fear on the frontier. Their military strategy involved small, decisive 
strokes designed to reinforce the Indians’ strength in the minds of western settlers and 
government authorities in Philadelphia and London. Threatening farms, blockhouses, 
towns, and even forts, they sought to clearly define the barrier between white and Indian 
territories and to emphasize their sovereignty over their homelands.
63 Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 15,49-50,95-96.
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Although the Mingos were particularly focused on taking the war to encroaching 
settlers, they were not alone in this pursuit. As early as May 1776, the Wyandots had 
teamed up with the Mingos to maintain a perpetual watch on Fort Pitt. The Shawnee 
delegates returning from their mission to the Cherokees killed a man near Licking River 
and kidnapped three young women less than two months later; another group o f Indians 
fired on some surveyors near the falls of the Ohio. Yet the Mingos, and especially their 
leader Pluggy, acquired the reputation of singlehandedly disrupting the frontier. After 
several fall raids near Wheeling, Greenbrier, Fort Randolph, and Hockhocking River, 
George Morgan pronounced that the Mingos were the “Perpetrators of all the mischief & 
Murder committed on the Frontier of Virginia” in the past year, despite the fact that 
Wyandot war parties had been spotted heading for Hockhocking less than two weeks 
before the attack there.64
Morgan was perhaps influenced by his June embassy to several Ohio tribes, all of 
whom were cooperative except the Mingos, who continued to insist that they had been 
ill-treated in the past. His opinion undoubtedly worsened a week after his visit when he 
learned that Pluggy had kidnapped two boys from Kentucky. Even though he secured the 
boys’ release, he likely deemed the Mingos unique troublemakers. As the recently 
appointed Indian agent responsible for harmonious relations in the west, he probably 
found it quite convenient to blame the increasingly troubled situation on one band of 
miscreants rather than a complex set of Indian grievances. Delaware and Shawnee
64 “Jehu Hay’s Journal o f Indian Affairs, May 15,1776,” Ser. 1, lot 687, 39, SIAP\ Revolution on 
the Upper Ohio, 177, 186-87,189,205-06,209-10,212-14; Revolutionary Virginia, 7: 153-54; Morgan 
Letterbooks, 1: 13 (quote), 15,2: 57; 1776 Morgan Letterbook, 66.
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leaders, eager to deflect attention from renegade warriors within their own nations, also 
found the Mingos to be easy scapegoats for all of the region’s conflict.65
Morgan was also quick to fault local settlers for fomenting Indian unrest. During 
the fall of 1776, rumors had escalated wildly that the Indians planned to follow up their 
attacks near Wheeling with a larger assault on Fort Pitt, and that a general Indian war was 
at hand. Morgan tried to quell these reports by pointing to the treaty conducted in late 
October and early November with the Delawares, Shawnees, and Six Nations in which 
the White Mingo promised to reprimand the Mingos on behalf of the Onondaga council. 
But he found the “idle and ridiculous tales” difficult to suppress. He worried that the 
alarm would be self-fulfilling because “parties have even been assembled to massacre our 
known Friends at their hunting Camps as well as messengers on Business to me,” exactly 
the kind of actions that ignited wars in the past. Furthermore, he complained to 
Congress, “it is not uncommon to hear even those who ought to know better, express an 
ardent desire for an Indian War, on account of the fine Lands those poor people possess.” 
When he received instructions from Virginia in the spring of 1777 to facilitate an attack 
on Pluggy’s Town, he politely explained that such a move would undoubtedly unite all 
the Ohio Indians in opposition to the Americans, even those who occasionally denounced 
the Mingos themselves.66
Despite Morgan’s optimism that an Indian war could still be prevented if the 
colonists avoided certain pitfalls, the Mingos, Wyandots, and numerous Shawnee and
65 1776 Morgan Letterbook, 42, 59-61; Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 188; Morgan Letterbooks,
1: 19,21-22,48-49, 57-59.
66 Morgan Letterbooks, 1: 13, 61 (quotes), 72-75.
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Delaware representatives proved that the spark had already been struck. Beginning in 
March 1777, warriors from these nations spread out across the region, hitting Kittanning 
on the Allegheny River, communities along Dunkard and Raccoon Creeks, Wheeling, 
and the three stations in Kentucky. From the summer of 1777 to the summer of 1778, 
they targeted Redstone, Greenbrier, Logstown, Ligonier, Hannastown, and Fort Randolph 
in addition to frequent return visits to Wheeling, Kentucky, and Dunkard Creek. Such a 
wide geographic scope became possible as tribes such as the Senecas from Allegheny, 
Ottawas, Chippewas, Potawatomis, Kickapoos, Mascoutens, Ouittanons, and 
Menominees also declared against encroaching Americans.67
Most of these parties consisted of 20-30 Indians who typically took several 
prisoners, killed a few people, burned houses and bams, and destroyed as much livestock 
as possible. Occasionally, they would unite to tackle a particularly formidable object, 
such as the 210 men who descended on Fort Henry near Wheeling in September 1777 or 
the 400 who besieged Boonesborough for nearly two weeks a year later. But even on 
these larger missions, their success came from breaking up into smaller units and 
terrorizing families or ambushing unsuspecting militiamen rather than actually breaching 
a fort’s walls. Although no single battle inflicted crippling damage on the frontier, the
67 Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 245,250-51,254,255; Frontier Defense, 5, 14-15,21-22,29,
31, 33-35, 36-42, 78-80, 138,173, 188, 194,248-49, 273,278; Frontier Advance, 50-52,106, 119-20; 
MPHC, 9: 365-66, 434; Pennsylvania Archives, 5: 444-45; Morgan Letterbooks, 1: 66, 3:22; Darlington, 
ed., Fort Pitt and Letters from the Frontier, 204; LDC, 8: 292, 301-02, 315,9: 700, 707,718. Although 
late March and early April 1777 marked the beginning o f a constant harassment o f the frontiers, the Indians 
were on the offensive during the winter o f  1776-1777 as well. In December a group o f Mingos attacked a 
party of Virginians bringing gunpowder to Kentucky. In January Pluggy was reportedly at war in the Fort 
Pitt region. C.W. Butterfield, ed., The Washington-CrawfordLetters...(Cincinnati: Robert Clarke & Co., 
1877), 62; George Rogers Clark Papers, 8: 214-15; “Jehu Hay’s Journal, Jan. 19,1777,” Ser. 1, lot 687, 
83-84, SIAP.
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cumulative effect of such widespread attacks produced the desired results: settlers fled 
eastward or abandoned their property to form fortified blockhouses for community 
protection. In Kentucky, a Virginia militia detachment arrived in August 1777, just in 
time to prevent the three stations from being deserted. Nevertheless, the residents of 
Kentucky spent the year crammed into three forts and faced a winter with very little food 
or clothing and scarcely any horses to use in procuring more of these necessities. By 
August 1778, 800 to 1,000 Indians were rumored to be “murdering the people on the 
back of Pennsylvania and Virginia.” Between May and September, the nations near 
Detroit delivered 17 out of 34 prisoners and 81 scalps to Hamilton.68
Despite this obvious success during the war’s early years, the Indians’ military 
strategy was about to encounter two significant obstacles that threatened to erase much of 
its progress. In response to Clark’s summer 1778 capture of Kaskaskia, Cahokia, and 
Vincennes, Governor Hamilton decided to liberate these forts using an army comprised 
partially of Indians. He left Detroit on October 6 with about 40 British troops and 70 
Indians, mostly Ottawas, Chippewas, and Potawatomis. En route to Vincennes he 
traveled through several Ottawa and Miami villages and entertained representatives and 
messages from the Shawnees, the Chickasaws, and several tribes from the Wabash and 
Illinois regions. Many of these Indians joined his army or provided vital intelligence, 
thus enabling him to retake Vincennes with ease in December. Although Clark surprised
68 Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 250-51; Frontier Defense, 31, 54-68, 78-80,102,106-12, 182- 
83; Frontier Advance, 67-73, 106,134 (quote); Faragher, Daniel Boone, 180-99; MPHC, 9: 464,477, 10: 
299; Pennsylvania Archives, 5: 344,742, 6: 39-40; Nancy O’Malley, “Stockading Up: ” A Study o f  Pioneer 
Stations in the Inner Bluegrass Region o f  Kentucky (Frankfort, KY: Kentucky Heritage Council, 1987);
Eric Hinderaker, Elusive Empires: Constructing Colonialism in the Ohio Valley, 1673-1800 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), 216-25.
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and captured Hamilton in February 1779, the expedition itself served as a unifying force 
for many Ohio Valley Indians. Hamilton’s army became a moving hub, coordinating the 
movements of Indians from Wisconsin to the Allegheny River. In the process, many 
nations grew excited by the prospect of a powerful army and some turned their attention 
to grand strategies for sweeping the Americans across the Appalachians, but native 
autonomy in devising military operations also came under attack. Indeed, during the 
remaining years of the Revolution, the British became more insistent about dictating 
martial moves.69
While Hamilton was responding to American initiatives on the Ohio Valley’s 
western front, the Delawares, Shawnees, Wyandots, and Mingos grew concerned about 
activity on the eastern front. In late October 1778, Gen. Lachlan McIntosh advanced 
across the Ohio River, first building a fort (named after himself) at the mouth of Beaver 
Creek and then pushing into Delaware territory to plant Fort Laurens on the west bank of 
the Tuscarawas River. The Indians reacted to this bold move in two ways. After 
spending considerable time counseling together, they unleashed a barrage of attacks on 
Fort Laurens, employing their pattern of small, decisive strikes with great effectiveness. 
They ambushed relief parties, killed messengers traveling between Fort Pitt and Fort 
Laurens, harassed soldiers who ventured onto the road near the fort, and actually laid 
siege to the fort numerous times, despite the efforts of the Delaware council, still 
technically supporting the Americans, to bring peace to the immediate vicinity. In late
69 John D. Barnhart, ed., Henry Hamilton and George Rogers Clark in the American Revolution 
with the unpublished Journal o f  Lieut. Gov. Henry Hamilton (Crawfordsville, IN: R.E. Banta, 1951), 104- 
49; MPHC, 9: 487; “Henry Hamilton to Frederick Haldimand, Jan. 26, 1779,” reel M-347, BHP.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
116
May 1779, nearly 200 Indians, mostly Shawnees, had gathered at the Mingo town to 
attempt another Laurens assault, only to be dispersed by the news that the Shawnee towns 
were being attacked by militia from Kentucky. Before another army could be gathered, 
the Americans abandoned Fort Laurens in August. The immediate threat had been 
eliminated, but the ability of McIntosh and his men to easily establish a foothold in 
Indian territory was disconcerting to local chiefs and warriors.70
In addition to responding to the colonists’ thrust into their homelands with quick 
military strikes, the Ohio Indians also asked the British for assistance. After their 
unsuccessful attempts to demolish strongholds like Forts Henry, Boonesborough, and 
Donnally, most war chiefs recognized that they needed artillery to topple fortified 
structures. They also felt comfortable calling upon the English to fulfill their alliance 
responsibilities. Hamilton had repeatedly promised that if an enemy army invaded their 
territory, he would protect them. That time was at hand, they reminded Capt. Richard 
Lemoult, commanding at Detroit in Hamilton’s absence. In fact, they were rather 
“displeased of the Governors attending to so distant a part when so large body of the 
enemy threatened their Lands so near hand.” Lemoult tried to appease them by telling 
them to await reinforcement from Niagara, but eventually he relented and sent Capt. 
Henry Bird with some volunteers, cannon, and ammunition to bolster the planned assault 
on Fort Laurens. When the mission was aborted because of the attack on the Shawnee 
towns, Lemoult scolded the Wyandots and Shawnees for leaving their father alone.71
70 Frontier Advance, 154-63, 202,210-11,222-25, 241-43,263-65, 338-48; Frontier Retreat, 41- 
42; MPHC, 9: 428,10: 334, 336-37, 19: 384.
71 MPHC, 9: 410, 427-29 (at 428), 10: 310-11, 334-36, 340.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
117
Requesting military aid introduced a new element to British-Indian relations. 
Crown officials had always believed themselves to be in charge of Indian affairs, which 
included directing or curtailing native offensive maneuvers. If English resources were 
going to be used, they insisted on controlling the operation. Having the Indians actually 
ask for assistance only encouraged this conviction. From the British-allied Indians’ 
perspective, however, seeking support from the powerful newcomers did not entail 
relinquishing their authority over expeditions. They consulted with leaders at Detroit, 
Niagara, and Michilimackinac just as they did with their Indian neighbors, but they never 
blindly followed British directions, especially if they conflicted with decisions that had 
already been made in Indian councils. For example, in November 1776 several Mingo, 
Shawnee, and Wyandot leaders asked permission to take up the hatchet against the 
“Virginians,” even though they had been attacking the frontiers for most of the year. 
When Hamilton advised them to stay at home, they ignored him, persisted in their strikes 
against settlers and travelers, and sent back a message saying that they thought he “was 
joking with them” when he told them to remain quiet.72
This struggle for military leadership was perhaps best on display in 1780 when an 
army of approximately 1,000 Indians and 150 whites marched into Kentucky. The 
Shawnees, Mingos, and others had again requested British aid in the winter of 1779- 
1780, and De Peyster, now commanding at Detroit, was eager to comply in an effort to 
reverse the gains the Americans had made the previous year. He sent Captain Bird and 
Alexander McKee to command the troops, along with several other Indian Department
72 “Jehu Hay’s Journal,” Ser. 1, lot 687, 78-79, S1AP.
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employees and the requisite artillery and ammunition. Before the small contingent left 
Detroit, De Peyster instructed McKee to keep the Indians under control. “They must 
know that taking a few scalps is not the object of the present enterprise,” he said. When 
the combined Indian and British army reached the Ohio River, Bird devised a plan to 
attack the fort at the falls of the Ohio, hoping to destroy that base before Clark could 
return to it with reinforcements. The Indians argued, however, that Martin’s and 
Ruddle’s stations on the Licking River were more appropriate targets because “it could 
not be prudent to leave their villages naked & defenceless in the neighbourhood of those 
Forts.” Bird and McKee acquiesced only to find that more arguments were forthcoming. 
They clashed with the Indians over battle tactics at the two forts, the treatment of 
prisoners, the salvaging of livestock, and further military operations, ultimately heading 
back to Detroit with 470 prisoners and victories over two forts but traveling with the 
knowledge that all of their proceedings had been dictated by the Indians.73
Although 1779-1783 contained many more large-scale expeditions than the early 
years of the war, the Indians had certainly not jettisoned their “small strike” approach to 
the fighting. Even while combined assaults on Fort Laurens or the Licking River forts 
were being planned, raiding parties continued to attack the entire expanse of the Ohio 
frontier: Bedford County, Ligonier, Hannastown, Pittsburgh, Brush Creek, Redstone, 
Greenbrier, Wheeling, southwest Virginia, all of Kentucky, and the lower Wabash River 
near Vincennes. The Potawatomis and Miamis occasionally patrolled the Wabash and
73 MPHC, 9: 582,10: 377-79, 394-95 (first quote at 394), 419,19: 528-34, 538-47 (second quote 
at 541), 553; Maude Ward Lafferty, The Destruction o f  Ruddle’s and Martin's Forts in the Revolutionary 
War (Frankfort, KY: Kentucky Historical Society, 1957).
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Illinois regions, dispatching heedless American soldiers or vulnerable river travelers. In 
1780, Westmoreland County magistrates reported that forty-three people had been killed 
or captured by the end of April, and De Peyster revealed a month later that the 
“Delawares and Shawnese are...daily bringing in Scalps & Prisoners.” After enduring 
substantial pressure in 1780, Kentuckians complained that 1781 was even worse, 
recording forty-seven killed or captured between January and April. “The Savages are 
constantly pecking at us,” John Floyd lamented to Clark, adding that the only reason the 
settlers remained in Kentucky was that they lacked the means to return eastward. Despite 
De Peyster’s admonition that “the Little war is by no means the thing,” the Indians 
proved that their raids could be as devastating as a large invasion.74
In addition to “constantly pecking” at the communities along the Ohio and its 
tributaries, the Shawnees, Wyandots, Delawares, Mingos, Kickapoos, Mascoutens, 
Miamis, and even the Lakes Indians aimed to disrupt commerce, supply, and 
communication along the river. After the Americans extended their territory to 
Kaskaskia and Cahokia in 1778, they quickly learned what the British had discovered in 
the 1760s when they claimed the region from the French: it was difficult to support 
Illinois from Fort Pitt if the Indians in the intervening territory were hostile. Many 
parties sent to scout river traffic were on reconnaissance missions, seeking to get advance
74 Frontier Advance, 241, 274, 282-84,292, 307; Frontier Retreat, 41, 77, 150-55, 160-64, 170- 
71,179, 187-88,223,248,271, 274, 319, 354-55, 371, 386,419; Pennsylvania Archives, 9: 240-41, 512, 
12: 107, 163,224 (“forty-three killed and captured in Westmoreland”), 255,261-62; MPHC, 9: 391, 10: 
396 (“Delawares and Shawnees daily bringing in scalps”), 498 (“Little war not the thing”), 506, 19: 318, 
415-16, 599,20: 16; George Rogers Clark Papers, 8: 302, 309, 396-97,466-68,472, 530 (“forty-seven 
killed and captured in Kentucky”), 584 (“Savages constantly pecking at us”), 604,19:46-47, 54, 59, 65; 
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notice of approaching colonial armies, but many were specifically prepared to ambush 
the slow-moving boats carrying the large influx of families into Kentucky. In the spring 
of 1780, there were approximately 2,000 warriors watching the Ohio and Wabash Rivers, 
and many river travelers were killed or captured.
Sometimes river attacks could have the same impact on the war as decisive land 
victories. For example, in October 1779,135 Wyandots, Shawnees, Mingos, and 
Delawares lured a supply convoy conducted by Col. David Rogers toward land and 
proceeded to rout the entire party, killing Rogers and 45 other men and taking 14 
prisoners. After a year in which the Americans seemed to be establishing firmer footing 
in native territory, this check to their invasion benefited both Indians and the British at a 
particularly opportune time. Another critical river battle occurred in August 1781, when 
Joseph Brant and his army of 100 whites and Indians ambushed a comparable party of 
militiamen led by Col. Archibald Lochry of Westmoreland Country. Lochry and his men 
were moving downriver to connect with Clark, who was planning a major offensive 
across the Ohio and toward Detroit. By killing and capturing Lochry’s entire party as 
well as engaging in smaller attacks in the ensuing days, the combined British and Indian 
forces thwarted Clark’s expedition. In both of these instances, the impetus to control the 
Ohio River served to unite Indians with disparate interests.76
75 Frontier Advance, 120; Frontier Retreat, 160-64; MPHC, 9: 477, 10: 398, 526, 583; George 
Rogers Clark Papers, 8: 581, 19: 176.
76 For the attack on Rogers see Frontier Retreat, 79-94,105-06; MPHC, 10: 368, Pennsylvania 
Archives, 12: 189; “De Peyster to Lt. Col. Brown, April 5, 1780,” reel M-350, BHP. For Lochry’s defeat, 
see MPHC, 10: 509-18, 530, 19: 655, 658; Pennsylvania Archives, 9: 458. Alexander McKee estimated 
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Americans were killed or captured, including 30 officers, MPHC, 10: 518.
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Guarding the Ohio and fending off a common enemy were not always enough to 
unite Indians separated by longstanding grievances. When American hostilities became 
particularly egregious, however, nations formerly indifferent to the plight of their 
neighbors rallied in response to these atrocities. Cornstalk’s murder in November 1777 
galvanized the Wyandots, Mingos, some Delawares, and Lake Indians as well as the 
Shawnees into renewed assaults on the Kentucky and Greenbrier frontiers. Similarly, 
when a party of militia slaughtered ninety Moravian Delawares “in cool blood” and killed 
several American-allied Indians who actually held commissions in the colonial army 
during the spring of 1782, Chippewas and Ottawas from as far as Michilimackinac joined 
the Delawares, Shawnees, Wyandots, Mingos, Potawatomis, Miamis, and other Wabash 
Indians gathered at Upper Sandusky to oppose additional enemy advances. Some of this 
assembly decisively defeated a 600-man army commanded by Col. William Crawford 
that eagerly hoped to silence all of the western Indians by thrashing this large group. 
Instead, the Indians did the overpowering, killing and capturing 250 soldiers including 
Crawford, who was tortured and burned at the stake in revenge for the Moravian 
massacre.77
In October 1782 Haldimand and De Peyster began to urge the Indians to refrain 
from further attacks because peace talks between the British and Americans had begun. 
Most nations complied with this directive but were shocked a month later when Clark led
77Paul A. W. Wallace, ed., Thirty Thousand Miles with John Heckewelder (Pittsburgh: University 
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a late season campaign against the Shawnee towns, burning and ransacking several 
villages and killing ten Indians. Throughout the winter of 1782-1783, the Six Nations, 
Delawares, Shawnees, Wyandots and others registered their outrage with British officials 
at Detroit and Niagara. They had put down the hatchet in good faith, they argued, only to 
have Clark seize the opportunity to lay waste to their lands. Despite De Peyster’s 
admonition against returning to war, the Indians descended upon colonial settlements in 
the spring, killing and capturing forty in the Fort Pitt region by the end of April, including 
17 in one particularly bloody week. The backcountry residents should have been 
prepared: the Indians had struck the frontier with similar vengeance in the spring of 1780 
after John Bowman and his party of Kentuckians had burned several Shawnee towns in 
1779.78
Collective responses to atrocities and perceived injustices combined with 
individual assaults on farms and outlying settlers to reinforce the Indians’ power 
throughout the course of the Revolution. During the war’s early years, frontier leaders 
worried that they would be overrun entirely as many families abandoned their 
homesteads and returned to the east. Increased immigration beginning in 1779 
strengthened the colonists’ hold on the territory, but the Indians countered with multiple 
coordinated attacks that created an alternate kind of threat to the persistent raiding. In 
addition to notable victories at Martin’s and Ruddle’s stations in 1780, against Lochry’s 
force in 1781, and against Crawford at Sandusky in 1782, large native armies also scored
78 MPHC, 10: 659-60,11: 323-24, 336-38,340, 342, 350-51,360; “Haldimand to Carleton, Feb.
17, 1783,” reel M-360, BHP; Pennsylvania Archives, 10: 22 ,45, 168; George Rogers Clark Papers, 8: 220, 
231.
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major successes at Hannastown, which they burned in July 1782, killing and capturing 
about twenty people in the process, and the Blue Licks in Kentucky, where the Indians 
completely routed the Kentucky militia, taking out a high percentage of the region’s 
militia captains and county magistrates. Each of these triumphs was another bid for the
7QIndians to become a recognized negotiating partner.
Unfortunately for the Indians, however, military success was accompanied by 
military reprisals that were also crippling. The Americans pillaged the Shawnee towns 
three times, destroyed the Delaware capital of Coshocton, and burned several Seneca and 
Muncy villages on the Allegheny River. Even large Indian armies occasionally met 
defeat, such as the May 1780 expedition against St. Louis and Cahokia that was repulsed 
after the Spanish officers at St. Louis received advance notice of the approaching army. 
These losses and Clark’s boastful posturing often produced morale failure within tribal 
councils, sometimes preventing the various nations from attacking seemingly vulnerable 
positions. Devastating losses also made the Indians more dependent upon the British. 
Consequently, Detroit increasingly became the center of united native activity, 
threatening to supersede common regional identities or to overshadow Indian objectives 
for maintaining land and sovereignty.80
Dissemblance
Because military strikes carried great risk in addition to great reward, several 
tribes opted to disguise their movements by avoiding formal commitments to any specific
79 For the attack on Hannastown, see George Rogers Clark Papers, 19: 110; MPHC, 10: 628; For 
the battle at Blue Licks, see George Rogers Clark Papers, 19: 89-109,112-13; DAR, 21: 114-16; MPHC, 
10: 634.
80 For the attack on St. Louis, see MPHC, 9: 558-59, 19: 529-31; DAR, 18: 209.
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policy or group of people. Some nations unintentionally dissembled as a result of 
internal divisions. Both the Shawnees and the Delawares had several leaders who formed 
their own factions, moved to different locations, and adopted contrasting responses to the 
war when they found themselves in conflict with other chiefs. These divisions made it 
difficult for British and American observers to determine native loyalties, but they 
clarified seemingly disconnected behavior. Other tribes chose a subtler path, remaining 
unified but allowing both crown officials and colonists to think that their allegiance could 
be won or lost at any moment. By creating confusion and anxiety for the warring whites, 
the Indians carved out more autonomy for themselves.
The Wyandots best embodied this dissimulation strategy. In 1776 they were one 
of the first nations to join the Mingos in attacking the frontiers, but they managed to 
avoid the “banditti” label, perhaps because they held considerable regional influence. 
When George Morgan made his first trip to the Ohio tribes after being appointed Indian 
agent in hopes of scheduling a treaty date, both the Shawnees and Delawares directed 
him to the Wyandots, saying that they were “in strict Friendship with fourteen different 
Western Nations” and consequently carried more weight than other Indians. By the fall, 
the general consensus on the Wyandots’ political inclinations was mixed but dubious at 
Fort Pitt and in Philadelphia. Their refusal to attend the 1776 Fort Pitt treaty, their 
mysterious councils at Detroit, and their accusations that the Americans had “two 
Mouths,” sometimes speaking peace and sometimes breathing threats, convinced many 
colonial officials that the Wyandots intended to be hostile. Balancing the scale was the 
chief Half King’s pledge of neutrality, given to American ambassador and trader William
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Wilson at the end of the summer, and the Wyandot council’s insistence that it wanted
o  1
peace regardless of the actions of some of its young men .
Although Moravian missionary David Zeisberger hoped that the Wyandots were 
“almost inclin’d to lay down the Hatchet & to live in friendship with the Americans,” 
during the winter of 1777, their extensive raiding, culminating with their participation in 
the siege of Fort Wheeling in September, revealed that they did not intend to permit 
settlers to push farther and farther west. Nevertheless, they continued to hold open the 
door of peace, agreeing to visit General Hand at Fort Pitt, only to change their minds and 
insist that Hand meet them with the Delawares at Coshocton. The following year, they 
sent more mixed messages. In May they attacked Forts Randolph and Donnally and 
harassed the Greenbrier region. Shortly thereafter they chastised the Delawares for 
acting in the American interest, threatening to “fall upon” Coshocton if the Delawares 
failed to desist from thwarting their adventures. “All thoughts of peace with the Nations, 
especially the Wiandots is in vain,” Zeisberger declared in July 1778. Two weeks later 
they “sued for Peace,” asking if the colonists intended to march on Detroit. I f  there were 
no plans to invade Detroit and, by extension, Indian country, the Wyandot captain 
promised to “immediately drop my Tomhawk & the back Nations shall do the same.”
81 1776Morgan Letterbook, 34; Morgan Letterbooks, 2: 59, 62-64 (“two Mouths” at 62); LDC, 5: 
554; Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 203. The question o f how the Wyandots were going to relate to the 
warring parties divided the Delawares in addition to the Americans. White Eyes and Killbuck were 
convinced that the Wyandots were hiding the tomahawk in their bosom to deliver to other nations and 
collectively strike the Virginians. Captain Pipe, another Delaware leader, denied such activity or motives. 
Morgan Letterbooks, 1: 18-22.
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Despite this pronouncement, no Wyandots made the trip to Fort Pitt for the September 
treaty.82
The Wyandots’ ability to navigate between the British and the Americans 
acquired greater urgency in November and December 1778 when General McIntosh 
erected Fort Laurens on the Tuscarawas River in the heart of the Ohio Country. In 
response to McIntosh’s ultimatum that “any nation or people who would not...Join us 
heartily by taking up the Hatchet with us,” the Half King announced that he was 
“Rejoiced” to hear the message asking him to treat for peace. He would consult with his 
fellow chiefs “over the Lakes” and act in accordance with their counsel. Meanwhile, he 
asked that the Americans “keep at some distance from my Towns,” so he could “prevent 
my foolish young men from doing any harm.”83
Having bought some time with the “Virginians,” a Wyandot delegation hastened 
to Detroit where they called upon Lemoult for assistance. “Father, you formerly told me 
to keep a look out, and when I saw the Virginians coming to acquaint you of it. You then 
told me you would come to my assistance, and drive them before you like a Flock of 
sheep. I now tell you Father, they are nearer to me than to you. I once more remind you 
of your engagement of coming yourself, or sending some of your chiefs to see your 
Children fight...If you do neither one or the Other, I shall begin to think you are as 
smooth Tongued as the Virginians.” This veiled warning prompted a flustered Lemoult 
to write to Hamilton (soon to be ousted from Vincennes by Clark) with the news that “the
82 Morgan Letterbooks, 1: 30,46-49 (at 30); Frontier Defense, 5-6, 19, 54-68; Pennsylvania 
Archives, 5: 446-47; Frontier Advance, 67-73, 82, 117-19, 129, 132-33 (at 119,132, 129).
83 Frontier Advance, 180, 187.
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wiandots are much displeased at you and me & have declared if we do not perform our 
Promisses in assisting them with Men and all their wants They will no longer listen to 
us.” Back at their home in Sandusky and in the Tuscarawas region, the Wyandots 
demonstrated great “displeasure” toward the Americans as well, assailing travelers near 
Fort Laurens, harassing soldiers from the garrison, hosting a growing body of Indians 
determined to launch a massive siege on the fort, and threatening the Delawares with 
death if they refused to sever all communication with the “Virginians.”84
Then, in April 1779, the Half King abruptly solicited an alliance with the 
Delawares, hoping that they could work together to strengthen themselves and bring 
peace to the region. He pronounced the English “good for nothing” and vowed to “not 
listen any more to [their] speeches.” Col. Daniel Brodhead, commanding at Fort Pitt in 
place of the deposed McIntosh, was delighted and asked the Wyandots to come to 
Pittsburgh to formalize the relationship, assuring them that the French king would be 
pleased with their choice to support the Americans and fight “the English & their Allies.” 
Secretly, he hoped to capitalize on the Wyandots’ influence with the western nations and 
eventually pit them against the Mmgos.
While Brodhead was strategizing to take advantage of his new weapon and the 
Wyandots were declaring that “nothing at all shall hinder [us] no more in going 
Straighteway to [our] Brothers the Virginians,” the British were seething at the apparent 
infidelity of the Indians. Henry Bird had arrived at Sandusky in early May with four
84 Frontier Advance, 192,220,223-25 (first quote at 220); George Rogers Clark Papers, 8:109; 
MPHC, 9: 428.
85 Frontier Advance, 265-66,278-79, 311 (at 266,278); Pennsylvania Archives, 12: 128.
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artillery pieces, only to find that the Wyandots were in the process of making peace with 
the Americans and were determined to “sit still.” “Nothing can be done with these 
wretches,” he complained. Matters grew even bleaker for Bird when the Shawnees were 
drawn away at the end of the month by attacks on their towns. The Wyandots chose this 
opportunity to disperse as well, attracting Lemoult’s ire. He scolded them for pursuing 
their hunting at the expense of their father’s interests and for flirting with the Americans 
who were only interested in taking their land.86
The principal Wyandot chiefs, Half King, Bawbee, and Dawascheht, tolerated 
these insults because they were following a particular strategy. By mid-June Brodhead 
became “Weary of Waiting for the Wyandots.” Four days later the Delawares reported 
on their behalf that they were “on the Road” and that nothing would hinder them any 
longer. After another week, however, Brodhead’s suspicions were confirmed. The trader 
Alexander McCormick, who lived near the Wyandot towns, sent a secret message to Fort 
Pitt, saying that the Wyandots “are not inclined to make a proper Peace with the 
Americans at present, they only mean to decieve You a while untill such times as their 
Com gets hard...after which their Tomhawk will be as Sharp against You as ever.” By 
feigning friendship, they sought to protect their towns from a colonial invasion that 
seemed imminent after McIntosh built Fort Laurens.87
86 Frontier Advance, 308-10, 346 (at 309-10); MPHC, 19: 412,10: 340-41. Relations between 
Bird and the Wyandots soured instantly when Bird tried to intervene in their handling o f a prisoner shortly 
after arriving at Upper Sandusky. After the Indians put the prisoner to death, Bird declared, “Nothing 
would satisfy me more than to see such Devils as you are all killed.” Given the fact that the Wyandots had 
already sought an alliance with the Americans, little could be done to salvage the relationship after this rift. 
It was perhaps this ill will that prompted the Wyandots to undertake their own expedition toward Fort Pitt 
when Bird commanded the combined Indian army to Kentucky in 1780. Pennsylvania Archives, 7: 525; 
MPHC, 9: 404, 584,19: 524, 529.
87 Frontier Advance, 324, 366,379-83 (at 366, 380, 382); Pennsylvania Archives, 12: 123.
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After John Heckewelder confirmed McCormick’s report and another month 
passed with no Wyandot visitors, Brodhead relinquished hope for a peace settlement. In 
August 1779, however, the Americans abandoned Fort Laurens, and Brodhead led an 
expedition against the Seneca and Muncy towns on the upper Allegheny River. When he 
returned, the Wyandots were waiting for him at Fort Pitt. The fiery and impetuous 
Brodhead laid down the gauntlet: peace could only be negotiated if they promised to join 
in destroying the English and the Mingos and if they left hostages at Fort Pitt until they 
complied with these terms. The Wyandots countered with a promise to “throw off...the 
English,” but they claimed to “love all the nations” and refused to do battle with them. 
Furthermore, they asked that the Americans desist from attacking the Shawnees and 
specified that if  the colonists marched on Detroit, they should travel via the Allegheny or 
Wabash Rivers rather than passing through Wyandot territory. If these conditions were 
met, they would agree to peace. Brodhead was enraged at their audacity in placing 
stipulations on him and proceeded to remind them that he was “a warrior as well as a 
Councillor” and to threaten that any nations who dared to oppose the Americans would 
not be able “to enjoy peace or property” “after the English are driven from this Island.” 
After this blustering speech, the Wyandots chose the path of outright hostility for the
• «  o oremainder of the war.
Despite their avowedly anti-American position in the Revolution’s later years, the 
Wyandots pointedly refused to completely play by British rules. As early as April 1778, 
they told Gen. Guy Carleton, British commander in Canada, that they expected to claim
™ Pennsylvania Archives, 7: 525-26, 542; Frontier Retreat, 40,43, 66-72,109, 193, 248,217-20 
(at 69, 72).
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the “Lands they should drive the Rebels from...by right of conquest,” a clear challenge to 
the crown’s contention that it controlled all the land. Likewise, they balked at the British 
insistence that all prisoners be turned over to the commanding officer at Detroit, choosing 
to keep many in their towns. By dissembling and resisting British efforts to secure total 
compliance, they retained autonomy and made themselves indispensable even as they 
relied on outsiders for ammunition and other supplies. Dangling their allegiance before 
British and American forces, they lured both sides into viewing Wyandot support as vital 
to their cause and almost within their grasp. Meanwhile, they protected their lives and 
property, exercised their sovereign political authority, and struck many blows against 
those who encroached on Indian territory.89
Although the Wyandots were the most successful at concealing their motives 
from British and American eyes, other nations also proved enigmatic, particularly after 
Clark’s capture of the Illinois forts and Vincennes gave the colonists a foothold in the 
region. For example, the Potawatomis living near the small British fort and trading post 
at St. Joseph seemed initially inclined to listen to Clark’s message in 1778, but Louis 
Chevallier, their principal British trader (although he was of French descent), and Lt. 
Thomas Bennett convinced them that “that step would be fatal to them.” Despite the 
diligent efforts of Cahokia’s Joseph Bowman and the French emissary Daniel Maurice 
Godefroy de Linctot to turn the tribes toward the Americans, Chevallier reported in 
March 1780 that the Potawatomis had “suddenly come out from a Sloth or rather a
89 MPHC, 9: 437,477,10: 299,11: 385.
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lethargy, that three years of want have not been able to cure” and appeared to be fully 
supporting the British.90
Several months later, however, Canadian officials removed Chevallier from St. 
Joseph, accusing him of privately supporting the French and Americans and corrupting 
the Potawatomis. His Potawatomi friends and customers were incensed. Recognizing 
that they could not afford to sever their British supply line, they responded to this affront 
by subtly undermining English interests whenever possible. They permitted Linctot to 
pass through their territory unscathed, contrary to De Peyster’s orders. They executed 
their military maneuvers half-heartedly, rarely even engaging the Americans on the Ohio 
or at Vincennes. Their boldest act of defiance came in February 1781, when they 
allowed a mixed party of Spanish militiamen and Indians led by Chevallier’s son to 
capture Fort St. Joseph without a fight. While they never openly embraced the 
Americans, they worked hard to keep the British at a distance and to foster an air of 
mystery about their allegiance.91
Like the Wyandots, the St. Joseph Potawatomis discovered that keeping both 
the British and the Americans off balance enabled them to more effectively pursue their 
own agenda. By dancing in the zone between outright loyalty to the crown and having
90 MPHC, 9: 378, 390, 392-93,395-96 466,479,482-83, 10:286,348-53, 380-81 (at 286, 380); 
George Rogers Clark Papers, 8,:172,311-15, 394-95. Like the Potawatomies, many other nations flirted 
with the Americans after Clark’s Illinois conquest. At one time Clark estimated that 1,000 Wabash and 
Illinois Indians supported him, but by 1782, he lamented that all the tribes who had once treated with him 
had fallen away except the Piankeshaws and a few Mississippi Indians. George Rogers Clark Papers, 8: 
553, 606, 19: 136.
91 MPHC, 9: 354, 368, 375, 545, 553, 569, 10: 378-79, 396,398, 401,406,424,438-40,444,448- 
55,486,506-08,653; RG 1 0 ,13: 33-35; Tanner, ed., Atlas o f  Great Lakes Indian History, 72. British 
officials argued about Chevallier’s trustworthiness for years, but in 1780, the skeptics won and removed 
him from St. Joseph.
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their supplies terminated, they could protect their national existence without sacrificing 
the ability to direct their political affairs. Occasionally, however, such dissembling also 
fooled other Indians and threatened to damage intertribal relationships. For example, a 
visiting delegation of Cherokees entered into an elaborate treaty with Brodhead in the 
summer of 1779. When they moved on from Fort Pitt and Coshocton, however, they 
encountered a group of Indians at the Shawnee town Wakatomica who chastised them 
severely for dealing with the Americans. The Cherokee spokesman dropped the hatchet 
at their council fire and insisted that he “did not receive [the tomahawk] from my Heart” 
nor did he intend to use it against any Indians or Englishmen. The council continued 
with a resolution to turn the hatchet against the Americans, but the trust between Indians 
was probably not repaired as quickly.92
Effectiveness o f Indian Responses 
Unfortunately for the Ohio Indians, coherent schemes for using the Revolution to 
achieve particular ends often served cross-purposes. Casting their lot with a definite ally 
seemed to shield their land, but it severely hampered the Indians’ ability to bargain with 
both sides. At the same time, pan-Indian efforts strengthened native demands but left the 
tribes vulnerable to two warring parties and the threat of inadequate supplies. Collective 
neutrality might have preserved both objectives, but the British and the Americans 
actively sought to undermine genuine attempts of Indians to interact with both sides. The 
greatest blow to native sovereignty came at the end of the war when the Indians were
92 Frontier Advance, 392-400; RG 10, 12: 254-57 (at 255).
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excluded from the peace treaty, despite their increased power and influence during the 
Revolution’s final years.
Although these setbacks discouraged some Indian leaders, their position relative 
to the British and Americans had been strengthened by the war in important ways as well. 
Contrary to the common notion that the Revolution began with fighting between the 
British and the Americans with the Indians eventually being forced to choose a side, the 
Indians actually precipitated the conflict in the western theater. When the Mingos grew 
tired of war in 1777, the Wyandots chiefs reminded them that “they had begun the war, & 
had always encouraged others to go to war; they had now brought it to pass what they 
always had wished for...therefore [they] could give them no other advice than to be 
strong & fight as men.” By threatening settlements, forts, and towns in raiding parties 
and joining together to accomplish large-scale victories such as the battles at Martin’s 
and Ruddle’s stations, Sandusky, and the Blue Licks, the Indians established themselves 
as an increasingly fearsome presence, forcing both sides to alter their battle plans and to 
rethink their notions of how the war could develop in the west.93
In addition to their military success, the Indians along the Ohio Valley corridor 
gained leverage in their dealings with outsiders by presenting multiple images of 
themselves to those intruding on their internal and external affairs. Some tribes staunchly 
protected Detroit, others passed information to Fort Pitt, still others ignored both sides, 
and many pretended to support one side while acting in the interests of the other.
Because of these varied responses, unified action could be nearly impossible to generate,
93 Frontier Defense, 167.
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but Clark’s post-truce attack on the Shawnee towns in November 1782 galvanized the 
Indians to resist the forthcoming peace treaty.
In the war’s aftermath, as American envoys endeavored to dominate peace 
negotiations with assorted Ohio Valley tribes, the Indians’ gains during the Revolution 
seemed to be at risk. Despite the United States’ claims, however, Indians recognized that 
their land had not been conquered. They had been snubbed during the political wrangling 
that ended the war, but all admission to future bargaining tables could not be bloodlessly 
blocked while they retained so many powerful weapons, not least of which was the 
ability to keep the blustering colonies off balance. Strategies such as unification and 
forging alliances that had been stymied by the Revolution’s particular circumstances 
could be tweaked to effectively face a different enemy. While the war for American 
independence might have ended in the minds of Europeans and colonists, the war for the 
Indians’ landed independence was just getting underway.
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Chapter Three:
Revised alliances
Although the winter of 1782-1783 was more “pleasant and mild” in Detroit than it 
had been for several years, the 2,500 Indians living in the fort’s vicinity were not 
celebrating nature’s beneficence. Despite enjoying a banner year for military success in 
the West, including decisive victories over sizable American forces at Blue Licks and 
Sandusky, the nations residing between the Ohio River and the Great Lakes ushered in 
1783 with considerable apprehension. In the fall of 1782, their British allies had urged 
them to put down the hatchet while American and English diplomats attempted to 
hammer out a peace agreement. They had complied, only to fall prey to a band of 
Kentuckians led by George Rogers Clark, who destroyed seven unprotected Shawnee 
villages in November, killing or capturing seventeen residents and burning 10,000 
bushels of com. This underhanded move ignited a storm of protest from both the western 
Indians and the Six Nations, but it also caused them to distrust the distant negotiations 
from which they had been excluded. Major Arent Schuyler de Peyster, the commander at 
Detroit, noticed the Indians’ “drooping spirits” and reported in January 1783 that they 
had begun to “fear they are to be the dupes of the war.”1
Rising anger toward the Americans and growing suspicion of the British, who 
kept advocating a cease fire while the colonists were launching attacks on their homes, 
were not confined to the Indians near Detroit. Representatives from four prominent
1 MPHC, 10: 659-660, 11: 336-38, 342, 350-51,20: 87, 89; “Enumeration o f Indians living near 
Detroit,” Ser. 1, lot 704, SIAP; “Six Nations to Niagara officers, Dec. 11, 1782,” reel A-686, Haldimand 
Papers', “Haldimand to Guy Carleton, Feb. 17, 1783,” reel M-360, BHP; DAR, 21: 155,169-71; George 
Rogers Clark Papers, 19: 157-58.
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western tribes journeyed to the Cherokee villages to “establish a firm league and 
confederacy amongst the different tribes of indians” intended to ward off the “cloud 
gathering in the north.” This delegation along with 1,200 Cherokee and Creek warriors 
traveled to St. Augustine, where they laid their grievances before British officials. In 
response to the Cherokees’ litany of depredations and concern that the English planned to 
“abandon their friends to the resentment of their enemies,” Indian agent Thomas Brown 
assured them that the king would be faithful to his allies, but he repeated the party line 
that they should attend to their hunting and planting and simply remain on the defensive.2
Observing the march of this large disgruntled force from the Holston River to 
Florida, North Carolina governor Joseph Martin alerted other southern leaders that this 
group intended to combine with British forces and reduce Fort Pitt before proceeding 
down the Ohio River, capturing Kentucky and Illinois in its wake. While this threat 
never materialized, other angry nations, particularly the Onondagas, Senecas, and 
Mohawks, determined to sharpen their axe again. They likened Clark’s attack on the 
Shawnee villages to the “unparalleled cruelties” exercised against the peaceful Moravian 
Indians in the spring of 1782 and the assault on the “Onandago Town” during General 
Sullivan’s 1779 campaign in which the Americans “put to death all the Women and 
Children, excepting some of the young Women that they carried away for the use of their 
Soldiers and were put to death in a more shameful and scandalous maimer.” “We have 
been so often and so repeatedly deceived by the Rebels,” they declared, “that we can no
2 “Thomas Brown to Carleton, Jan. 12, 1783,” reel M-359, BHP.
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longer trust their Words.” This mistrust cast the already shady peace negotiations in an
-3
even dimmer light.
As the Cherokees and Six Nations added their voices to the western Indians’ 
complaints, frustration spread rapidly in Indian country during the first half o f  1783. 
Their fear that Clark would return in the spring with a larger army was not unwarranted. 
He spent much of the spring writing long letters to Virginia governor Benjamin Harrison 
insisting that the only way to establish a genuine peace with the Indians was to 
completely subjugate them. The Americans needed to disabuse their native enemies of 
the idea that they were timid and willing to negotiate peace at any cost, he said. The 
Indians “should be obligated to treat with us on our own terms.. .convinced that they [are] 
Inferiour to us,” and forced to acknowledge that “they are under obligations to us for the 
Very lands they live on,” he declared, adding that an army of 1,500 would be necessary 
to accomplish this goal.4
While Harrison tactfully avoided Clark’s call to arms, frontier settlers took 
matters into their own hands. In Washington County, Pennsylvania, residents were still 
receiving scalp bounties during the spring. A few months later, a group of 400 floated 
down the Ohio River and brazenly planted a settlement on the Muskingum River. When 
the Indians’ ire flared up at these outrages, the British Indian Department devoted its 
considerable influence to heading off violent retaliation. Although these agents did 
nothing to encourage goodwill toward the Americans, they were careful to avoid 
jeopardizing the peace process. This stance from an ally, who less than a year before had
3 George Rogers Clark Papers, 19: 189; “Six Nations to Niagara officers, Dec. 11,1782,” reel A- 
686, Haldimand Papers.
4 George Rogers Clark Papers, 19: 205-06, 213, 229,236-39 (at 229).
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championed all attacks on the frontier, contributed to the Indians’ growing sense of 
uneasiness and isolation.5
If the threat of Clark’s return and the increasingly frequent appearance of whites 
on the northwestern side of the Ohio were not enough to create Indian anxiety, rumors 
regarding the outcome of the far-off peace negotiations kept many villages in a state of 
alarm during the first half of 1783. Most nations seized every opportunity to remind 
British officials not to forget them in the treaty, perhaps causing them to react even more 
angrily when scattered reports about their land reached their ears. “We are informed that 
instead of prosecuting the War, we are to give up our lands to the Enemy,” the Weas and 
Kickapoos reproached De Peyster in June. “[I]n endeavouring to assist you it seems we 
have wrought our own ruin.” Several Six Nations chiefs demanded to know if it was true 
that the “English had basely betrayed them by pretending to give up their Country to the 
Americans without their consent or consulting them.” If so, they thought it was “an act 
of cruelty and injustice that Christians only were capable of doing.” Even a group of 
Ottawas living near Michilimackinac and far from any American colonists feared the 
consequences of the fact that the “Tree was fallen on the wrong side” with nothing 
having been “laid before them.”6
Although this uncertain climate characterized almost all native communities west 
of the Appalachians, few Indian groups, even those living together in the Ohio Valley, 
responded in the same way. Having been the immediate victims of the Americans’ most
5 Hazard, ed., Minutes o f  the Provincial Council o f  Pennsylvania, 13: 537; LDC, 20: 643-44; 
Edmund C. Burnett, ed., Letters ofMembers o f  the Continental Congress, 8 vols. (W ashington D.C.: The 
Carnegie Institution ofWashington, 1921-36) 7: 289-90; Pennsylvania Archives, 10: 168.
6 MPHC, 11:355, 370 (Wea quote), 373-74 (Ottawa quote), 20: 118-20 (at 119); “Six Nations to 
the British, June 30, 1783,” reel A-686, Haldimand Papers.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
139
recent attack, the Shawnees sought reassurance that they would avoid the same fate in the 
coming year. In January they expressed their concerns to British and Seneca 
representatives, both of whom counseled them to remain united with the Delawares and 
Wyandots for security. De Peyster casually mentioned the deployment of the 34th British 
Regiment to Detroit, giving the impression that he was offering those troops as 
reinforcement without explicitly making such a promise. Several months later, Shawnee 
ambassadors met with Maj. George Walls at the Falls of the Ohio regarding the exchange 
of prisoners. Despite the fact that Clark had coached Walls to stage the entire event as a 
means of determining the Shawnees’ disposition, their interaction was amicable, at least 
on the surface.7
These friendly exchanges masked the seething resentment harbored by many 
Shawnees who actively sought revenge. British agent Alexander McKee made repeated 
trips to Wakatomica to halt war parties, but most of his efforts were fruitless. As early as 
March, bands of Shawnees, Wyandots, Mingos, Cherokees, and Wabash tribes began to 
harass the entire Ohio River corridor, venturing as far inland as the Clinch River. By the 
beginning of May, forty people had been killed or captured in the Pittsburgh region alone. 
In mid-July a highly-publicized skirmish between Kentuckians, who crossed the river to 
steal horses from a Shawnee hunting party, and the Shawnee defenders of their property 
resulted in the death of three whites and one Indian. Shawnee chiefs tried to smooth over
7 MPHC, 11: 337-38,20: 96; “George Walls speech to the Shawnee, May 3, 1783,” Ser. 1, lot 705, 
S1AP; “Walls speech to the Shawnee, July 7, 1783,” reel A-686, Haldimand Papers; George Rogers Clark 
Papers, 19: 218-19.
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this incident by telling Major Walls that their “young men is foolish as well as yours,” 
but the affair raised new tensions, complicating the fledgling relationship.8
When the western Indians were not attacking frontier settlements or negotiating 
with American military personnel, they spent considerable time counseling together 
about the unpredictable state of their lives. Some of these gatherings took place in the 
privacy of their towns, but in many cases entire villages flocked to Detroit where they 
could consult with each other as well as demand answers from their British allies. From 
the middle of June to the middle of July, De Peyster entertained the Sauks, Wyandots, 
Ouittanons, Kickapoos, Piankeshaws, Senecas, Hurons, Chippewas, Ottawas, 
Potawatomies, Shawnees, Delawares, and Miamis, all of whom wanted to know “what 
was to become of them and their lands.” A considerable number of Cherokee and Creek 
representatives, bringing requests from their women not to be forgotten, joined the 
throngs as well, adding to the swelling population of Cherokees who had settled among 
the Shawnees the year before. Many of these Indians responded impatiently to De 
Peyster’s admonition to refrain from mischief, recognizing that matters were undoubtedly 
more complicated than the British were letting on. Others like the Delawares actively 
restrained their warriors and also urged their neighbors to put down the hatchet. Both 
sides appealed to De Peyster for ammunition and other necessities, saying that if the 
British wanted them to focus on hunting, they would need to replace the ammunition 
expended during the past few years of war.9
8 MPHC, 11: 354,359-60,20: 122-23, 146, 153-54, 157; Pennsylvania Archives, 10:22,45, 167- 
68, George Rogers Clark Papers, 19: 220,231-32; Palmer, ed., Calendar o f  Virginia State Papers, 3: 521, 
529-30.
9 RG 10, 13: 195-233; MPHC, 11: 372 (quote), 20: 96, 122; “Enumeration o f Indians living near 
Detroit, 1782,” Ser. 1, lot 704, SIAP.
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While De Peyster attempted to parry the Indians’ pointed questions, American 
ambassador Ephraim Douglass hastened through Sandusky en route to Detroit, where he 
hoped to share word of the official treaty proceedings. Captain Pipe welcomed him 
graciously on behalf of the Delawares (taking care to mention that his nation had not 
“voluntarily engaged in the War”), but the Wyandots, Shawnees, and Miamis seemed less 
interested in meeting with him than in taking their grievances to Detroit. Eventually 
Douglass reached Detroit, but De Peyster prevented him from speaking to the assembled 
nations, moving him on to Niagara where he was also barred from addressing the native 
crowds. Although they thwarted Congress’s plans in this instance, British agents realized 
that they would soon need to present some definitive account of the peace settlement if 
they were to retain the Indians’ interest, especially since influential Americans like 
George Morgan were actively encouraging various nations to reconcile themselves to the 
“Great Council of the United States.”10
In early September, McKee convened most of the Ohio Indians and a large 
contingent of Lake Indians near Sandusky and delivered a speech from Sir John Johnson, 
superintendent of Indian affairs. Johnson announced that the king had thought best to 
end the “long, bloody, expensive and unnatural war,” agreeing to a boundary line 
between British and United States territory. Contrary to rumors, he stated that the Indians 
still held “right of Soil” and were “Sole Proprietors” of their lands, and he doubted that 
the Americans would try to take their country under the pretext of having conquered it.
He urged them to refrain from further hostilities, return any prisoners among them, and to 
be united with each other so they could maintain their “consequence.” After McKee
10 Pennsylvania Archives, 10: 83-90; MPHC, 11: 380-81.
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finished, Joseph Brant, representing a Six Nations deputation who had heard Johnson’s 
speech at Niagara, declared to the large audience that his people had resolved to lay their 
hatchets aside and to maintain a close watch over the 1768 boundary line to make sure 
that no Indians were deprived of their lands. He concluded with a ringing 
pronouncement that “there may be never hereafter a separation between us, let there be 
Peace or War, it shall never disunite us, for our interests are alike, nor should any thing 
ever be done but by the voice of the whole.”11
When the conference had concluded, McKee claimed that all had gone well: the 
Indians had agreed to desist from hostilities and their doubts had been assuaged. In 
reality, the assembled nations had seized the opportunity to assert their own opinions on 
the appropriate ways to relate to their expansionist neighbors, opinions that McKee hoped 
to suppress. Midway through the proceedings, a Huron chief declared that he would not 
participate in returning white prisoners. “Whatever was taken from the Enemy should 
remain with us in order to strengthen our Nation,” he said. McKee promptly challenged 
this remark, and T’Sindatton responded with some conciliatory statements, but he never 
rescinded his previous declaration. Likewise, multiple speakers talked of putting down 
the hatchet, but they emphasized that they were keeping it near their sides rather than 
burying it completely, suggesting that Indian fears had not been entirely put to rest.12
On the issue of native unity for the protection of Indian land, everyone agreed 
with Brant’s proposal, but the western Indians seemed eager to phrase it in their own
11 The Indians in attendance were the Wyandots, Delawares, Shawnees, Mingos, Ottawas, 
Chippewas, Potawatomies, Creeks, Cherokees, and Six Nations. No Wabash tribes made the trip. MPHC, 
20: 174-83 (at 179-80); “Minutes o f  Transactions with Indians at Sandusky,” reel A-686, Haldimand 
Papers.
12 MPHC, 20: 180-83.
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terms. “We hope no Nation will tamely give it [their land] up! It is the Gift o f the Great 
God who made all things to us, and we have already spilt the best of our Blood in 
defending it,” they announced, adding that they hoped the Six Nations would not lose 
sight of the genuine interests of the whole group. They wryly acknowledged that the 
Iroquois were indeed well prepared to guard the boundary line “since [they] were the 
people who fixed it.”13
These veiled references to discontent with the Six Nations did not prevent the 
western Indians from additional meetings with them, especially when the Americans and 
the English both seemed more threatening. A month after McKee’s supposedly 
successful conference, a group of Six Nations, Delawares, Shawnees, and Cherokees 
called British generals McLean and Butler to their council fire near Niagara. They were 
greatly alarmed by American claims to have conquered them, which seemed to have 
resulted in increasing encroachment on Indian lands, both things that Johnson had 
assured them would not happen. But their complaints were reserved not only for the 
United States. “You have also repeatedly told us that you wou’d remain with and share 
the same fate with ourselves,” they reminded the generals, “but on our serious 
Consideration we have reason to fear that we shall be left alone to defend our Women & 
Children and a Country that has so long supported them, against a people who seem 
determined to over run.” Since the Indians were not even consulted in the peace 
settlement, they had serious doubts about British sincerity in protecting Indian interests, 
they added.14
13 Ibid., 176, 182.
14 ‘Six Nations, Delawares, Shawnees and Cherokees to McLean and Butler, Oct. 2, 1783,” reel A- 
686, Haldimand Papers. The Indians were also suspicious of the British because o f fraudulent land claims 
by British officers, see MPHC, 11: 409-10,435-36.
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After using these fall conferences to announce their intent to remain unified and 
to defend their lands, most Ohio Valley Indians settled into watchful waiting, warily 
keeping both the British and the Americans within view as 1783 gave way to 1784. 
Watchfulness did not mean idleness, however. Convinced that the steady stream of 
emigrants to Kentucky (where the population now exceeded 8,000) could only indicate 
disaster for the nations north of the Ohio River, scattered parties launched raids into 
western Pennsylvania and Kentucky, some beginning long before the snow was gone. 
Several Shawnee chiefs blamed the Cherokees living among them for these winter 
attacks, promising to curb them in the future, but random strokes against American 
settlements continued throughout the year. These same leaders exchanged pleasantries 
with Gen. James Wilkinson, focusing on their mutual desire for peace and avoiding any 
discussion of land settlements. Rather than engaging in violence or talking with the 
objects of suspicion, most Indians spent the first half of 1784 “counciling amongst 
themselves.” In June, McKee spotted a delegation of Shawnees visiting the 
Potawatomies, ostensibly to renew their friendship, but he believed their “real business” 
to have a more sinister object, namely a revitalized confederacy extending from “one 
extremity of North America to the other.”15
While the Indians kept watch over their land, delegates to Congress debated the 
best method to pry it from their grip. States such as New York and Pennsylvania were 
eager to purchase land within their borders from the Indians, but other representatives
15 DAR, 21: 223 (confederacy quote); Pennsylvania Archives, 10: 264; Donald F. Carmony, ed., 
“Spencer Records’ Memoir of the Ohio Valley Frontier, 1766-1795,” Indiana Magazine o f History 55 
(1959): 340-41; Jared C. Lobdell, ed., “Military Reminiscences o f Captain Henry Jolly,” Indian Warfare in 
Western Pennsylvania and North West Virginia at the Time o f the American Revolution (Bowie, MD: 
Heritage Books, 1992), 79; Palmer, Calendar o f  Virginia State Papers, 3: 558-59, 565-67; MPHC, 20: 
229-30 (“counciling together” quote).
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insisted that “the Savages should without Compensation abandon Part of their Country to 
the United States who claim it by Conquest & as a Retribution for the Expence & 
Damages incurred by the hostile & cruel Conduct of the Savages.” Ultimately, Congress 
adopted the policy of emphasizing that the land had been legally transferred to the United 
States from Britain as reimbursement for the destruction wrought by the Indians during 
the Revolution. Since the Americans were so generous, however, they would draw a 
boundary line between Indian and white territory, thus giving back some of the land to 
the Indians, and even deign to offer token gifts at the proposed peace treaties. “[W]e 
persuade ourselves that their eyes are open to their error and that they have found by fatal 
experience that their tme interest and safety must depend upon our friendship,” the 
committee on Indian Affairs concluded.16
After fixing upon this strategy, Congress urged that peace, a boundary line, and 
United States’ possession of the western territory needed to be established as quickly as 
possible because “lawless banditti and adventurers” were already poised to snatch up the 
land. In the winter and spring of 1784, the federal and selected state governments bustled 
about, appointing commissioners to meet with the Indians and instructing them to deal 
firmly yet without provocation. As word of attacks on the frontier began to trickle 
eastward, suggesting that the Indians were not keen to surrender their lands without a 
struggle, treaty plans became bogged down with the necessity of raising troops to protect 
the men heading westward to impertinently seize native land. Cries blaming the British 
and Johnson’s inflammatory speech at Sandusky for turning the Indians against the 
Americans immediately arose and prompted a further accumulation of soldiers. Initially,
16 LDC, 20: 710-11 (at 710), 21: 139;7CC,25: 681-92 (at 686).
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Congress had called for a single treaty with all the Indians of the northern and middle 
departments. But in the interest of time, safety, and keeping the Indians as disunited as 
possible, they charged the commissioners to meet with the nations separately. 
Consequently, in October, New York and American delegates met with the Six Nations at 
Fort Stanwix and inked a contract ceding vast tracts of land to the United States.17
The western Indians were outraged that the Six Nations had ventured to make a 
treaty with the Americans without consulting them. Already suspicious that the Iroquois 
regarded their lands with too much of a proprietary air, this “breach of faith” in the 
Sandusky confederacy reignited old animosities. Commissioner Arthur Lee 
acknowledged that the Six Nations chiefs had desired to postpone any resolution until 
they could counsel with their western comrades, but “the decided language we held 
obliged them to an immediate determination, which bids fair to prostrate their 
confederation and its diabolical objects,” he wrote triumphantly. Predictions of an easy 
follow-up treaty with the Shawnees, Wyandots, and Delawares circulated in Philadelphia, 
although some sawier congressmen realized that the Indians had an “Aversion.. .to 
treating seperately,” and could refuse the commissioners’ overtures.18
Having heard the disturbing news from Fort Stanwix, most western nations were 
indeed skeptical about meeting with Lee and his colleagues, George Rogers Clark and 
Richard Butler. To make matters even more uncertain, the commissioners decided in 
early December 1784 to move the treaty from Cuyahoga to Fort McIntosh, citing difficult
17 LDC, 21: 139,406, 450-51,494-95,497, 525-26, 551, 571, 739-40, 763, 789-90, 815; JCC, 25: 
681-92,26: 124, 135, 153-54,238,460, 552; Pennsylvania Archives, 10: 119-25, 553-55; Hazard, ed., 
Minutes o f  the Provincial Council o f  Pennsylvania, 14: 187,261-62; LMCC, 7: 461-64,477.
18 Consul Wiltshire Butterfield, ed., Journal o f Capt. Jonathan Heart... to which is added the 
Dickinson-Harmar Correspondence o f1784-5 (Albany: Joel Munsell’s Sons, 1885), 49; LDC, 22: 25; 
LMCC, 1: 614.
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travel conditions during the winter for the change. Military commander Josiah Harmar, 
recently deployed to repair McIntosh’s crumbling barracks, hastily sent 6,000 rations to 
Cuyahoga to prevent the Indians already assembled there from dispersing. A few weeks 
later, Lee authorized gifts of rum and gunpowder to be sent to other wavering nations 
waiting at Kuskuskies. Despite these incentives, only the Wyandots, Delawares, and 
several Ottawa and Chippewa chiefs were present when the proceedings began in January 
1785.19
The treaty did not go well for the Indians. On January 14 they delivered a speech 
expressing their firm belief that the lands in question were their own. The commissioners 
answered in “a high tone,” saying that since the Indians had “adhered during the war to 
the king of Great Britain, they were considered.. .a conquered people and had therefore 
nothing to expect from the United States, but must depend altogether upon their lenity 
and generosity.” Harmar reported that this threat had “the desired effect,” and Butler, 
Lee, and Clark proudly sent a copy of their handiwork to Philadelphia two weeks later.
In addition to the new boundary line adorning United States maps that severed most of 
present-day Ohio from its Indian owners, the Fort McIntosh treaty also required the 
nations to leave hostages until all white prisoners had been returned, to swear allegiance 
to the Americans, and to surrender any of their number who committed crimes in the 
states. The commissioners were particularly pleased that they had also reserved land 
within the Wyandot and Delaware tracts that the United States could use to build forts
19 “Josiah Harmar Journal, Nov.-Dee. 1784,” Letter Book A, vol. 46, Josiah Harmar Papers, 
William Clements Library; Butterfield, ed., Dickinson-Harmar Correspondence, 50-52.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
148
and to access waterways. With these strokes of the pen, they announced that they had 
eradicated all Indian claims to land as far west as the Great Miami River.20
Even before rumors reached Fort McIntosh that some Kentucky inhabitants near 
Lexington were planning to ambush the Indians on their way home, the treaty proved to 
be completely unsatisfactory for the western nations and ensured that the war begun 
during the Revolution would resume. This time around, the enemy was not simply 
encroaching settlers and fort-building soldiers, but government officials wielding maps 
and compasses. While their land was in greater jeopardy than ever before, many chiefs 
objected even more strongly to the tone of the commissioners at both Fort McIntosh and 
Fort Stanwix (and later treaties as well), believing their identity as sovereign nations to 
have been trampled upon by swaggering Americans intent on declaring them a 
subjugated people. In order to defend both their land and sovereignty, various Indian 
nations sought to revise strategies they had employed during the previous decade of 
fighting to fit the new political context and to guarantee peace and safety for their 
communities21
Before they could formulate any long-term plans for responding to their 
aggressive neighbors, the western Indians had to process all the implications o f the recent 
exchanges at Forts Stanwix and McIntosh. Having participated in the most recent 
proceedings, the Wyandots and Delawares were forced to leave hostages with General
20 Butterfield, ed., Dickinson-Harmar Correspondence, 53; Calloway, Revolution and  
Confederation, 329-31; “Butler, Lee, and Clark to Congress,” Jan. 28,1785, Papers o f  the Continental 
Congress, reel 37, item 30, 271. The “high tone” that Harmar mentions sounds like the work o f Clark who 
believed that “a sense o f superiority has infinitely more influence on an Indian mind than that o f benefits 
bestowed or faith engaged,” PCC, reel 37, item 30,271.
21 PCC, reel 69, item 56,255-56; “Harmar to Major General Mifflin, Jan. 31, 1785,” Letter Book 
A, 33, Harmar Papers.
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Harmar. Several weeks after the treaty had concluded, one of the Delaware captives 
escaped, causing Captain Pipe to soothe the diplomatic stir by handing over his son and 
nephew. By the beginning of June, both nations had brought in a total of fifteen white 
prisoners, demonstrating enough compliance to release their hostages and to guard the 
veneer of good will existing between them and the Americans, despite their 
dissatisfaction with the January conference.22
Meanwhile the Shawnees and Mingos denounced the treaty participants, hoping 
that none of the surrounding nations would “listen to anything the [Wyandots] or 
Dellawares may say on Behalf of the Americans as they have sold their Lands & 
themselves with it to them.” To ensure that even distant tribes learned of the American 
ill-treatment, they forwarded the messages to the Cherokees and Creeks and asked their 
British associates to spread the word among the Lake Indians. “You now see Trouble is 
coming upon us fast, we think it nigh at Hand. The Virginians are settling our Country & 
building Cabbins in every Place,” they fretted.23
Two months later, they returned the “high tone” of the commissioners in kind. 
Using the person of John Crawford, captured by the Mingo chief Captain Wolf for 
trespassing on Indian land, as bait, various Shawnee, Mingo, Cherokee, and Delaware 
chiefs called together a small group of American negotiators and rebuked them for saying 
nothing good at either Fort Stanwix or Fort McIntosh. Not only had they claimed to own 
all the country, they had “seized and detained” prisoners on both occasions, all the while 
neglecting to kindle the council fire at the accustomed place, Detroit. Speaking for his
22 “Harmar Journal, Feb. 23, 1785, March 8, 1785,” Letter Book A, vol. 46, “Harmar to Knox, 
June 1, 1785,” Letter Book A, 65, Harmar Papers.
23 “Shawnee and Mingo speech, March 20, 1785,” Ser. 1, lot 713, SIAP.
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fellow chiefs and all the nations from Iroquoia to the Wabash River, the Shawnee Captain 
Johnny reminded the men that the Ohio River was the boundary established by their 
forefathers. The Indians did not object to receiving traders provided they made no 
attempts to settle, he clarified, but “it is now clear to us your Design is to take our 
Country from us. We remind you that you will find all the People of our Colour in this 
Island strong, unanimous & determined to act as one Man in Defence of it. Therefore be 
strong & keep your People within Bounds, or we will take up a Rod & whip them back to 
your Side of the Ohio.” Furthermore, he added, failure to comply with this ultimatum 
would mean that the Americans would never see their “Flesh & Blood” residing among 
the Indians ever again.24
Although the Indians dismissed Crawford and sent the Americans back across the 
Ohio safely, they followed up these threats with assaults on other adventurers who dared 
to set foot in their territory. The Shawnees, Mingos, and Cherokees patrolled the 
Muskingum region, while the Kickapoos and other Wabash tribes canvassed the land 
farther down the Ohio. In the villages throughout the entire area, the Indians were in 
“great ferment,” universally counseling about how to prepare for the enemy’s next move. 
That move turned out to be an invitation to another treaty. At the conclusion of the Fort 
McIntosh treaty, the commissioners had recommended that it would be wise to secure 
peace agreements from the Wabash and Illinois Indians in addition to making another 
effort to pacify the Shawnees and Miamis. Congress agreed and eventually settled on the 
mouth of the Great Miami River as a suitable location. Suspecting that this summons
24 Ibid., “Council at Wakitomike, May 18, 1785,” Ser. 1 lot 714. The Delaware chiefs at this 
council were likely Buckonghelas and his followers. They lived near the Shawnee towns and had not 
attended the Fort McIntosh treaty, unlike their Delaware counterparts led by Captain Pipe. See Tanner, 
Atlas o f  Great Lakes Indian History, 84-86, for divisions among the Delawares.
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would be received with considerable skepticism, Richard Butler enlisted the Wyandots 
and Delawares to promote the treaty before heading westward himself to oversee its 
satisfactory completion.25
The Wyandots took their job seriously. In late August, they welcomed four 
United States ambassadors, who had also been given the task of inviting tribes to the 
Great Miami, and offered to assume responsibility for the Potawatomies and the nations 
residing around Detroit. By the time Butler arrived at the treaty site in late October, 
however, few of his scouts had encouraging news. The Ottawas, Chippewas, and 
Potawatomies politely but firmly said that they were too engaged with other negotiations 
to heed the call at the moment, expressing surprise that the Americans had ignored the 
ancient council fire when making their plans. They also chided the Wyandots for hastily 
supporting the proposal without fully considering its implications. William Clark 
reported that the Wabash Indians had avoided his request by saying that they needed to 
consult other chiefs, but based on their generally indifferent attitude, the onset of their 
hunting season, and their persistent attacks on the frontier, he doubted that they would 
make the trip. Samuel Montgomery and his company received the same answer from the 
Miamis and then suffered the indignity of having their horses stolen, preventing their 
departure from the Miami town and halting the progress of their invitation.26
With the arrival of Butler and the continued efforts of ambassadors Daniel Elliot 
and James Rinker, the Wyandots found themselves in an increasingly conflicted position.
25 “Harmar Journal, June 22,1785, July 6, 1785,” Letter Book A, vol. 46, Harmar Papers; PCC, 
reel 37, item 30, 272, LDC, 22: 197,251-52, 383,480; MPHC, 24:22.
26 David I. Bushnell, Jr., ed., “A Journey through the Indian Country beyond the Ohio, 1785,” 
Mississippi Valley Historical Review!, no. 2 (1915): 264-65,268-71; MPHC, 11: 466-67, PCC, reel 69, 
item 56,299.
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They hovered around Butler’s camp, demanding rum and other tokens of favor for their 
diplomatic services, but began to complain that they “had don a great deall.. .and they 
were now tired.” Their faltering spirits received another blow from the Shawnees and 
Mingos at Wakatomica who scolded them for attending the Beaver Creek (Fort 
McIntosh) conference in blatant disregard for the agreement all the nations had made to 
be unified. After chastising the Wyandots and Delawares for their past and present 
support of the United States, the Shawnee and Mingo chiefs admonished the Americans 
as well. “[Y]ou know very well Brothers, its not the way to make a good Peace to keep 
people prisoners or have soldiers at their Backs, it cannot be for the good of the Nations.” 
If you light the council fire at Detroit, we will come in the spring, they promised.27
Delaware and Wyandot leaders like Captain Pipe and Half King understood that 
the United States’ poor treaty etiquette was not the only reason for these angry responses 
from most of the Ohio Valley nations. Just as the congressional representatives began to 
deliver their latest invitation, geographer Thomas Hutchins arrived at Fort McIntosh 
ready to survey the land supposedly acquired at the January 1785 conference. He 
expected to be joined by some Delaware and Wyandot chiefs to ensure protection for his 
team, but they quickly informed him that given the efforts to “kindle a Council fire at the 
Mouth of the big Miami River,” they were unable to do “two pieces of Work at the same 
time” and advised him to return home until after the treaty. While Hutchins’ presence 
added more fuel to the incessant counseling that unified disgruntled villages, the Indians’
27 Richard Butler, “Journal o f  General Richard Butler,” in The Olden Time 2, nos. 10-12 (1847): 
454-57,484-531; PCC, reel 69, item 56,251-54, 275-77 (at 253,275). The mention o f “soldiers at their 
Backs,” might refer to the small number o f military personnel at Fort McIntosh, but more likely refers to 
the larger number of troops that arrived with Butler and proceeded to build Fort Finney at the mouth o f the 
Great Miami River to house the treaty.
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refusal to guard him provoked various American officials to question their peaceful 
intent. Capt. John Doughty blamed the Delaware chiefs for failing to stop the killing of a 
man named Chambers at Tuscarawas and opting instead to only protect their trader friend 
and his goods. He also fingered seven Wyandots as the perpetrators of this incident and 
charged them with murders earlier in the summer as well. Clearly, the Wyandots and 
Delawares were under suspicion from both Indians and whites.28
As the appointed treaty date drew nearer, the prospects for a genuine peace grew 
increasingly dim. Butler, Harmar, and other American officials attributed this failure to 
English agents who assured the Indians that only jurisdiction and not ownership of their 
lands had been transmitted by Great Britain to the United States in 1783. These same 
agents allegedly tampered with Congress’s invitations and actively instructed chiefs not 
to meet with the Americans. While men like Simon Girty, Robert Surphlet, and 
Alexander McKee certainly promoted British economic interests, their influence was 
only a small factor in turning native leaders away from the Great Miami. Primarily, the 
Indians were disturbed by the American effort to break their confederacy, the complete 
disregard for native sovereignty during previous negotiations, and the blatant designs on 
their land, most clearly viewed by Hutchins’ surveying attempts. The presence of George 
Rogers Clark with two militia companies encamped on the opposite side of the Ohio 
River certainly did not encourage treaty attendance either.
28 LDC, 23: 17,43-44; PCC, reel 74, item 60, 189-91,193-97,205-07,209-10 (quotes), reel 164, 
item 150, vol. 1,107-09.
29 Butler, “Journal o f  Richard Butler,” The Olden Time, 2: 481-90, 502-05, 515; PCC, reel 69, 
item 56,291-94,327-28, reel 74, item 60, 190-91; LDC, 22: 588, “Harmar to unknown, Dec. 28,1785,” 
Letter Book A, 105, Harmar Papers.
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Notwithstanding these obstacles, 150 Shawnee men and 80 women joined the 
Wyandots and Delawares at the hastily constructed Fort Finney in January 1786. Most of 
the proceedings involved the renewal of friendship between the Wyandot and Delaware 
chiefs who had attended the Fort McIntosh treaty and the Americans, but the 
commissioners also spent considerable time denouncing the British and informing the 
Shawnees that they had been misguided in trusting speeches from Detroit. Head chiefs 
Kekewepellethe and Moluntha did not contradict these jabs at the English, but they 
objected when the treaty’s articles addressed the division of land and hostages. 
Complaining that the Americans had left them only “ponds” to live on, Kekewepellethe 
stated, “God gave us this country, we do not understand measuring out the lands, it is all 
ours.” Furthermore, he refused to deliver hostages because he and his people were true to 
their word. If this was how the United States conducted business, he declared, “you may 
keep your goods, and give them to the other nations, we will have none of them.” In 
response to this impassioned speech, Butler threatened to wage war on the Shawnees, 
even destroying their women and children, unless they complied with Congress’s “liberal 
and just” terms. The same afternoon Kekewepellethe retracted his comments, and the
i n
treaty concluded two days later.
Butler and the other commissioners exulted in their success, announcing to 
Congress that “from the local situation of the Shawanoes and the ascendancy they have 
over the other Indian nations we are of opinion their friendship is of more importance to 
the weal of the citizens of the United States than that of any other tribe of Indians in the 
western Territory.” In addition to leaving hostages at Fort Finney, the Shawnees seemed
30 Butler, “Journal o f Richard Butler,” The Olden Time, 2: 512-31 (at 521-24).
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determined to work for peace and to provide protection for the surveyors later in the year. 
What Butler overlooked in this triumphant report was that although six chiefs had placed 
their marks on the treaty, the remaining Shawnees had left the gathering with the 
tomahawk clutched firmly in their hands. Considering that the Piankeshaws, Weas, 
Miamis, Kickapoos, Cherokees, Mingoes, and Lake Indians had all refused even to attend 
the treaty, the prospects for peace were even more remote than they had been after the 
Fort McIntosh treaty. This time, however, the Indians were prepared to meet the 
American threat immediately. The incessant counseling of the previous year had yielded 
results.31
During the next three years, war parties from many Ohio Valley nations targeted 
the burgeoning settlements in Kentucky, the established enclaves near Wheeling and Fort 
Pitt, and especially the surveyors, hunters, soldiers, and farmers who dared to pursue their 
trades on the Indian side of the river. For nations such as the Mingos and the scattered 
Cherokees who had migrated into the region in the early 1780s, raiding had never really 
ceased in 1783 because the United States had never made peace with them and continued 
the practices that had roused native ire for the past decade. As the war escalated in 1786, 
the Mingos were rejoined by many others, but once again they frequently assumed the 
role of scapegoat for all violence against Americans. Shortly after the Fort Finney treaty, 
Shawnee leaders led by Moluntha named the Mingos and Cherokees as the primary 
disturbers of the peace, perhaps in an effort to deflect suspicion from their escaped
31 PCC, reel 69, item 56, 377-82 (at 378); “Minutes of Debates in Council on the...Ottawa 
River.. .November, 1791,” Early American Imprints, Ser. 1, nos. 24-25 (American Antiquarian Society and 
NewsBank, Inc., 2002), 10-11; “McKee to John Johnson, Feb. 25,1786,” Ser. 1, lot 716, SIAP; Although 
members o f  Congress shrugged off the absence o f  the Shawnees at the Fort McIntosh treaty, saying that the 
Six Nations would keep them in line, they were quick to accept the commissioners’ pronouncement a year 
later that peace with the Shawnees was o f  most importance. LDC, 22: 197,23: 211.
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hostages. After a spring full of “scalping work” by many nations, Delaware and 
Wyandot chiefs also sought to divert attention from their own people’s participation by 
blaming the Mingos living near the Shawnee towns. Eventually, the Shawnees 
themselves were accused of sending out war belts, a fact that Moluntha acknowledged, 
before admitting that the perpetrators were beyond his control.32
In the next few years, most Ohio Valley nations, including the Potawatomies, 
Chippewas, and Ottawas, participated at least occasionally in the war. None engaged 
more vigorously than the Wabash tribes, however, most notably the Miamis, Weas, 
Pinakeshaws, and Kickapoos. Distance from the western fringe of British settlement had 
limited their involvement in the Revolution’s early years, but Clark’s arrival in 1779 
connected them to the broader conflict. His influence and that of the French at Vincennes 
preserved their neutrality for a few years; but as American promises failed to meet their 
needs and Kentucky settlement began to threaten their hunting grounds, they took the 
offensive.
Despite multiple recommendations from Indian commissioners, no peace treaty 
had been conducted with these nations by 1786, and encroachment on their lands had 
occurred with greater frequency. Consequently, after a grand council at the Wea towns, 
they launched successive waves of attacks against Kentucky and the Vincennes region, 
“constantly bringing in horses and scalps” for the next few years. Like the Shawnees 
farther up the Ohio, they were perfectly positioned to dominate river traffic. While the 
Shawnees, Mingos, and Cherokees terrorized the hourly progression of flatboats heading
32 PCC, reel 85, item 71, vol. 2, 547-48,553, reel 164, item 150, vol. 1,249-50,253-54,265,269- 
70, 341-43, 373,423,431-33,499-503, vol. 2, 373, reel 165, item 150, vol. 3, 55, 59; “Harmar to unknown, 
Feb. 28,1786,” Letter Book A, 113, Harmar Papers (“scalping work”); “Harmar Journal, June 25, 1786,” 
Letter Book A, vol. 46, Harmar Papers.
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for Kentucky, Wabash warriors harassed convoys of soldiers and supplies intended to 
reinforce Fort Knox at Vincennes. Not content with these small strokes, they even dared 
to take on the American garrison, retiring only when the French distributed presents and 
threatened to take up arms against them.33
Although the Wabash and Shawnee-led attacks on citizens, soldiers, and property 
on the rivers and in Kentucky and western Pennsylvania halted the surveyors’ progress 
and created considerable fear on the frontier, they failed to staunch the overwhelming tide 
of settlers pouring into the area. During the final six months of 1787, Harmar counted 
146 passing boats bearing 3,196 people and scores of horses and livestock and estimated 
that Kentucky could muster 5,000 fighting men. A year later, John Heckewelder claimed 
that vessels bound for Kentucky hourly passed his lodging at Marietta, Ohio, when river 
conditions were favorable.34
Not only did Indian raids fail to prevent rapid development, they also provoked 
retaliatory expeditions that proved even more devastating to native communities. As 
early as May 1786, Virginia governor Patrick Henry complained about the state of affairs 
in Kentucky, urging Congress in June to send a “respectable force” of continental troops 
into Indian country to either treat or make war. When the federal government hesitated, 
the Kentucky militia took matters into their own hands in October. Clark led 1,200 men
33 PCC, reel 69, item 56, 279-81,283-85, reel 164, item 150, vol. 2,21-26,29-31 (at 30), reel 165, 
item 150, vol. 3, 213-14,261-63; Leonard C. Helderman, ed., “Danger on Wabash: Vincennes Letters o f  
1786,” Indiana Magazine o f  History 34 (1938): 458-67; “Harmar to Knox, July 7, 1787, Aug. 7, 1787,” 
Letter Book B, “Harmar to Major General Mifflin, June 9, 1788,” Letter Book C, “Harmar to Knox, Sept. 
14, 1788,” Letter Book D, Harmar Papers', Gayle Thombrough, ed., Outpost on the Wabash, 1787-1791 
(Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society, 1957), 42, 76, 80, 82, 93, 109-10; MPHC, 24: 29-30; Thomas 
Ridout, “An Account o f my Capture by the Shawanese Indians,” WPHM, 12 (1929): 7-31. For more details 
on the Wabash Indians’ participation in the war, see White, Middle Ground, 421-33.
34 “Harmar to Knox, May 14, 1787, Dec. 9, 1787,” Letter Book B, Harmar Papers; Wallace,
Thirty Thousand Miles with John Heckewelder, 229; Harmar also counted passing boats and their cargo 
from Oct. 1786-May 1787, LDC, 24: 380.
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up the Wabash River, while Col. Benjamin Logan headed for the cluster of Shawnee 
towns on the Mad River with approximately 900 volunteers. Most Shawnee warriors 
were either hunting or responding to the reports of Clark’s advance on the Wabash, but 
those remaining offered stout resistance until they yielded out of fear of injuring their 
own people taken captive. Altogether Logan burned seven towns, destroyed all the com 
and produce, killed eleven, and imprisoned an estimated thirty women and children. 
Meanwhile 400 of Clark’s men deserted (perhaps remembering the July plundering raid 
by two militia companies that resulted in death for their captain at the hands o f  a formerly 
friendly band of Piankeshaws), thereby thwarting his plans. Clark stayed at Vincennes, 
endeavoring to treat with the Indians, but he was soundly rebuffed by several chiefs and
O f
succeeded only in angering the other local leaders.
Although the Shawnees and the Kentuckians managed to stage several cordial 
exchanges of prisoners in 1787, both sides continued to wreak havoc. Col. Levi Todd 
raised 170 men in May to attack the Mingo, Cherokee, and Shawnee haven on Paint 
Creek, returning several months later to complete the job. The following year Patrick 
Brown and his cronies assaulted several hitherto peaceful Wabash bands, prompting a 
stem rebuke from Major Hamtranck at Vincennes but nothing in the way of actual 
punishment. None of these expeditions killed or captured large numbers, and they often
35 PCC, reel 29, item 20, vol. 2, 317-20 (“respectable force” at 318), reel 85, item 71, vol. 2,427- 
31, reel 164, item 150, vol. 2,118; “Harmar Journal, Nov. 13, 1786,” Letter Book A, vol. 46, “Harmar to 
Hutchins, Dec. 5, 1786,” “Harmar to Knox, Dec. 7, 1786,” Letter Book B, Harmar Papers', MPHC, 24: 34- 
39; William Lytle, “Personal Narrative o f  William Lytle,” Quarterly Publication o f  the Historical and 
Philosophical Society o f  Ohio, 1, no. 1 (1906): 12-21; L.C. Helderman, “The Northwest Expedition of 
George Rogers Clark, 1786-1787,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 25, no. 3 (1938): 317-34; LDC, 
23: 321-22, 340-42, 381,383,398-99,408,24: 96,98-99, 102.
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galvanized the Indians into renewing their own raids. Nevertheless, they checked the 
effectiveness of a military response to the Americans’ western advance.36
The most common alternative to violent reprisals was simply to continue 
counseling together, usually with an eye toward native unification. In addition to the 
regular exchange of messages throughout the year, the majority of Ohio Valley tribes 
gathered in large numbers at least once a year between 1786 and 1788. Some chiefs 
undoubtedly viewed these occasions as opportunities to recruit new war parties and to 
strengthen the combined attack on the United States, but others exhorted their fellow 
leaders to refrain from depredations and seek diplomatic solutions. Four themes tended 
to dominate these conferences: enumerating mutual grievances; preserving land and 
sovereignty by insisting that the Americans discuss land transactions with the entire 
confederacy; figuring out how to relate to the Americans whose political and cultural 
framework frequently clashed with their own; and redefining their relationship to the 
British.
Most of these themes were prominently on the table during the November- 
December 1786 meeting at the Huron villages on the Detroit River. Initially, the nations 
had begun to gather at the Shawnee towns in September, but Logan’s expedition forced 
them to disperse and destroyed the seat of their council fire. When they reconvened, 
tensions were even higher than before. McKee believed the party favoring hostilities and 
revenge was stronger than the peace party, but both sides resolved to cease raiding until 
after the conference and the Shawnees had had the opportunity to negotiate for the release
36 Faragher, Daniel Boone, 256-57; Carmony, ed., Spencer Records ’ Memoir, 347-48; Tanner, ed., 
Atlas o f Great Lakes Indian History, 72; Thombrough, ed., Outpost on the Wabash, 114-17.
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of their women and children. The Wyandots and Delawares also sent a message to 
Butler, telling him to “keep back all your people from coming this way for.. .any sort of 
Business, likewise you will inform the Surveyors to halt and not to Survey any more at 
present as we are going to have a great Council.”
Perhaps because the eleven nations represented at the conference disagreed about 
how to respond to the Americans, they focused on the grievances they had in common.
In a letter to Congress, they described how they had been disappointed about being 
ignored during the peace settlement between Britain and the United States, especially 
since the “quarrel was not of our own making.” Despite this neglect, they had remained 
largely peaceful, but in the past few years much confusion and mischief had arisen. “We 
think it is owing to you that the tranquillity.. .has not lasted... [because you] managed 
every thing respecting us your own way,” they chided, proceeding to list the specific 
offenses. The Americans had called nations together at places convenient to themselves 
without regard to established council fires and Indian preferences. Then, at those 
meetings, they had made peace and completed land transactions with separate groups, 
“entirely neglect[ing] our plan of having a general conference with the different nations 
of the confederacy.” Although most tribes repudiated these treaties, surveyors, settlers, 
and soldiers had all crossed the river, even killing some chiefs working for peace. 
Notwithstanding all of these issues, the Indians concluded their letter by suggesting that 
they meet with the Americans in the spring at a mutually convenient place to restore 
friendship and “speak to each other without either haughtiness or menaces.” To make
37 “McKee to Johnson, Nov. 12, 1786,” Ser. 2, lot 646, “Delaware and Wyandot to Butler, Dec. 
1786,” Ser. 1, lot 718, SIAP.
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sure that Congress took them seriously, they also added that measures should be taken to 
prevent “surveyors and other people from coming upon our side [of] the Ohio river,” 
threatening to defend their ancient rights and privileges with blood if necessary. “It shall 
not be our faults,” they warned, “if the plans which we have suggested to you should not
n o
be carried into execution.”
This invitation to a treaty couched in thinly veiled threats exhibited a fitting 
compromise to the question of how to respond to the Americans who had now added a 
surprise military attack to their expanding list of sins. Some of the Shawnees and all of 
the Cherokees, Miamis, and Wabash Indians recommended open war, but the Wyandots 
and several Delaware chiefs feared the consequences of alienating their powerful 
neighbor. Despite these general opinions, every council participant recognized that the 
situation was exceedingly complex. The Delaware chief Buckonghelas, who frequently 
opposed the more pacific Captain Pipe, acknowledged that any diplomatic maneuvers 
could be undone by warriors who refused to pass up an opportunity to kill or plunder the 
enemy. Joseph Brant, representing a divided Six Nations delegation, himself seemed to 
vacillate between war and peace, at times vehemently denouncing the Americans and at 
others instructing the Wabash Indians to be more reserved lest they meet the same fate as 
the Shawnees. Faced with a complicated problem involving an unpredictable opponent, 
the Indians clung to the idea of a confederacy as their only means of agreeing among 
themselves and fending off the United States’ illicit advances.39
38 Walter Lowrie and Matthew St. Clair Clarke, eds., American State Papers: Documents, 
Legislative and Executive, o f  the Congress o f  the United States, Class II, Indian Affairs, 2 vols. 
(Washington D.C.: Gales & Seaton, 1832) 1: 8-9; MPHC, 11: 467-69.
39 PCC, reel 164, item 150, vol. 2, 115-18,267-75; “John Butler to John Johnson, Nov. 22, 1786,” 
Ser. 2, lot 654, SIAP.
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If the Americans’ past misdeeds such as seizing land without purchase, bringing 
soldiers to peace treaties, using an imperious tone to bolster their claims to superiority, 
and demanding hostages garnered them an untrustworthy reputation, the long silence that 
met the Indians’ invitation did little to assure the Ohio Valley nations that the future 
would be any different. Congress’s failure to respond quickly rested in part with the 
confederation. The Shawnees had been designated to deliver the carefully crafted speech, 
but by July 1787 they still had not completed the task, so the Delawares and Wyandots 
assumed responsibility for bringing word to Butler who forwarded the message to 
Philadelphia. Secretary of War Henry Knox laid out the situation in great detail, 
ultimately arguing that a treaty was preferable to war because of the beleaguered state of 
American finances and the fact that the Indians could potentially muster a formidable 
force. He opposed overturning any of the previous treaties or “returning” land to the 
Indians, but he did suggest that “instead of a language of Superiority and command, may 
it not be politic and Just to treat with the Indians more on a footing of equality, convince 
them of the Justice and humanity as well as power of the United States and o f this 
disposition to promote the happiness of the Indians.”40
By the time Congress reached a decision to conduct another treaty, almost a year 
had passed, Hutchins had surveyed a sizable tract of Ohio land, and the Indians had 
resumed their hostilities with particular vengeance. In the spring of 1788, American 
messengers circulated the invitation, enlisting the aid of Wyandot chiefs to entice the 
warring tribes to attend. Although many observers doubted that the treaty would ever
40 “Butler to Johnson, April 27,1787, Ser. 2, lot 657, SIAP; PCC, reel 34, item 27, 341-44 (quote 
at 343), reel 164, item 150, vol. 2, 369-71.
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materialize, newly-appointed governor of the Northwest Territory, Arthur St. Clair, 
arrived at Fort Harmar in June eager to implement his instructions. The skeptics received 
more fuel for their position a month later when a party of Ottawas and Chippewas 
attacked the advance guard watching over provisions at the Falls of the Muskingum, the 
site chosen for the conference. St. Clair, already annoyed that the Indians had postponed 
the treaty so their confederacy could confer beforehand, reacted angrily, withdrawing the 
supplies to Fort Harmar and refusing to conduct business at the appointed place. “After 
such an insult, to meet the Indians at that place, should they be inclined to come, I 
thought inconsistent with the dignity of the United States,” he told Knox. A week later 
he announced that his men had arrested six Chippewas who had come to the Falls a few 
days after the incident, believing at least one of them to be a perpetrator.41
American credibility dropped even lower after St. Clair’s hasty response. By 
changing the treaty location, the United States was again guilty of staging a treaty at an 
unknown council fire. Likewise, St. Clair insisted on imprisoning the Chippewas, even 
though the Delawares vouched for them and cited the Ottawas who escaped as the real 
culprits. He also sent a message to the Indians beginning to gather at the Miami River, 
demanding satisfaction for the Muskingum killings, a move that seemed to “stagger the 
Indians much.” The governor’s incendiary action compounded the already fractured 
unity binding the nations together. By the time Brant arrived at the new Miami River 
council fire, accompanied by over 200 of the Six Nations, the western Indians, who had
41 PCC, reel 164, item 150, vol. 2, 373, reel 85, item 71, vol. 2, 547-58, 553, 561-66, reel 165, 
item 150, vol. 3, 55, 59,205-07,209-14, 341; “Harmar to Knox, April 10, 1787,” Letter Book B, Harmar 
Papers', William H. Smith, ed., The St. Clair Papers: The Life and Public Service o f  Arthur St. Clair, 2 
vols. (Cincinnati: Robert Clarke, 1882), 2: 36-37,45-46, 50-53,63-64.
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been waiting for him for several months, were annoyed at the delay and even more 
unsettled about how to respond to the Americans than they had been in the past.42
Noticeably absent from previous native councils was much discussion about 
boundary lines. To the Ohio Valley Indians, the Americans had erred by illogically 
concluding that they had conquered the people and land north of the Ohio River, which 
prompted them to conduct threatening, one-sided treaties that failed to establish peace. 
Since most of the Indians rejected these treaties and the boundary lines inscribed in them, 
their goal was to subvert the entire United States agenda of illegally claiming lands rather 
than focusing on markings on a map. In their minds, the 1768 Fort Stanwix agreement 
had guaranteed them the land in question, and nothing in the past few years had changed 
that fact. Even the Wyandots, who had attended and signed each of the contested treaties, 
seemed puzzled about how the Americans justified their claim to land above the Ohio.43
The September-October 1788 conference introduced the idea among the Indians 
that the boundary itself might warrant some discussion. Although the information from 
this meeting is meager and clouded by factional rivalries, it appears as though Brant 
surprised everyone by suggesting a compromise boundary line, one that would require 
several nations to yield “a small part of their country” but did not relinquish the vast 
acreage prescribed by the Americans. If the United States rejected this effort, then he 
recommended taking up the hatchet. Some of the Wyandots, Delawares, and Lake 
Indians supported this concession but hesitated about pursuing open war. Other groups 
advocated war but wanted nothing to do with losing any land. St. Clair’s informants
42 St Clair Papers, 2: 81-83, 87-88; PCC, reel 165, item 150, vol. 3 ,294 ,297  (at 294).
43PCC, reel 164, item 150, vol. 2, 272-73.
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reported that the Kickapoos and Miamis “particularly would agree to nothing that was 
proposed, and would propose nothing themselves.” To complicate matters further, 
rumors spread through Indian country that if they trekked to Fort Harmar, the Americans 
planned “to kill them all, either by putting poison in the spirits.. .or communicating the 
small-pox with blankets.”44
Just as St. Clair was becoming convinced that the treaty would not take place and 
his calls to raise the militia for protection were growing more urgent, he received word 
that a large group of Indians was ready to embark for his fort on the Muskingum River. 
Before they had traveled very far, however, they sent a message to St. Clair, asking that 
the United States shelve the previous treaties and consider Brant’s new proposal. Clearly 
affronted, the governor shot back an answer, detailing the “futility” of the Indians’ idea 
that they could be “discharged from the obligation of former treaties.” Upon hearing this 
response, so indicative of every American attitude and position that had created the 
current hostility, Brant “immediately” returned to Detroit with many of the Six Nations, 
Delawares, Shawnees, and Miamis. Some of the Wyandots, Delawares, Senecas, and 
Lake Indians continued to Fort Harmar where they attempted to negotiate with St. Clair. 
First, they argued for the Ohio River boundary, but when that was rejected, they tried a 
different approach. “We don’t understand.. .how you came to get this land from our 
Father, as none of us Know any thing about it, We cannot find out when it was that we 
should have given our Lands to our Father,” they challenged, before extending Brant’s 
offer of the land east of the Muskingum. St. Clair squashed this proposition as well and
44 St. Clair Papers, 2: 93-96 (at 95, 93).
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quickly brought the proceedings to a conclusion, adding another virtually identical and 
equally ineffective treaty to the United States annals.45
In the midst of wrangling with the Americans and squabbling with each other, the 
Indians were also seeking to redefine their relationship with the British. By the last few 
years of the Revolution, most Ohio Valley nations had chosen to align themselves with 
their “Father” at Detroit, but they grew increasingly wary at the war’s conclusion, since 
following British advice tended to leave them vulnerable to marauding Americans. They 
resented that they had been excluded from peace negotiations, especially since their lands 
seemed to be a major topic of debate, and they questioned how the British believed 
themselves qualified to barter with their territory at all. Casting further suspicion over 
British activities were the reduction in supplies for the Indian Department and the rise in 
shady land purchases by British traders and government officials.46
As a result of this skepticism regarding the British, some Indians chose to distance 
themselves from the council fire at Detroit. In 1785 Captain Johnny warned a group of 
Americans to stay on their side of the Ohio River or face violent measures. He concluded 
by saying that “what we have said we are determin’d to do without the council or Advice 
of our Father, who formerly assisted us when requisite.” Despite this bold expression of
45 Ibid., 98-100, 102, 106 (at 99, 100); Calloway, Revolution and Confederation, 481-94 (at 482). 
Richard White suggests that the Indians who attended the Fort Harmar treaty split with Brant in a bid to 
gain control o f  the confederacy’s leadership. This view seems to overestimate Brant’s influence in the 
confederacy and ignores the fact that the Wyandots had been working to broker a peace between the 
Americans and the belligerent Indians nations for the past three years. Those who attended the Fort 
Harmar treaty were simply the nations who had been in contact with U.S. ambassadors, some, like the 
Wyandots and Senecas, even passing details o f  their Miami River conference to St. Clair while it was still 
unfolding. See White, Middle Ground, 445-47.
*6MPHC, 11: 408-10,435-36, 444.
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independence, most Indians realized that they needed the trade goods that the British 
offered, particularly after Logan’s expedition destroyed considerable food supplies. The 
winter of 1787-1788 was especially harsh. Running low on ammunition and expecting an 
American army to barge into their territory in the spring (they had still not heard of 
Congress’s decision to pursue another treaty), the nations at Lower Sandusky also lost 
sixty people to a smallpox epidemic. Consequently, they begged for powder, lead, a 
storehouse, and British troops to assist them in defending their land and protecting their
47property.
Partly in response to these requests and partly to maintain British ties to the native 
communities, McKee occasionally distributed gifts and food between 1784 and 1788. 
American observers always viewed such actions, as well as the presence of British traders 
in the region, as evidence of Whitehall’s tampering with the Indians and disrupting the 
peace process. From an Indian perspective, however, the question was not how the 
British were influencing them but how they could use the British to achieve their own 
ends. During the Revolution they had benefited from Detroit’s ammunition, artillery, and 
foodstuffs as they waged war against encroaching Americans. Now the task was to 
exploit British fears of losing their business in the hope that generous expressions of 
friendship would result. To do this, they reprimanded British leaders for thrusting the 
current strife with the United States upon them by neglecting them in the peace treaty. 
They also continually emphasized their unified strength and reported their embassies to
47 “Council at Wakitomike, May 18,1785,” Ser. 1, lot 714, SIAP; PCC, reel 165, item 150, vol. 3,
141-42.
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southern and western nations to make the confederacy seem even larger and more 
formidable.48
These plans for manipulating the British and revising their old alliance were only 
partially successful. While McKee’s aid facilitated their large gatherings, the Indians still 
struggled with a basic question: what exactly could they expect from their former allies? 
Canadian governor Lord Dorchester insisted that he had “no power.. .to begin a war,” but 
other officials hinted that the British supported native defense of their land rights. These 
mixed messages forced the Indians to persist in asking for a clear reply to their requests 
for assistance and to develop a new strategy for figuring out how to deal with the British 
when no clarity was forthcoming 49
Unfortunately for the Indians, managing the British, like countering the 
Americans, required a stalwart unity that the western confederacy was not able to muster 
during the second half of the 1780s. Although they shared the same grievances, they 
differed markedly on how to seek redress. The wrangling before the Fort Harmar treaty 
also revealed the deep distrust that many Ohio Valley Indians harbored toward Brant, a 
fissure that only exacerbated the rivalry between Brant and Complanter for influence 
within the Six Nations. When the Americans exulted in January 1789 that the Indian 
“confederacy is broken,” they were correct in highlighting native disunity, but they 
underestimated how quickly the solidarity of 1783 could be reconstituted if conditions 
continued to deteriorate. Neither genuine unification nor its promised defense against
48 LDC, 25: 424; PCC, reel 69, item 56,251-54,291-94, reel 74, item 60, 189-91, reel 164, item 
150, vol. 1, 301, vol. 2,21-26,270,281-82, reel 165, item 150, vol. 3,39-40; MPHC, 11:470-71.
49 MPHC, 24: 39 (quote); 20: 179.
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American advances had materialized yet, but the Indians had not abandoned hope for 
improvement in the future.50
In the immediate aftermath of the Fort Harmar conference, however, the western 
nations focused their attention on warfare rather than unity. The Wyandots and other 
Indians congregated near Sandusky complained that they had been forced to sign the 
treaty, both because of American threats and their “poor, naked, & hungry” condition. 
They had spent the previous fall counseling about how to respond to the Americans and 
then traveling to Fort Harmar and consequently, neglected their hunting, leaving them 
without adequate provisions for the winter and spring. In return they were “for the most 
part cheated,” receiving such a small compensation that “it was not even worth while to 
put out their hands for it.” By the time they reached home, they had decided to disregard 
the agreement. In April they sent a message to St. Clair, instructing him to refrain from 
building forts in the disputed territory and warning that they intended to kill any 
surveyors who ventured onto their land. They also intended to attack the most recent 
settlement on the Muskingum because they “resolved to fight for their land, and then if 
they lost it they would lose it like men.”51
These were not idle words. As the Wyandot ambassador delivered this message 
at Fort Pitt, other western Indians were raiding near Wheeling, on Dunker’s Creek, and at 
the new establishment across from the Little Kanawha River. The Wabash Indians seized 
the opportunity to renew strikes on Kentucky, even though many of them had remained 
aloof from the previous year’s councils. At the end of July, Maj. John Hardin led 220
50 St. Clair Papers, 2: 109; LDC, 25: 505.
51 Wallace, Thirty Thousand Miles with John Heckewelder, 242.
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men on a two-week retaliatory expedition that killed twelve Weas, but rather than curbing 
hostilities, this invasion prompted another round of killings, kidnappings, arsons, and 
horse thefts. One distressed Kentucky leader reported to both the federal and Virginia 
governments that the Indians attacked so frequently he could not possibly recount all the 
incidents.52
Hoping to escape more destruction, St. Clair dispatched peace emissaries in the 
spring of 1790, but their reception was lukewarm at best. The Shawnee chief Blue Jacket 
told Antoine Gamelin, “from all quarters, we receive speeches from the Americans, and 
not one is alike. We suppose that they intend to deceive us.” Meanwhile, assaults on 
Kentucky continued unabated, and the Ohio River became increasingly treacherous to 
navigate, as the Indians devised new schemes to capture passing boats. At the request of 
the Kentuckians, Harmar attempted to dislodge the “vagabond” Indians at the Scioto 
River who seemed to be most responsible for disrupting river traffic. But he merely 
wandered around for a few days, taking a few scalps before his men threatened to desert. 
By June he joined St. Clair in concluding that the necessity of chastising the warring 
tribes outweighed the threat of alienating the nations still formally aligned with the 
United States.53
Harmar’s military strategy involved a two-pronged attack. While he marched 
toward the Miami towns, Col. John Francis Hamtranck was to create a diversion among
52Ibid., 244; “Harmar to St. Clair, May 8, 1789,” Letter Book E, Harmar Papers', St. Clair 
Papers, 2: 114,121-22; Thombrough, ed., Outpost on the Wabash, 159, 162, 166,169, 182-83; ASPIA, 13- 
14, 84-85.
53 St. Clair Papers, 2: 135-40, 144-47,155-160 (at 157); Thombrough, ed, Outpost on the 
Wabash, 223-25,231-33; Pennsylvania Archives, 11: 673, 712-13, 715-16; ASPIA, 86-91, 97-98; “Harmar 
to Knox, March 24, 1790,” Letter Book G, “Harmar to Knox, June 9,1790,” Letter Book A, vol. 30, 
Harmar Papers.
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the Kickapoos, Weas, and Piankeshaws to keep them from reinforcing the international 
assemblage at Kekionga. Harmar set out on September 30 with 320 federal troops and 
1,133 militia. Learning of his advance, the Indians quickly abandoned their towns and 
crops, a move that perhaps lulled the Americans into a false sense of security. After 
burning the houses and fields, Harmar ordered a detachment of 150 to scout to the west. 
Despite being outnumbered, the Indians, led by the Shawnees and Potawatomies, soundly 
trounced this group, repeating the feat three days later against a unit twice as large. 
Harmar hastened back to Fort Washington before his army could sustain any more losses 
and proceeded to pronounce the expedition a success, even after learning that Hamtranck 
had completely failed to accomplish his end of the mission. Although he acknowledged 
that he had lost many valuable men (initially he estimated 180, though other accounts say 
300), he proudly highlighted the demolished villages and insisted that the Indians had 
suffered as many casualties as the Americans. “The Savages never received such a stroke 
before in any battle that they have had,” he declared.54
Despite Harmar’s confident words, it quickly became apparent that the Indians 
also claimed victory. Rather than being awed by United States power and authority, they 
were emboldened to continue their efforts to arrest illegal expansion. Nations previously 
unsure about resisting an American army flocked to Kekionga, where several groups 
were rebuilding their towns, and the Glaize, where Indians gathered briefly before 
scattering to harass their constant enemy. The frequency and ferocity of these attacks 
prompted Knox and St. Clair to devise a new military strategy. Penetrating the Indian
54 MPHC, 24: 104-09,132-34; St. Clair Papers, 2: 188,190; Thombrough, ed., Outpost on the 
Wabash, 259-63; “Harmar to Knox, Nov. 11,23, 1790,” Letter Book A, vol. 30, “Harmar Journal, Oct. 22, 
1790,” (quote), Harmar Papers.
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country and establishing a post in the heart of the Miami, Delaware, and Shawnee 
territory remained the ultimate goal, but they also authorized Brig. Gen. Charles Scott 
and Lt. Col. James Wilkinson to command expeditions against several influential Wabash 
towns. Before unleashing these forces, Knox prepared peace messages for the western 
Indians and sent them with Col. Thomas Proctor, who was also instructed to recruit 
support for his cause from Six Nations representatives on his way to Sandusky and the 
Miami towns. Considering that Scott’s troops were being raised as Proctor was 
embarking on his journey, the peace attempt was feeble from the beginning, but it 
received a death blow when St. Clair requested that the Six Nations join him in  fighting 
the western Indians at the same time that Proctor was asking them to assist him in making 
peace. These mixed messages ended Proctor’s errand before he even reached the Ohio 
Country.55
In early June Scott terrorized the Kickapoos and Weas, burning two o f their 
principal towns along with adjacent villages, killing 32, and taking 58 prisoners. 
Wilkinson followed this expedition in August with the destruction of L’Anguille, another 
significant town, attacking while most of the warriors were at the Miami villages 
purchasing ammunition. Altogether he destroyed 2 towns and 430 acres of com, killing 8 
and capturing 34 in the process. Angered by these raids to the west and the murder of 
several “friendly” Indians in the east, the nations assembling near the Miami towns 
prepared to exact revenge. As St. Clair led his army of 1,400 northward from Fort 
Washington in early October, the Indians advanced to meet them with 1,040 warriors.
55 ASPIA, 112-13, 121-22, 129-130;*. Clair Papers, 2: 199-204; MPHC, 24: 180-97,220-23, 
233-41; Thombrough, ed., Outpost on the Wabash, 272,282-84; Executive Journal o f  the Northwest 
Territory, vol. 1, 136-37, Ohio Historical Society; Pennsylvania Archives, Ser. 2,4: 473-524, 538-40, 545- 
51,555, 562-65.
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Simon Girty informed McKee of their departure and reported that they “were never in 
greater Heart to meet their Enemy, nor more sure of success, they are determined to drive 
them to the Ohio and starve their little Posts by taking all their Horses and Cattle.”
Girty’s assessment proved to be partially correct. The Indians overwhelmed St. Clair’s 
forces, killing approximately 600, including many officers, and sending the remainder 
scurrying back to Fort Washington, but they never managed to uproot the Americans 
from their establishments. Nevertheless, this decisive native victory swelled the fledgling 
confederacy’s confidence and forced Congress and Knox to rethink their entire Indian 
policy.56
Defeating two American armies in successive years indicated that the Ohio Valley 
Indians possessed a different mindset than they had in the previous decade. During the 
1780s they had been stunned by their British allies’ complete neglect during the peace 
process. Shortly thereafter they were surprised again by the United States’ conduct at 
various treaties. Thinking they were gathering simply to make peace (a move not 
necessarily guaranteed since their war on the Americans was not defined simply by the 
Revolution’s aims), they were taken aback when Congress’s commissioners addressed 
them as a conquered people, demanded hostages, and announced that the land now 
belonged to them. While many nations responded violently to these blatant breaches of 
etiquette, they remained slightly befuddled by the Americans’ goals and the speed at 
which new settlers streamed into the region. By the 1790s, however, they had recovered 
from their shock and even began to regain some of the initiative in dealing with their
56 ASPIA, 132-35; St. Clair Papers, 2: 222,227-29,233-39,249-71; Pennsylvania Archives, Ser.
2 ,4 : 548; MPHC, 24: 261-64,281, 313-17, 328-37 (at 329-30); Winthrop Sargent, “Winthrop Sargent’s 
Diary while with General Arthur St. Clair’s Expedition against the Indians,” Ohio Archaeological and 
Historical Quarterly, 33, no. 3 (July 1924), 237-73.
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unwelcome neighbor, as their 1790 and 1791 victories proved. Perhaps more important, 
they had reached a common understanding of American designs on their land, but 
unanimity on an appropriate response still seemed to elude them.
In the wake of St. Clair’s defeat, the time appeared ripe for a renewed 
commitment to unification. Military success had lured Indians to the Miami and Maumee 
Rivers from Michilimackinac, Illinois, Canada, and the South, and ambassadors 
dispatched after the November 1791 action hoped to bring in more. Although some of 
these nations had returned home before St. Clair’s sizable army marched against them, 
they undoubtedly recognized the power of their combined strength and the value of 
identifying shared goals. In addition to martial triumph, geography aided those who 
advocated a stronger confederation. Since the attack at Gnadenhutten in 1782 and 
Clark’s and Logan’s forays against the Shawnee towns in 1782 and 1786, most of the 
area Indians congregated either at Sandusky or the Miami River. These migrations were 
primarily motivated by the need for distance between their towns and American raiding 
parties and hunters, but they also conveniently placed the various nations in a good 
position for cooperative ventures.57
Perhaps even more significant to forging unity than geography or battlefield 
victories was the further crystallization of grievances brought on by the attacks of the past 
two years. Harmar, Scott, Wilkinson, and St. Clair with their substantial armies had all 
penetrated farther into Indian territory than any enemy larger than a raiding party. While 
the Ohio Valley Indians rejoiced at their rout of the Americans, this new concern
57 MPHC, 24: 220-23; “Minutes o f Debates in Council... 1791,” 20; Tanner, Atlas o f  Great Lakes 
Indian History, 84-91.
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magnified the problems of the past two decades. Encroaching settlers had not 
disappeared when raids made their existence precarious in Kentucky and western 
Pennsylvania. If armies continued to press onto native land regardless of the drubbings 
they received in 1790 and 1791, the Indians would face even more immediate threats.
Just as they had after Logan decimated the Shawnee towns in 1786, the Indians 
gathered in late 1791 to discuss these recent developments and to decide whether to 
extend peace to the United States or to wait for Congress to humbly approach them. The 
aged Ottawa Egusheway announced that his heart inclined toward peace, but he could see 
no way of achieving that goal “on honourable terms” without war. Consequently, he 
instructed the assembly, “You ought not to give peace to your enemy until they ask it, or 
until they first retire out of your country.” Speaking on behalf of the warriors, he recited 
a litany of American crimes: pushing the Indians away from the seaboard over the past 
two centuries, misrepresenting the 1768 Fort Stanwix treaty to allow illegal settlement on 
their hunting grounds, deceiving them during the Revolution by counseling neutrality and 
then sending armies into their country and murdering Cornstalk and the Moravian Indians 
at Gnadenhutten, luring them to treaties under pretense of peace only to fraudulently 
seize land by “pen and ink witch-crafit,” committing severe breaches of treaty protocol, 
attempting to divide the Indians’ loyalty, and claiming that “by virtue of conquering our 
fathers, they have conquered us,” thereby becoming the “sole and absolute sovereigns” of 
the land north of the Ohio River. He reminded his hearers that they had solemnly agreed 
to make decisions together, a unity that was necessary to convince the United States that 
Indian opposition was composed of more than a “separate banditti.”58
58 “Minutes ofDebates in Council... 1791 ” 5-20 (at 6, 18 ,11 ,8 , 14-15).
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When Egusheway finished, he conceded the floor to his cousin, who spoke for the 
peace chiefs. He agreed with his relative’s version of recent history and believed Indian 
resentment to be justified, but he still advocated offering peace to Congress because the 
Americans were too powerful. “Compared to them, your numbers are so few,” he said, 
“that were you to lose one warrior for each hundred you might destroy of theirs, they 
would in time extirpate you from your country. ...it is true, that whenever you attack 
double, or treble, the number of your enemy, you can beat them; but what avails it to 
destroy an hundred of them, when you see ten hundred immediately arise like locusts 
from the earth!” He suspected that the white men were dominated by an evil spirit that 
prompted them to defraud the Indians and enabled them to flood onto native lands with 
astonishing speed. The only way the Indians could gain an advantage over this 
innumerable adversary was to engage the military aid of the British, but thus far, all of 
their requests at been ignored. Despite these arguments for avoiding war, he advised that 
peace be offered only if the United States “will retire from our lands, and make a fair 
agreement to be honest in future.”59
The competing ideas at this conference produced mixed results throughout 1792. 
Indian war parties attacked river traffic and expanding settlements with particular ferocity 
during the first half of the year, spurred on by reinforcements from distant nations and 
reports of American fort construction at the site of the previous autumn’s battle. They 
also killed two of Knox’s emissaries who carried invitations to meet with President 
Washington in Philadelphia. By M y, however, plans for another grand council began to 
take shape, and in October the large, multi-national gathering extended an invitation to
59 Ibid., 20-21.
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meet for peace at Lower Sandusky, provided the United States destroyed its forts on their 
lands and agreed to make the Ohio River the boundary between them.60
Although the outcome of this council seemed to indicate like-mindedness, there 
were many factors that conspired against unification as well. In 1790 Congress and Knox 
had renewed overtures to Complanter and his group of Senecas, asking them to use their 
influence to bring the western Indians to peace. During the next few years, he made 
multiple trips to Philadelphia, using these opportunities to protest his people’s ill- 
treatment and to contest the legitimacy of several treaties specific to the Six Nations. 
While he and other Seneca leaders did not hesitate to confront the Americans on 
particular issues, they agreed to represent the United States in a positive light. At the 
October 1792 conference, the Seneca chief Farmer’s Brother told the assembled nations, 
“We have been two years in Council with Washington and during that time, we have 
heard nothing fall from him, but what breathed the strongest desire of cultivating peace & 
friendship, with all nations of our Colour on this Island.”61
The Shawnee chief Messquakinoe sternly reprimanded the Six Nations on behalf 
of the confederacy. “You have told us you have been listening these last two years to the 
United States and that during that time, you heard nothing, but what tended to the welfare 
of the people of our Colour. How can this be? For whilst you were considering for the
60 Pennsylvania Archives, Ser. 2 ,4 : 594, 600-06; ASPIA, 238,242-44,337; “Thomas Duggan 
journal,” Ser. 2, lot 697, SIAP; Richard C. Knopf, ed., Anthony Wayne: A Name in Arms (Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press, 1975), 45,132; MPHC, 24: 390-96,414-15,468-72,483-98.
61Hazard, ed., Minutes o f  the Provincial Council o f  Pennsylvania, 16:497-506; ASPIA, 226,232; 
Pennsylvania Archives, Ser. 9,1: 338-47; MPHC, 24: 492-93 (at 492); Knopf, ed., Anthony Wayne, 47-8. 
Knox also tried to recruit Brant to reach the western Indians. He did agree to visit Philadelphia during 
1792, but he remained focused on drawing a different boundary line, a move that ultimately pleased neither 
party. ASPIA, 236-37, 242-43, MPHC, 24: 379,417-18,456; E.A. Cruikshank, ed., The Correspondence o f  
Lieutenant Governor John Graves Simcoe, 5 vols. (Toronto: Ontario Historical Society, 1923-31) 1: 169, 
242-43, 5: 18-20.
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good of your Western Brethren, two powerful armies were sent by the Americans to 
destroy us. Has their sweet speeches so much intoxicated you and blinded you, that your 
sight could not reach so far, as where we are now sitting?” He went on to say that the 
Americans were simply attempting to separate the Six Nations from the western Indians, 
just as they had tried to do with the Delawares and Wyandots at the Forts McIntosh and 
Harmar treaties. These latter nations had since “put [Congress’s] speeches behind them,” 
and he hoped the Six Nations would act similarly. “We know very well what the 
Americans are about, and what are their designs,” he said. Consequently, he ordered the 
Senecas to inform the United States that all the assembled Indians were insisting on the 
Ohio River line. To Washington in particular they should convey that “we do not want 
compensation; we want a restitution of our Lands which he holds under false pretenses.” 
Messquakinoe’s words seemed to neutralize the potential disharmony between the 
Senecas and the western Indians. The Six Nations representatives dutifully 
communicated the confederacy’s message and invitation to the Americans and were 
careful to retain a mediating position, doing nothing to anger either side or to disrupt the 
Indian council’s plans.
Unfortunately for the vast assembly at the Glaize, another threat to unification 
could not be erased so easily. Several days before their proceedings began, Gen. Rufus 
Putnam conducted a peace treaty with the Wabash and Illinois Indians at Vincennes, 
using the prisoners captured by Scott and Wilkinson in 1791 as leverage. Although 
Putnam suspected that the Eel River Weas and Ouitanons were more interested in 
recovering their relatives than in genuinely establishing peace, he offered reasonable
62 MPHC, 24: 493-95, 509-16; ASPIA, 323-24, 337.
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terms: “all the lands belonging to these tribes would remain in their possession unless 
purchased fairly,” all depredations should stop and no violent retaliation was allowed, 
and the Indians were required to return prisoners but not forced to leave hostages. After 
the Indians finished celebrating, Putnam asked them to send messages to the Miamis, 
Delawares, Shawnees, and others “who have hitherto stopped their ears, and refused to 
speak with the United States about peace.” He and his sidekick John Heckwelder also 
sent letters to the disgruntled Indians and invited several Wabash chiefs to Philadelphia to 
further solidify their relationship. Putnam’s efforts did little to dissuade the hostile 
nations, but they did succeed in keeping most of the Wabash Indians away from the 
confederacy, even though Congress never ratified the treaty.63
Ultimately, however, unification’s severest blows came from the Indians 
themselves. During the first half of 1793, it appeared as though the 1792 council’s 
ultimatum would strengthen the Ohio Indians’ ability to defend their lands. Knox quickly 
accepted their invitation to negotiate for peace (although his mistake on the treaty’s 
location elicited a storm of protest and accusations that the United States was once again 
maneuvering to dictate the meeting’s outcome), and both sides refrained from sending 
war parties against each other. As May and June arrived, tensions began to arise.
Despite Complanter’s March admonition to military commander Anthony Wayne that 
American troops should remain stationary at Pittsburgh until after the treaty, Wayne 
began to send supplies and troops down the Ohio to Fort Washington at the beginning of 
May, believing Complanter’s advice to be an “artful” attempt to keep his army from
63 John Heckewelder, “Narrative o f John Heckewelder’s Journey to the Wabash in 1792,” 
Pennsylvania Magazine o f  History and Biography, 12, no. 1 (1888), 171-72; ASPIA, 238-41, 319-20, 338; 
MPHC, 20: 314-15.
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moving until the waters were too low for transport. Meanwhile, Brant suggested to 
McKee that the western Indians convene a private pre-conference, which would postpone 
the June 1 meeting date with the Americans. This schedule change left Knox’s treaty 
commissioners stranded at Niagara until they received notification that the Indians were 
ready to proceed.64
While the commissioners waited with Upper Canada’s lieutenant governor, John 
Graves Simcoe, the Indians began to squabble at the Miami (Maumee) Rapids. Brant 
preached the importance of unanimity, but his plan to concede some territory north of the 
Ohio angered the Shawnees, Delawares, and Miamis and drew them into private councils. 
Wayne’s war-like movements around Fort Washington added to the confusion and 
prompted the Indians to send a fifty-chief delegation to Niagara to inquire about this 
unorthodox act during peace negotiations. The commissioners downplayed the existence 
of “warlike appearances,” attributing any that might have occurred to “a few disorderly 
people” rather than the United States army. They also addressed the Indians’ second 
concern about their authority to draw a new boundary line, assuring them that they held 
such power and looked forward to establishing a line based on mutual concessions that 
would create a “just & permanent peace.”65
Brant was encouraged by this response, but those who favored the “old” Ohio 
River boundary wanted no part of new “pen and ink work” that would deprive them of 
land. The arrival of a Cherokee and Creek deputation with word of military success 
against the United States in the South agitated the Indians even more. Finally, Delaware,
64 MPHC, 12: 43, 49,24: 518-19, 541; RG 10, 8: 8287-288; Knopf, Anthony Wayne, 205-06,230 
(quote); Pennsylvania Archives, Ser. 2 ,4: 628.
65Simcoe Papers, 1: 361; “Brant’s Journal,” RG 10, 8: 8443-446; Knopf, ed., Anthony Wayne, 251- 
55; ASPIA, 349,351; MPHC, 24: 562-68 (at 564-65).
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Shawnee, and Wyandot representatives sent another message to the commissioners, now 
waiting at Detroit. “If you seriously design to make a firm and lasting peace you will 
immediately remove all your people from our side of [the Ohio],” they declared, this time 
specifically asking if the commissioners were authorized to fix the Ohio River as the 
boundary. In response, the Americans launched into the familiar tale of how legitimate 
treaties with the Wyandots, Delawares, Ottawas and Chippewas had given them the land 
north of the Ohio. Too many settlers were now planted in this country to be uprooted, so 
it was impossible for the Ohio to be the boundary, but the United States was willing to 
“give such a large sum in money or goods as was never given at one time for any quantity 
of Indian Lands” and also deliver an annual supply of goods. Furthermore, the 
commissioners were willing to concede that contrary to Congress’s first claim that they 
were given the land in the 1783 Treaty of Paris, they now acknowledged that the Indians 
possessed the right of soil and that they merely claimed the tracts they had already 
acquired and the exclusive right to make more purchases in the future.66
This “concession” failed to impress the Indians, who certainly believed they had 
never relinquished their right of soil. The delegation also reminded the commissioners 
that all the treaties they cited for validation of their expansion were “not complete” 
because they involved only a few chiefs. When the Shawnee, Delaware, and Wyandot 
ambassadors returned to the Rapids with the commissioners’ speech, the inter-Indian 
wrangling continued. The Shawnee Captain Johnny accused Brant and the Six Nations of 
breaking the confederacy by turning from the 1792 decision to insist upon the Ohio River
66 Wallace, Thirty Thousand Miles, 312-18; Dwight L. Smith, ed., “William Wells and the Indian 
Council o f  1793,” Indiana Magazine o f  History, 56, no. 3 (Sept. 1960), 220-22; ASPIA, 352-54; MPHC,
24: 579-85 (at 580, 584). The commissioners were Benjamin Lincoln, Beverly Randolph, and Timothy 
Pickering, and this speech reflected Knox’s instructions well. See ASPIA, 340-42.
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boundary. He thought even a partial Indian force would be enough to repel the 
Americans. Brant countered by saying that his revised line would benefit the entire 
group because it would be preferable to war.
Eventually, those nations favoring “the 1768 line” triumphed and proceeded to 
send a pointed letter to the commissioners. They argued that Congress had acted 
irresponsibly in selling their lands to settlers because they had made it very clear that “the 
consent of a General Council was absolutely necessary to convey any part of these 
Lands.” Indeed, irresponsibility looked suspiciously like purposeful deception, 
considering that St. Clair had persisted in conducting the Fort Harmar treaty, despite the 
absence of many nations. This dishonorable move lent further credence to the Wyandot 
and Delaware complaints after the earlier treaties, namely that they had gone to make 
peace and instead been forced to sign “deeds of concession.” After discounting the 
American claim to land because of 1780s treaties, they addressed the other excuse for the 
United States’ inability to withdraw from their territory. If Congress re-designated the 
large sum of money and the annual gifts promised to the Indians and used them to 
relocate the settlers, everyone would be satisfied. “If you add also the great sums you 
must expend in raising & paying armies, with a view to force us to yield you our Country 
you will certainly have more than sufficient for the purposes of repaying these settlers for 
all their labour and their improvements,” they added. To conclude their letter, they 
rejected the “concession” that the United States would only claim pre-emption rights to
67 ASPIA, 354; “Brant’s Journal,” RG 10, 8: 8447-475.
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their land, saying that since they had never given Britain that privilege, it could not be 
transferred to the Americans.68
When the commissioners received this message with its resolve to protect the 
Ohio boundary, they declared the negotiations at an end. The Indians began to gradually 
disperse at the beginning of September, although many hastily returned a month later 
when Wayne set his army in motion. These warriors attacked a convoy in mid-October, 
reportedly killing 20-30, stealing 60-70 horses, and capturing 40 loads of supplies and 10 
prisoners, but most importantly, halting the American advance for the season and giving 
them time to place their women and children in “some secret recess.” Meanwhile Brant, 
his Six Nations followers, and his Lakes Indian sympathizers gathered at Buffalo Creek 
and appealed to Congress to accept a revised boundary line. These nearly simultaneous 
actions illustrated the deep rift among those Indians concerned with American expansion 
to the Northwest. Although they reached different conclusions about an appropriate 
boundary, their common fixation on the line itself narrowed their objective regarding the 
Americans to one issue and weakened their unity in the process.69
The wildcard in all of the inter-Indian and Indian-American disputes was the 
British. Acting on orders from London, regional leaders officially continued the policy 
of neutrality initiated in the 1780s. As American armies grew more threatening, 
however, Simcoe privately worried that their real target was to capture the British posts, 
reasoning that neither Harmar nor St. Clair would have needed such large forces if their
68 MPHC, 24: 588-92; Reginald Horsman, “The British Indian Department and the Abortive 
Treaty o f  Lower Sandusky, 1793,” Ohio Historical Quarterly, 70, no. 3 (July, 1961), 189-213.
69 MPHC, 12: 75, 79-81, 105-08,24: 592-96,605,614-16,625; ASPIA, 478; Simcoe Papers, 2: 
96; Knopf, Anthony Wayne, 279-82 (at 280).
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only goal was to chastise the Indians. He also feared that the Indians would join the 
invaders, thus making Detroit even more vulnerable and ensuring that the king’s fur 
trading interests would be eliminated in the Ohio Country. Faced with these potential 
problems, Simcoe and Dorchester adopted a three-pronged strategy. First, they instructed 
the British ambassador in Philadelphia, George Hammond, to propose British mediation 
between the Americans and the Indians following St. Clair’s defeat, a move that would 
also help to create an Indian buffer state “extending the whole length of the lines of [the 
British and American] frontiers.” The third segment of the plan directed McKee and 
Elliott to deliver more supplies and presents, which would hopefully ingratiate the 
Indians and make them susceptible to British suggestions.70
The first two of these ideas affected the Indians very little. The United States 
government was not interested in either a buffer zone or British mediation, and the 
debacle in 1793 ensured that no real meeting transpired between the confederacy and the 
Americans, making the Indians’ request for their “Father’s” presence in councils 
irrelevant. But the third part of Simcoe’s plan affected the Indians considerably. As the 
American threat became more tangible, native requests for aid increased and, under the 
lieutenant governor’s orders, were fulfilled in the form of war accoutrements and 
provisions for the Indians’ frequent and extended conferences. Once again, the Indians 
capitalized on the current political climate to wrest necessary goods from the British. 
Although supplies were important, the various nations ultimately hoped to persuade their 
Detroit neighbors to join them in battle. Brant and others accused McKee of
70 MPHC, 24: 377-78,386-87 (at 386), 426,461-62,473,482, 521-23, 548-50, 577-78, 600-05; 
Simcoe Papers, 1: 119, 128, 130-32,141-42, 176-77,267-68, 308-09, 349,2:46, 59-61.
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disseminating the false notion that the British were prepared to offer actual military 
support. Shawnee emissaries recruiting among the Cherokees and Creeks apparently 
repeated this story in 1792-1793. Whether they genuinely believed this report or were 
simply trying to coerce the British into open assistance by inciting a large number of 
people to demand the “promised” service, they prevented the British from directing their 
diplomatic affairs.71
If British intentions were difficult for the Indians to discern in the early 1790s, 
they became even more complicated during the winter of 1793-1794 as Wayne’s massive 
army camped threateningly within easy striking distance of the Glaize and Detroit. 
Simcoe, Dorchester, and others continued to speculate that “other objects [must be] in 
view besides the Indian War,” given the size of the American force. They also worried 
that the longer Wayne remained in the area, the greater the chance of the Indians making 
peace with him and joining the United States in driving the British entirely out o f the 
region. Their fears gained new strength in January when some Delaware, Shawnee, and 
Miami warriors sent two messengers to Wayne asking for peace. Although Wayne was 
skeptical of their sincerity from the beginning and told them they would have to return all 
prisoners within thirty days to provide “convincing & unequivocal proofs of
[their]...desire for peace,” he spent more than two months in negotiations with them
» 11 before deciding that their real goal was “to reconnoiter our position, & to gain time.”
71 RG 10, 8: 8242-243; “Shawnee, Delaware, and Miami speech to McKee, May 16, 1792” Ser. 1, 
lot 738, S1AP; MPHC, 12:43-44,24: 401-02,417-18, 573,605.
72 Simcoe Papers, 2: 213 (quote); MPHC, 24: 629-33 (at 630), 646-48; Knopf, Anthony Wayne, 
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Despite assurances from the Shawnees and Miamis that they had merely intended 
to inquire about a prisoner exchange rather than ask for peace, the fact that the Indians 
had initiated any communication with the Americans while McKee was absent 
heightened British fears of an attack. McKee believed that the opposition to Wayne was 
decreasing daily, and Simcoe fretted that peace overtures from the western Indians might 
encourage the Six Nations, who had recently become quite angry with the United States, 
to pursue the same course. To quell some of these concerns, Dorchester ordered soldiers 
to the Maumee River, instructing them to reconstruct and inhabit an abandoned post near 
the rapids. He also carelessly expressed to the Seven Nations of Canada, reporting at 
Quebec on the failed negotiations of the previous summer, that “from the manner in 
which the People of the States push on, and act, and talk on this side, and from what I 
learn of their conduct towards the Sea, I shall not be surprised if  we are at war with them 
in the course of the present year.”73
Dorchester’s words quickly spread to the Ohio Country, fanned into flame by 
Brant and John Butler, commanding at Niagara. When combined with the new British 
fort in their backyard, this speech caused the Indians to rejoice, hoping that their “Father” 
was finally delivering the assistance they expected. After hearing this message, 
Complanter’s people grew even more insistent upon blocking American expansion into 
disputed territory at Presque Isle, and Brant abandoned his idea of meeting with the 
United States to draw a new boundary line. Despite the apparent promise of British aid, 
many Indians remained unconvinced that the Europeans intended to rouse themselves on
73 MPHC, 20: 325-26,335,24: 631-32, 643, 650-51; Simcoe Papers, 2: 149-50,152, 174 (at 149-
50).
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their behalf. They were “always setting the Indians on like dogs after game, pressing 
them to go to war, and kill the Americans, but did not help them,” several Shawnees 
complained. Other leaders remained cautiously optimistic and opted to send frequent 
requests for “necessaries” and complaints when the supplies were substandard.74
Regardless of their faith in the British, the Ohio Valley nations grew increasingly 
resolved to “advance against the Big Knives, and endeavour to stop their progress.”
Much of their confidence came from the large influx of Indians gathering at the Glaize 
and the Maumee rapids. From these bases, scouts spied on Wayne’s movements and war 
parties harassed American convoys, while individuals continued to venture into Kentucky 
to steal horses. By June, warriors were arriving daily, including some like the Kickapoos, 
Weas, Chippewas, and Ottawas who had been determined for peace less than a year 
before. With numbers now approximating 2,000, the Indians decided to preemptively 
strike a convoy heading for Fort Recovery, Wayne’s new establishment on the site of St. 
Clair’s defeat. Over a two day period, they successfully killed or captured more than 300 
horses and 60-70 men. But when they turned their attention to storming the fort, they 
were repulsed and suffered a number of casualties of their own. This incident could 
almost be considered a victory for the Indians were it not for the fact that many of the
74 MPHC, 12: 111,20: 336-37, 342-43,360-61,24: 656, 662-67, 671-73 (see Complanter’s threat 
to defend lands if  the Americans would not comply with his demand, 673); Simcoe Papers, 2: 245-47, 252, 
255,285,301; ASPIA, 489-90, 507-23 (at 490). Brant did not abandon his scheme simply because of 
Dorchester’s speech. In response to Brant’s fall 1793 boundary proposal, Knox offered to meet with the 
Six Nations in council, a move that Brant had not anticipated. He declined the offer, saying that the 
problems with past treaties were always inadequate representation and the American inclination to dictate 
terms, both o f which he believed would be repeated. See MPHC, 12: 112-14,24: 633-42.
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distant participants returned home afterwards (either to enjoy their plunder or to mourn 
their losses), leaving the native force greatly depleted.75
By the end of July, McKee was encouraged by the return of some of these 
Indians, particularly the Ottawas, Chippewas, and Potawatomies who joined the 
Wyandots, Delawares, and Shawnees in hovering around the string of American forts 
stretching from the Ohio River to Fort Recovery. The Wabash Indians formally 
“expressed their sorrow for having listened to the big Knives” in 1792, and begged “the 
Confederacy to take Pity on them and receive them again among them as Brothers.” 
Despite this solidarity, the Indians were still considerably outmanned by Wayne’s forces, 
and Britain had still given no formal promise of military support beyond supplying guns, 
powder, flints, and knives. Consequently, the Miami chief Little Turtle visited Detroit 
and asked for twenty soldiers and two pieces of artillery to attack Fort Recovery, saying 
that without British support, the Indians could not resist the American army. Two weeks 
later, after word reached the Glaize that Wayne was moving in that direction, causing a 
mass exodus to the Rapids, several Wyandot chiefs added their voices to the request for 
aid, reminding Lt. Col. England that “you told us.. .that if  ever any Enemy should begin 
to threaten us we should let you know it and you would support us.” In a final, desperate 
appeal, they even questioned British honor, accusing them of tolerating American 
abuse.76
None of these ploys worked, and the 700-1,000 Indians could simply watch from 
the Rapids as Wayne built Fort Defiance on the site of their abandoned homes. Still
15MPHC, 12: 115-16, 118, 120-22,20: 346-51, 354-59, 364-67, 24: 656, 660, 695; Simcoe Papers, 
2: 238,266,278, 301, 305-06, 5: 90-96; Darlington, Letters from Fort Pitt, 264-67; Knopf, Anthony Wayne, 
345-49; ASPIA, 495.
76 MPHC, 24: 696-98 (at 697); Simcoe Papers, 2: 334, 357, 366 (at 357).
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determined to defend their lands, they exchanged messages with the Americans, hoping 
to stall for reinforcements. But after a week Wayne advanced and defeated the Indian 
resistance, pushing them six miles beyond the British Fort Miamis, which not only failed 
to defend the Indians during battle, but refused to shelter them during their retreat as well. 
Casualty figures for both sides varied widely, but McKee reported that the Indians were 
more demoralized than the numbers would suggest, probably because they lost at least 
ten principal chiefs. They also endured the army’s destruction of their “very extensive 
and highly cultivated fields and gardens,” so large that Wayne called them the most 
“immense fields of com” he had seen in “any part of America, from Canada to Florida.” 
A week after the battle, he told Knox that he had burned “the Villages & Com fields for 
about Fifty miles on each side of the Miamis” and had more to torch beyond the Glaize in
77the next few days.
Although the battle later dubbed Fallen Timbers was devastating to the western 
Indians, it did not signal an immediate end to their conflict with the United States.
Several Indian war parties continued to attack American stragglers, and Wayne expected 
a larger assault throughout September and October. Once again the Indians were divided 
on the best course of action. Wayne informed them that if they brought in all their 
prisoners, he would be ready to exchange and then proceed to a peace agreement. Brant,
77 Simcoe Papers, 2: 366-67,386-87,395-99,404-05, 3: 9-14,30, 50,179-80; MPHC, 12: 122,20: 
369-72,25: 10-15,21-23; “A Precise Journal o f General Wayne’s last Campaign...” Proceedings o f  the 
American Antiquarian Society, 64, pt. 2 (Worcester, MA: American Antiquarian Society, 1955), 273-302; 
Dresden W. H. Howard, “The Battle o f Fallen Timbers,” Northwest Ohio Quarterly, 20, no. 1 (January, 
1948), 37-49; M.M. Quaife, ed., “General James Wilkinson’s Narrative of the Fallen Timbers Campaign,” 
MVHR, 16 (June, 1929), 81-90; R.C. McGrane, ed., “William Clark’s Journal o f General Wayne’s 
Campaign,” MVHR, 1, no. 3 (1914), 419-443; Richard C. Knopf, ed., “Two Journals o f the Kentucky 
Volunteers, 1793-1794,” Filson Club History Quarterly, 27, no. 3 (July 1953), 247-81; ASPIA, 490,494-95 
(extensive fields quote); Knopf, Anthony Wayne, 351-55 (at 354).
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who had once again been conspicuously absent when an American army invaded Indian 
territory, tried to revive the confederacy in preparation for a spring meeting with the 
United States (presumably where he would again advocate his boundary idea). Simcoe 
responded to another Wyandot request for clarification regarding the British willingness 
to assist them by defending his past record and promising to “uniformly fulfill all his 
engagements” and keep “his Arms.. .at all times...ready to receive you and his territory 
open to protect and defend you from all Enemies.”78
To many of the 3,500 refugees at Swan Creek, none of these options was 
appealing. Peace with the Americans would result in a loss of territory, and Brant and 
Simcoe had both proven unreliable when it came to truly acting in the western Indians’ 
best interests. Accustomed to British promises that sounded sincere but were actually 
quite vague, the Wyandots restated Simcoe’s words in more specific terms: “you told 
us.. .if ever the Virginians came again you would order your Warriors to fire on them.” 
Unfortunately, paraphrasing British assurances did not increase their trustworthiness, 
leaving the Indians still uncertain about how to proceed. Some simply busied themselves 
with hunting or building temporary houses for the winter; others tentatively planned to
7Qmove west of the Mississippi River.
In early November, several Sandusky Wyandots traveled to Fort Greenville, 
where Wayne had established headquarters for the winter, and asked for peace. Although 
Wayne suspected them of playing an “artful game” because they had recently met with 
Simcoe, McKee, and Brant and seemed to be acting independently of the other Indians,
78 MPHC, 12: 142-44,20: 378-80,25: 40-47; Simcoe Papers, 3: 96,121-25, 128, 147-49,155, (at 
124-25) 5: 110, 119-20; Darlington, Letters from Fort Pitt, 267-68.
79 MPHC, 12: 148-49,20: 379-80, 25: 45 (quote); Simcoe Papers, 3: 128, 131, 5: 119-20; ASPIA,
529.
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he repeated his September message about prisoners and added that he intended to make 
peace based on the terms of the Fort Harmar treaty. He also threatened that if the Swan 
Creek Indians continued to resist, they would be ruined along with their British 
benefactors. Given the fractured opinion regarding peace among the western Indians, 
many in the war camp scolded the Wyandots for their action, accusing them of bringing 
trouble upon themselves and ignoring the other nations. In a short time, however, the 
Miamis, Chippewas, Ottawas, Potawatomies, and Sauks began to trickle in, and by 
February Wayne declared that “the whole of the late Hostile tribes have now come
O A
forward with overtures for peace.”
Although disgruntled factions continued to exist, most Indians adopted a shared 
attitude toward the Americans. They desired peace and had agreed to curb hostilities, but 
they remained skeptical about treating with people who had so frequently trampled upon 
their sovereignty in the past. This fledgling unity was bolstered by their common anger 
toward Brant and the British. Representatives like McKee and the Vicar General 
Edmund Burke worked tirelessly to lure the wavering nations back into the British fold, 
but the Indians insisted that they had “lost all confidence in the British since the 20th of 
August, Because they remained idle spectators & saw their best & bravest Chiefs & 
Warriors slaughtered before their faces, & under the Muzzles of their great Guns without 
attempting to assist them—hence they consider the British not only liars—but also 
Cowards.” Rather than treating Brant with outright contempt, many Indians preferred to 
simply disregard him. This message sounded particularly loudly in June 1795 when
80 ASPIA, 527-29, 548-50; Simcoe Papers, 3: 219-21,274-76,286-97; MPHC, 12: 160-63, 20: 
390-96,25: 81-83, 86-87, 34: 734-37; Knopf, Anthony Wayne, 362 (“artful game”), 380-85 (at 384).
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Brant attempted to convene another pre-conference before meeting with Wayne. By the
o  1
time he arrived in Detroit, most nations had already assembled at Greenville.
The Greenville treaty also served to unify the Indians, albeit not in the manner the 
Americans had hoped. From mid-June through early August, various chiefs with 
numerous followers streamed to the fort and regularly engaged in talks with Wayne. 
Prominent speakers such as Little Turtle objected to the United States’ determination to 
abide by the Fort Harmar treaty, arguing that he was unacquainted with it because it had 
been conducted by the Six Nations “who seduced some of our young men to attend it.” 
When he realized that the treaty’s provisions had allotted Miami land to the Americans 
without his permission, he protested. Later he questioned American claims to 
reservations within his territory and proposed a new boundary line that preserved more 
native hunting ground. Wayne countered by saying that the Miamis had been allowing 
French and British occupation of portions of their land for many years, so he had 
precedent for seizing a patch for the United States. As for Little Turtle’s boundary, it was 
too “crooked, as well as a very difficult line to follow.” Before any more challenges 
could be raised, Wayne halted the proceedings and called the Indians to sign the treaty.82
Most attendees placed their names on the treaty, but their unity arose from a 
general dissatisfaction with the results. Egusheway complained that he had “never before 
heard several of the Articles” after Burke read them. Little Turtle intended to refrain 
from signing altogether, but when Wayne pressured him, he bitterly complied, saying that 
“as he was forced to do it he would, but that there was little use in putting his hand to a
81MPHC, 12: 171-73,20: 395-98, 34: 737-38; Simcoe Papers, 3: 288-95, 314, 4: 9-10, 27-28, 50, 
5: 130-31; Knopf, Anthony Wayne, 386-90,415-18 (at 416-17).
S2ASPIA, 564-83 (especially 567, 569-71, 573, 576-78); Simcoe Papers, 4: 68-71.
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Treaty, which his heart could not approve of.” By January 1796, the Indians were still 
upset, and rumors had even begun to swirl that many great chiefs, who had mysteriously 
died after attending the meeting, had been poisoned at Fort Greenville. Six months later 
it was no surprise to find a new militant faction developing.83
In slightly more than a decade, many Ohio Valley Indians had gone from 
staunchly defending their land at the end of the Revolution (complete with convincing 
military victories) to canvassing for a new home outside of the region after the Greenville 
treaty. Although this path was far from linear and tended to be influenced more heavily 
by “pen and ink work” than military exploits, it contained a subtle shift in the balance 
between the Indians’ twin objectives of preserving land and sovereignty. During the 
1780s, native complaints focused more on the Americans’ condescending tone and their 
insistence that they had conquered the Indians and their land. By the 1790s, exclusive 
attention rested on the boundary-line dispute, stifling other means of resolving conflict 
and other grievances. In the end, those who opted to move traded land for sovereignty by 
distancing themselves from the Americans who sought to deprive them of their legitimate 
exercise of power.
As native objectives evolved between 1783 and 1795, so did their strategies. By 
the end of the Revolution, most Ohio Valley Indians had chosen to affiliate themselves 
with the British, but their “Father” repeatedly disappointed them in the ensuing years. 
Despite frequent pleas for Canada’s leaders to fulfill their duties as an ally and not simply 
a trade partner, Simcoe, Dorchester, McKee, and their superiors in London refused to
83 MPHC, 12: 176-78,195 (at 178), 34: 739; Simcoe Papers, 4: 71-74,, 93 (at 72).
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provide the tangible assistance the Indians expected. Consequently, unification became a 
more serious pursuit in the mid-1780s and 1790s. In an effort to revise the alliances that 
had affected the previous decade, the Indians sought to create a confederacy that would 
protect their land and ensure that their voices would be heard. This plan effectively 
created fear among United States leaders, but it was hampered by dominating outsiders 
like Brant and a general failure to agree on the best way to repel the trespassing 
Americans.
Now that the political climate no longer pitted the British and the colonies against 
each other, stratagems like neutrality and dissembling seemed less applicable. The 
Wyandots, ever the masters at concealing their true allegiance, transformed their 
dissimulation during the Revolution into a mediating role in the post-war years. As one 
of the few nations to sign the Fort McIntosh treaty, they received American approbation 
and a small degree of protection from marauding militia bands. St. Clair even sent them 
a letter after Harmar’s expedition, assuring them that the army intended to chastise only 
the Shawnees and Miamis. In turn, Congress expected the Wyandots to pass along treaty 
invitations and to work for peace among the more hostile nations. While the Wyandots 
faithfully executed this task, they also used their position to act in the Indians’ interest by 
twice warning off the surveyors and continuing to insist that although they had made 
peace with the Americans, they believed the United States’ claim to their lands 
unjustifiable. Eventually, their frustration with American audacity in sending large 
forces into Indian country and building forts on land not granted in any treaty moved
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them into the belligerent camp. Yet after the battle at Fallen Timbers, they were the first 
to re-establish contact with Wayne and to investigate the prospects of peace.84
These altered tactics promised to serve the Wyandots well in the years following 
the Greenville treaty. Unification had failed because the Indians could not agree on the 
best response to the American threat. Mediation, however, assumed that different ideas 
existed and sought to forge a new path. On the surface, new strategies for relating to 
non-Indian neighbors seemed necessary because the political and cultural landscape had 
changed dramatically. The United States now dominated diplomatic affairs and the 
British played a smaller role, particularly after control of the forts had been transferred to 
the Americans in 1796. Meanwhile, the Indians were forced to designate new tribal 
boundaries within a greatly reduced amount of land. But for all this upheaval, much 
remained the same. Indian complaints about inadequate presents, double-talking allies, 
and scheming land dealers continued, as did European and American reliance upon native 
trade to fuel part of the Atlantic economy. Most important, however, Indian objectives 
remained immutable. While the acres they defended might have changed, their desire 
and ability to sustain viable, sovereign communities persisted.
u  ASPIA, 147-48; PCC, reel 74, item 60,209; MPHC, 11: 466-67; “Wyandots to US, 1786” Ser.
1, lot 718, SIAP.
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Chapter Four 
Enemies in many Guises
In February 1778, Chief Blackfish and 120 of his Shawnee warriors patrolled the 
forests of Kentucky, looking to retaliate for the murder of their leader Cornstalk the 
previous November. He had intended to besiege the struggling settlement named 
Boonesborough, but when he encountered Daniel Boone and twenty-six other local 
residents making salt at the Lower Blue Licks, he abandoned his original plan and settled 
for capturing a core group of able-bodied men, who would bring a handsome price as 
trade bait or serve as useful adoptees into Shawnee villages. Blackfish also knew that 
taking captives, particularly fully grown, armed men, would create almost as much unrest 
among frontier settlers as pillaging and burning a stockade. For four months the 
Shawnees seemed content with this form of conquest; but after several men escaped and 
returned to raid their adoptive homes, they determined to destroy Boonesborough. 
Unfortunately for their preparations, Boone slipped away in time to warn his Kentucky 
neighbors, who mounted a resilient defense when Blackfish’s army of four hundred 
arrived in September.1
A decade later, the Shawnee chief Nenessica, with a band of ninety Shawnees, 
Potawatomies, Ottawas, and Cherokees, seized another group of outsiders, among them a 
trader, creditor, and speculator named Thomas Ridout. Ridout and his company were 
bound for the falls of the Ohio on one of the slow, flat-bottomed boats that traversed the
1 Faragher, Daniel Boone, 154-99; Chester Raymond Young, ed., Westward into Kentucky: The 
Narrative o f  Daniel Trabue (Lexington: The University Press o f  Kentucky, 1981), 47, 57-64; MPHC, 9: 
435.
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Ohio River in great numbers. Between Limestone and the Great Miami River, the 
Indians easily waylaid the vessel, capturing both prisoners and goods worth more than 
£1,500 sterling. For some in this multi-ethnic party, plunder was paramount, but the 
Shawnees also sought revenge for the burning of their villages by Kentucky militia in 
1786. Initially, they had joined with other nations in sending peace overtures to 
Congress, but after a year with no response, they had taken up the hatchet. Although the 
fate of most of the prisoners is unknown, some were killed, probably as a gesture of 
vengeance. Ridout remained with the Indians for about two months before being 
released, perhaps because he identified himself as English rather than American.2
Four years later, a Shawnee and a Mingo warrior captured ten-year-old Oliver 
Spencer near Fort Washington. Having traveled to the fort to celebrate the Fourth of 
July, Spencer secretly abandoned his companions after a few days and was overtaken 
while returning home. His two captors seemed primarily interested in adding a few 
prisoners to their peltry collection, but they were also part of the large Indian community 
at the Auglaize that had formed the bulk of the opposition to St. Clair’s army the previous 
autumn. Many residents here believed that “their late victories over the whites, 
particularly their signal defeat of St. Clair, were evidences of the returning favour of the 
Great Spirit.” Bolstered by this religious assurance, they were determined to drive the 
“pale faces” south of the Ohio River. Taking a small boy might seem like a feeble 
gesture in the grand effort to push the Americans back, but it served the purpose of 
creating fear on the frontier. After eight months and an elaborate bargaining system
2 Thomas Ridout, “An Account o f my Capture by the Shawanese Indians,” WPHM, 12, no. 1 
(January 1929), 3-31.
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between the British, Americans, and Indians, Spencer was redeemed and returned to
•3
relatives in New Jersey.
Although Boone, Ridout, and Spencer were abducted by different Indians in 
diverse locales and eras, they represented the constantly changing face of the enemy for 
the Ohio Valley nations. To his contemporaries as well as successive generations, Boone 
modeled the life of pioneering hunters and settlers: men whose forays into uncharted 
territory blazed the trail for thousands of land-hungry individuals intent on developing 
new communities in the American “wilderness.” To the Indians he exemplified the first 
wave of trespassers, whose existence was tenuous and therefore subjected to recurring 
raids designed to erase the outsiders’ imprint on native land.
As Kentucky and western Pennsylvania and Virginia settlements became more 
deeply rooted with the great influx of immigrants during and after the Revolution, 
businessmen such as Ridout appeared with increased frequency. Whether they aimed to 
survey land illegally, hunt or trap on the Indian side of the Ohio, or engage in trade with 
various nations, they sought to exploit the general lawlessness of the region at Indian 
expense. Even Ridout, who seemed generally sympathetic to the Indians’ position 
relative to the Americans and was designated simply to collect debts, embarked for 
Kentucky prepared to engage in trade. Unlike Ridout and Boone, the ten-year-old 
Spencer did not represent a specific face of the enemy, but his presence indicated that the 
Americans were becoming even more entrenched on land north of the Ohio.4
3 Oliver M. Spencer, Indian Captivity: A True Narrative o f  the Capture o f  the Rev. O.M. Spencer 
by the Indians... (New York: B. Waugh and T. Mason, 1835, rpt. Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 
1966), 34-126 (at 96).
4 Ridout, “An Account o f my Capture,” 3.
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While settlers and unscrupulous traders might have been the most common foes, 
many other antagonists popped up for the Ohio Valley Indians as well. Government 
officials assured them that they could control unruly westerners and were determined to 
bring justice to the frontier, but they contented themselves with hand-wringing and 
threatening proclamations rather than genuine law enforcement. Congressional agents 
brought tidings of peace, while simultaneously ushering in surveyors, building forts, and 
flourishing fraudulent land deeds. Soldiers competed with Indians for game, in addition 
to destroying their homes, crops, and relatives. Indian agents and religious leaders 
seemed to labor for their clients’ benefit, but were ultimately loyal to their home 
governments. British officials constantly proclaimed their friendship and promised 
protection against the Americans, but never responded when the Indians directly appealed 
for aid. Even outside Indians could don the adversarial cloak, either by attempting to 
dominate Ohio Valley affairs, as the Six Nations did during the entire period, or by 
strengthening another threat, as the Chickasaws and Choctaws did when they guided 
Wayne’s army in 1794.
Faced with such a multifaceted enemy, it is no surprise that the region’s tribes 
rarely agreed on the best way to preserve their land and sovereignty. Few villages were 
privy to all of this opposition at the same time, and most based their strategy on the 
clearest threat, which usually varied by town, season, or year. A static foe would have 
been easier to understand and repulse, but the ever-shifting character of those who sought 
to dispossess the Indians of their Ohio Valley homeland created discord even before their 
real weapons could be launched.
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In addition to bearing a variety of countenances, the Indians’ enemy had different 
goals over time. For the young Continental Congress just beginning to exercise its 
authority in 1775, the first item of business regarding the western theater was to figure 
out what to do about the Indians, particularly those who had been battling Lord Dunmore 
and the Virginians less than a year before. Reports had already reached Philadelphia that 
Canada’s governor Carleton was “instigating the Indian Nations to take up the Hatchet 
against them,” so Congress devoted many sessions to considering whether it should 
respond in kind. At first the delegates could only agree to encourage the nations to 
remain friendly toward the colonies. This resolution enabled them to vilify the British as 
the sort of people who would “let loose these blood Hounds to scalp Men, and to butcher 
women & Children,” while they “stood forth like Men and fought [their] own Battles; 
and advised [the Indians] to sit quietly under the Shade of their Trees and reap the Fruits 
of our Toils & Dangers; the Freedom purchased by our Blood.” In time Congress 
authorized the military to recruit Indians, but in the Ohio Valley this move served to 
alienate nations rather than strengthen their relationship to the Americans.5
While representatives debated the pros and cons of soliciting native auxiliaries, 
others began to plan for an attack on Detroit. As early as September 1775, Congress 
rejected a proposed expedition because “the Season [was] so far advanced,” and the 
intelligence regarding the fort’s defenses was incomplete. During the next three years, 
the war in the West soured for the colonies, as most Ohio Valley nations turned the 
tomahawk against threatening American settlers. Consequently, Congress revisited the
5 JCC, 2: 109, 123,152-53,174-76 (Carleton quote at 109); LDC, 1: 452, 630, 660, 663,2: 7, 3: 
586,4:239-40, 9: 144-46,224-25,12: 534-36 (at 1:452,12: 534).
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idea of marching against Detroit in 1778. Indian agent George Morgan strongly 
advocated this measure rather than sending troops against native villages, arguing that the 
road was passable, the post defenseless, and the neutral Indians more amenable to an 
assault on the British than an attack on their neighbors. Despite Morgan’s persuasive 
efforts, Congress abandoned the drive to Detroit, but permitted a combination of militia 
and continental soldiers to advance into Indian country and chastise any hostile tribes. 
The Moravian missionary John Heckewelder lamented this decision, claiming that “no 
firm peace Can be settled as long as Detroit is not taken, the place from which all evil 
springs.”6
For the remainder of the war, Col. Daniel Brodhead, commander at Fort Pitt from 
1779 to 1781, begged General Washington to approve his schemes to take Detroit. 
Washington rejected each plea, citing insufficient supplies, intelligence, or men, but 
caved in December 1780, when Virginia governor Thomas Jefferson suggested a joint 
expedition of Brodhead at Fort Pitt and George Rogers Clark at the falls of the Ohio. All 
of the carefully laid plans quickly became irrelevant as recruiting for both armies 
stagnated, supplies failed to materialize, and bickering between the two commanders 
injured morale. The final blow to the campaign’s prospects came when 90-100 Indians 
ambushed Col. Archibald Lochry as he traveled down the Ohio to join Clark, killing 
about a third of the party and taking the rest prisoner.7
If the merits of attempting to capture Detroit were disputed throughout the entire 
conflict, support for “carrying the War into the Nation.. .as the only way to secure [the]
6 LDC, 2: 15-16 (at 15); Frontier Advance, 88-89,112-13,121,245 (at 245).
7 Frontier Retreat, 40, 94,100-02, 123,133,311,350; George Rogers Clark Papers, 8: 485-90; 
MPHC, 10: 509-18, 19: 655-56, 658; Pennsylvania Archives, 12: 185.
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Frontiers” and win respect for the colonies was largely universal. By 1777, when Indian 
raids across the Ohio became more frequent, calls for retaliation increased, most notably 
from the Virginia council and Governor Patrick Henry. At first, Morgan balked at the 
suggestion to flatten Pluggy’s town, fearing that it would ignite a general Indian war and 
encourage random attacks on friendly nations. “Should it please God to bless us with 
Victory to overcome our British Enemies on the Sea Coast,” he cajoled, then “we shall 
have it in our power to take ample satisfaction of our Indian Enemy.” Five months and 
countless attacks later he had shifted his position, although he still believed Detroit to be 
the better target than native villages.8
Despite Morgan’s objections, few federal or state officials opposed the idea o f 
taking the offensive, at least in principle. Gen. Edward Hand, the first continental 
commander at Fort Pitt, believed that “destroying the settlements of these perfidious 
miscreants” was the only way to protect the frontiers, even after he led an ill-fated 
excursion up the Allegheny River, killing several women and a boy and antagonizing a 
large band of Delawares in the process. His successor, Gen. Lachlan McIntosh, followed 
Congress’s orders to “chastise and terrify the savages” in 1778 by building Fort McIntosh 
at the mouth of Big Beaver Creek and then marching inland to Tuscarawas and planting 
Fort Laurens near Delaware and Wyandot communities. The Americans turned out to be 
the ones terrified, however, as large Indian forces harassed supply lines and Fort Laurens 
itself, ultimately forcing the company to withdraw in August 1779. Following McIntosh, 
the fiery Brodhead penetrated Indian country several times: first in an attack on Seneca
8 Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 176; George Morgan Collections, MSS 17, Library o f Congress, 
13-14; Morgan Letterbooks, 1: 71-77 (at 76); LDC, 7: 495.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
203
villages along the Allegheny River as part of Sullivan’s campaign into Iroquoia and later 
in devastating the Delaware capital of Coshocton.9
Of all these aggressors, no name inspired more fear at Ohio Valley council fires 
than George Rogers Clark. In December 1777 he persuaded the Virginia government to 
approve his plan to capture the British forts at Kaskaskia and Cahokia in the Illinois 
country and Vincennes on the Wabash. After executing this mission, he threatened the 
local Indians into making a tentative peace and soon declared that he was ready to 
proceed toward Detroit. To check his progress and win back the territory, Gov. Henry 
Hamilton left Detroit in October 1778 and by mid-December had reclaimed Vincennes. 
Two months later, Clark secured his fearsome reputation by secretly converging on Fort 
Sackville and forcing Hamilton and his handful of British regulars to capitulate. 
Previously, Hamilton had symbolized British might, largesse, and courage, so the Indians 
concluded that his conqueror must be very powerful indeed. But fear did not produce 
loyalty. As Clark and his administrators failed to provide adequate supplies, most of the 
Wabash and Illinois Indians drifted back to Detroit for necessities and political allies. 
Clark followed up these westerly campaigns by attacking Shawnee towns in 1780 and 
1782, moves that solidified native animosity toward the Kentuckians rather than 
chastening the committed warriors.10
While most American strategists hoped that taking the war across the Ohio would 
produce submissive Indians, they viewed this possibility as a means to achieving the
9 Pennsylvania Archives, 5: 443; Frontier Advance, 121, 154-68, 170-78, 183 (at 121); Frontier 
Retreat, 40 ,43, 55-66, 343, 348, 373, 376-82, 399.
10 George Rogers Clark Papers, 8: 27, 65-74,115-29, 138-73,218-58,266-97; John D. Barnhart, 
ed., The Journal o f  Henry Hamilton, 1778-1779 (Crawfords ville, IN: R.E. Banta, 1951), 106-91; 
Pennsylvania Archives, 8: 515; MPHC, 10:418-21,423, 11: 321-28.
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larger goal of keeping the British at bay. To them, the Shawnees, Wyandots, Mingos, 
and other belligerent nations were simply acting at the behest of Hamilton and his 
superiors rather than out of objectives and designs of their own. Consequently, 
forestalling the Indians would mean silencing the British in the western theater. In 
addition to repeated, sudden attacks “on such nations...as were the most troublesome,” 
colonial officials devised other means to check native aggressions. “If you find any 
Indians on the south side of the Ohio, which have crossed... with Hostile Intentions you 
will Treat them as open & avow’d Enemys,” West Augusta County’s Lt. Dorsey 
Pentecost advised his militia captains in 1776. George Washington proposed a more 
insidious scheme in 1781. Since the Americans had largely resigned themselves to 
having very little chance of procuring Indian allies at this juncture in the war, he 
instructed Brodhead to “foment differences” among various groups in an effort to 
neutralize their opposition to his advances.11
Despite their efforts to curb Indian raids and implement schemes to capture 
Detroit, Congress, military personnel, and most colonial governments still viewed the war 
in the Ohio Valley as ancillary to the real struggle being waged in the East. Supplies and 
men were designated to reinforce Washington’s troops with very little to spare for the 
distressed inhabitants of frontier counties or military expeditions undertaken in the West. 
In the spring of 1781, while preparing for his Washington and Jefferson-approved strike
11 George Rogers Clark Papers, 19: 66; Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 208; Frontier Retreat,
314. Because many Americans blamed Indian unrest on Hamilton’s machinations, they labeled him the 
“Hair Buyer General,” a reference to rewards he reportedly distributed for colonial scalps. See Bernard W. 
Sheehan, “ ‘The Famous Hair Buyer General’: Henry Hamilton, George Rogers Clark, and the American 
Indian,” Indiana Magazine o f  History, 79 (1983), 1-28 and John D. Barnhart, “A New Evaluation o f Henry 
Hamilton and George Rogers Clark,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 37, no. 4 (1951), 643-52, for 
more information.
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into Indian territory en route to Detroit, Clark requested that Congress provide him with 
necessary stores not available at Fort Pitt. General Sullivan vehemently objected, arguing 
that “they were going on some wild goose Chase against the Indians or Detroit.. .when 
they aught to have turned all their force against the Enemy now destroying the most 
Cultivated part of their Country.” All available “fources and supplies [were] necessary 
against the Enemy who were invading sundry parts of the country,” he insisted.12
Opinions such as these disturbed settlers and local authorities, who believed their 
region to be an equally important part of the country and the war effort. They shared the 
material sufferings of their seaboard counterparts and lived under the same fear that the 
enemy could easily overrun them given the right circumstances. Similar experiences did 
not translate into similar goals, however. While federal representatives dreamed of 
reducing Detroit, leaders of Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Kentucky thought primarily of 
defense. They advocated the construction of new forts as tangible deterrents to the 
Indians and symbols of protection for the settlers. Embracing the “best defense is a good 
offense” philosophy, many also called for expeditions across the Ohio, but they always 
favored attacking native towns rather than targeting British forts or supply centers. Even 
Clark, who had become a hero to many Kentuckians, faced severe criticism during the 
Revolution’s final years when he seemed to be applying resources to schemes not 
immediately related to Kentucky’s safety.13
Since forts were expensive and could protect only a small portion of land, most 
counties raised ranging parties to scout on both sides of the Ohio and to repulse
12 Pennsylvania Archives, 9: 115-16; LMCC, 6:60 (quote).
13 Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 192-99; Frontier Advance, 46; Pennsylvania Archives, 9: 307, 
325; George Rogers Clark Papers, 8: 530-31, 544, 552, 596-600, 605-07, 19: 5, 43, 126-29, 135.
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marauding Indians. This additional security measure was specifically implemented to 
keep terrified settlers from fleeing eastward, but it also highlighted many of the tensions 
between local and federal ideas about how the West should be viewed during the war. 
County and state officials contended that the rangers were guarding American soil and 
should be paid from the common treasury. Congressmen and governors from states 
without western lands countered that Pennsylvania and Virginia had “wantonly settled 
part of the back Country,” and it should not be the responsibility of all the colonies to 
support such selfish and foolhardy actions.14
As the Revolution proceeded, the easterners’ resentment toward all western 
settlement increased, because they believed negligent adventurers incited the Indians and 
enabled the British to conduct the war on another front. Brodhead railed against the 
“folly and villainy” of the trespassers, who had dared to settle between Fort McIntosh and 
the Muskingum River, not acknowledging that the presence of a continental fort on the 
Indian side of the Ohio undoubtedly encouraged Virginians to cross the river. Clark 
disagreed with this “publick Clamour against the Settlement” of the West, arguing that 
Kentucky in particular had “proved of great importance by engaging the attention of the 
Enemy that otherwise would have spread Slaughter & Devastation through out the more 
Interior Frontier, deprived them of giving any assistance to our Eastern Armies, and more 
than probable, the Allegany would have been our Boundary at this time.” Rather than 
seeing the West as a distraction, critics should award it “the most favourable point of 
View as a place of the greatest consequence and ought to meet with every
14Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 242,252-57, Frontier Advance, 134-35, 199; Pennsylvania 
Archives, 5: 344, 742, 6: 39-40, 68-69, 535, 614; LMCC, 6: 60 (quote).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
207
incouragement,” he insisted. Furthermore, the posts at Vincennes, Kaskaskia, and 
Cahokia had “in a great measure baffled the designs of the Enemy at Detroit.” 15
Besides fending off enemy attacks, another way to frustrate English plans was to 
prevent disaffected people from joining ranks with the Indians or the British. This goal 
occupied the attention of every commander at Fort Pitt, particularly at the beginning of 
the war. In the summer of 1777, Governor Hamilton at Detroit circulated a proclamation 
in the Pennsylvania and Virginia backcountries, inviting residents to “withdraw 
themselves from the Tyranny and oppression of the rebel Committees, & take refuge in 
this Settlement.” To counteract this measure, General Hand and other officials attempted 
to link common defense against the Indians with common support for the colonies, but a 
large number of “tories” resisted his efforts. The local militia cracked down on this 
“conspiracy” and even implicated Hand and George Morgan for suspicious activity (both 
were acquitted), but they never succeeded in stamping out dissent altogether. When 
Alexander McKee, Simon Girty, and Matthew Elliott, three traders and Indian 
department operatives before the war, declared their open support for the British by 
fleeing their loose confinement at Fort Pitt in March 1778, the accusations and intrigue 
began again.16
While the Americans feuded among themselves about the consequences of 
exhibiting disloyalty, attacking Detroit, invading Indian country, and encouraging
15 Frontier Retreat, 96-97, 106-07; Pennsylvania Archives, 12: 176-77; George Rogers Clark 
Papers, 8: 217-18, 553, 597.
16 Frontier Defense, 14, 51-53,142-45, 184-87,203-04,249-56 (at 14); “Thomas Brown to Hand, 
Aug. 29, 1777,” “Joseph Chew to Hand, Oct. 23,1777,” Peter Force Transcripts, Series 7e, reel 13, 
General Edward Hand Papers, 1775-1846, Library o f  Congress. For a more detailed look at the conflict 
between British and colonial supporters in western Pennsylvania, see Anne M. Ousterhout, A State 
Divided: Opposition in Pennsylvania to the American Revolution (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987).
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settlement, the British maintained fewer goals for the western theater, though they also 
struggled with internal disagreements. Shortly after Hamilton arrived in Detroit in late 
1776, Gen. Guy Carleton reminded him that “keeping the Indians firm to the King’s 
interest ought to be your first and great object.” Carleton’s successor, Frederick 
Haldimand, continued that policy, particularly exhorting the commanders at distant posts, 
such as Major Arent Schuyler De Peyster at Michilimackinac, to preserve the Indians’ 
friendship, since “our existence almost entirely depends upon [their] disposition.” 
Fortunately for Hamilton, De Peyster, and others, the British Indian department was well- 
equipped to foster good will with the Ohio Valley nations. Unlike the colonists, they had 
an extensive network of agents already operating in most major Indian centers. Most of 
these men also conducted trade and housed sizable stockpiles of goods. If supplies ran 
low at these outposts, they could be replenished at Detroit far more easily and cheaply
I  <T
than the Americans could ship inventory to Fort Pitt.
It soon became apparent that what the British really wanted was native 
dependence rather than friendship. Recognizing that without Indian support their entire 
enterprise in the Ohio Valley and Great Lakes regions would be obsolete, they sought to 
tread carefully between offending their clients and completely controlling their access to 
necessary food and ammunition. This plan worked well during the first half of the war, 
partially because the crown’s naval blockade made it even more difficult for the 
Americans to import trade goods. By 1780, however, the scheme had backfired. Nations 
that had been victimized by colonial troops or had neglected their hunting in favor of
17 MPHC, 9: 345, 360. For an example o f  a British trader living in Indian territory, see Paul L. 
Stevens, trans. and ed., Louis Lorimier in the American Revolution, 1777-1782: A Memoire by an Ohio 
Indian Trader and British Partisan. The Role o f  One French-Canadian in the American Revolution 
(Naperville, IL: Center for French Colonial Studies, 1997).
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expeditions now flocked to British posts, expecting to be given much-needed presents as 
a reward for their allegiance. Haldimand lamented the soaring expenses and the “long 
habit of Indulgence” that had encouraged a taste for “Luxuries” among the various tribes. 
Even more galling than the rapidly accruing debt was the fact that he still could not make 
the Indians truly “Subservient.. .to the King’s Service,” despite his best efforts to make 
them economically dependent on the king’s stores.18
Establishing positive (if not exploitative) relations with local Indians was also 
paramount for the British because they had military strategies for the West that depended 
upon native personnel. Secretary of State Lord George Germain instructed Hamilton to 
make “a Diversion on the Frontiers of Virginia and Pennsylvania” with the various 
nations who had already exhibited interest in fighting the Americans. He hoped that 
eventually Loyalists would gather at Detroit to supplement these Ohio Valley warriors, 
enabling Hamilton “to extend his operations so as to divide the attention of the Rebels, 
and oblige them to collect considerable Force to oppose him, which cannot fail of 
weakening their main army.. .and thus bring the War to a more Speedy Issue.” To 
execute this scheme, Hamilton planned to send out numerous small parties, keeping the 
“most reputable of the chiefs and Warriors in the neighbourhood” in the event that 
Carleton or Haldimand needed them for a special assignment.19
Hamilton dreamed of using the West for more than a simple diversion, however. 
After the colonists captured the Illinois and Wabash posts in the summer of 1778, he
18 MPHC, 9: 478, 535-36,10: 408-10 (indulgence quote), 434; “Frederick Haldimand to Guy 
Johnson, Sept. 5, 1781,” reel A-683, Haldimand Papers.
19 MPHC, 9: 346-47,440. Sometimes the diversion was to protect other western operations. For 
example, in 1780, a British and Indian expedition planned to leave Michilimackinac to attack Spanish St. 
Louis. De Peyster, now commanding at Detroit, promised to send a separate army to harass the Kentucky 
frontier and draw attention away from the battles near the Mississippi. See MPHC, 9: 580, 10: 379.
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concluded that not only did the British need to liberate Vincennes, Kaskaskia, and 
Cahokia, they needed to plant themselves more firmly in the region so they could 
coordinate offensive operations more effectively. From this centralized location, he 
hoped to attract Indians from Michilimackinac and the South in addition to his Ohio 
Valley allies, who would join together, sweep through Kentucky, and even subdue Fort 
Pitt. As he traveled to Vincennes in late 1778, he sent messengers to the Cherokees and 
Chickasaws to set this plan in motion. They responded positively, saying they would 
arrive in three months to drive the Virginians from Illinois; but before any unified action 
could take place, Clark had locked Hamilton in irons and dragged him to Williamsburg.20
This aborted attempt to unite the southern and western Indians and to overwhelm 
the colonists from the west was not solely Hamilton’s idea. Before the lieutenant 
governor had even arrived at Detroit, Virginia’s Lord Dunmore and his agent John 
Connolly had concocted an elaborate plan to combine the Ohio Indians with local militia, 
seize Fort Pitt, and then penetrate into Virginia, where they would link up with 
Dunmore’s army in the East and effectively divide the southern and northern colonies. 
Connolly was arrested by a vigilant committee of safety in the fall of 1775 as he tried to 
make his way to Detroit, but his tactical musings did not languish during his several years 
in prison. By 1781, he had apparently resurrected his proposal for “a Diversion from 
Canada to cooperate by way of Fort Pitt with an Expedition from the Southern Army up 
the Rivers Potomack & Susquehanah.” Haldimand belittled this scheme and its 
originator, arguing that the route was too difficult to travel and Fort Pitt too impregnable
20 George Rogers Clark Papers, 8: 169; Barnhart, ed., Journal o f Henry Hamilton, 128, 154, 157, 
168-71; MPHC, 9: 477-78.
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to be taken by a small coup. Furthermore, he declared that while the Indians’ friendship 
had enabled the British to retain possession of most of the Ohio Country, their refusal to
<y I
follow his military orders would render such an intricate mission impossible.
Haldimand’s hesitation about adopting this aggressive strategy for the West and 
his uncertainty about the use of native auxiliaries was matched by other British observers 
as well. In February 1778, Edward Abbott, lieutenant governor at Vincennes, abandoned 
his post because he believed it impossible to govern the area “without incurring any great 
expence,” as he had been instructed. These restrictions prevented him from distributing 
the requisite Indian presents and, consequently, made it difficult for him to keep the 
Indians “in the crown’s interest.” When he reached Detroit, he criticized the British 
policy of “employing Indians on the Rebel frontiers.” If the “poor unhappy people” had 
not been “forced to take up arms against their sovereign” rather than “be pillaged & left 
to starve,” he said, “many hundreds would have put themselves under His Majesty’s 
protection.” He acknowledged that some people believed it “necessary to employ Indians 
to prevent their serving our enemies,” but he maintained that encouraging the nations
O')toward neutrality would be just as “serviceable to us, as their going to war.”
Abbot’s disapproval of Indian depredations was especially poignant because it 
indirectly addressed a third British goal for the western front. In addition to solidifying 
friendships with local Indians and creating a genuine military threat to divert resources 
from the East, Carleton, Haldimand, and their superiors aimed to smother the disaffected 
population in their midst, who threatened to undermine all of their other designs for the
21 Pennsylvania Archives, 4: 654-55, 682-83, 9: 102; MPHC, 9: 399, 402-03; “Haldimand to 
Clinton, Sept. 29, 1781,” reel M- 353, BHP. For more on John Connolly, see Percy B. Caley, “The Life 
Adventures o f  Lt. Col. John Connolly: The Story o f  a Tory,” WPHM, 11, no. 2 (April 1928), 76-94.
22 MPHC, 9: 488-89.
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region. Abbot believed that far from quelling the “Rebellious disposition” of many 
residents at Detroit, Vincennes, and Illinois, the British were actually alienating even 
more people by sending the Indians against the frontiers. De Peyster worried that a 
strong pro-American faction might actually turn the Indians away from the British, 
especially if they were able to secure supplies through the French and Spanish on the 
Mississippi.23
These concerns reached a peak shortly after Clark’s victory over Hamilton. 
Receiving “certain intelligence” that Detroit was teeming with “disaffected” people and 
judging them to possibly be “dangerous Enemies,” Haldimand ordered Capt. Richard 
Lemoult (governing in Hamilton’s absence) to “apprehend any Person or Persons whom 
you may have cause to believe is in any manner directly or indirectly aiding or abetting 
the Rebels or their allies, either with Provisions, Intelligence or otherwise.” While this 
hard-line approach may have worked among ordinary town residents, it was less effective 
in controlling distant British agents and traders whose loyalty might be in question. Most 
of these men had established themselves in native communities during the French regime, 
but had shifted their allegiance to the British rather than abandon their homes and 
livelihood after the French defeat in the Seven Years’ War. When France formally 
aligned itself with the colonies during the Revolution, however, Hamilton, Haldimand, 
and other English leaders suspected men such as Louis Chevallier and Duperon Baby of 
treachery, fearing that large numbers of Indians would be drawn away from British 
influence in their wake. This uneasiness eventually prompted Michilimackinac 
commander Patrick Sinclair to deport Chevallier in 1780, a move that created more
23 Ibid., 10:482,488-89 (at 482).
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animosity toward the British among the local Potawatomies than any rhetoric from their 
resident trader.24
While nervousness about potential traitors plagued both the British and American 
camps, it still occupied less time than fretting about native alliances. Not only did both 
sides have different ideas about how to incorporate Indians into their war aims, they also 
held contrasting opinions on how to cultivate their friendship. Of course, the Ohio Valley 
nations possessed their own notions of how to resolve conflict and maintain peaceful 
relations. Given these disparate perspectives on the nature of alliances as well as the 
demographic, military, and ideological upheaval of the Revolution, the chances of 
mistrust, miscommunication, and even outright hostility increased rapidly as the war 
progressed and settlers continued to aggravate native warriors and hunters.
Although the Americans wished to establish ties with the western nations, they 
generally approached Indian diplomacy with considerable skepticism, frequently 
reminding their guests that in the past, treaties were “no sooner concluded, but the 
Indians or some of them Began to Break the peace by Stealing from and Robbing our 
people. Killing our Women and Children and Committing other Outrageous Acts against 
the faith of the said Stipulations.” Questions about native reliability tended to fuel the 
already adversarial assumptions that most colonists made about alliances. In their minds, 
treaties were to be conducted when problems arose or when it was necessary to achieve 
particular goals, such as making peace, acquiring land, or securing allies during wartime.
24 Ibid., 9: 545, 553, 569, 10: 338 (at 338).
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If suspicion was eliminated in the process, it was a happy byproduct, not an end in 
itself.25
By contrast, most Indian nations viewed treaty conferences as the lifeblood of any 
healthy relationship between sovereign powers, rather than a last resort when the 
friendship appeared to be in jeopardy. Since distrust precluded both personal and public 
negotiations, frequent meetings were necessary to mourn the dead, strengthen 
communication, and reaffirm peaceful intentions. This constant cultivation o f  their 
solemn covenants was the solution to dissolving any doubts about their allies’ honesty, 
thus enabling productive dialogue to begin. Only after mutual respect had been 
established could the various speakers turn to business matters, and even then proper 
protocol needed to be maintained to ensure that nothing was compromising the 
foundational relationship.
The problems that could arise from such divergent ideas about alliances were 
prominently displayed at Congress’s 1778 conference with the Delawares. Since the 
beginning of the Revolution, most of the Delaware nation had adhered to the colonists’ 
admonition that “this is a Family quarrel betwixt us and Old England; you Indians are not 
concerned in it; we don’t wish you to take up the Hatchet against the King’s Troops.” 
Despite being surrounded by belligerent neighbors, the Delawares around Coshocton had
25 Calloway, Revolution and Confederation, 162. For a more detailed treatment o f the nature of 
Indian-American diplomacy, see James Merrell, Into the American Woods: Negotiators on the 
Pennsylvania Frontier (New York: Norton, 1999).
26 For another view o f the nature o f Indian and European alliances, see Nancy Shoemaker, A 
Strange Likeness: Becoming Red and White in Eighteenth-Century North America (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), 83-103. Although she argues that in forming international alliances “Indians and 
Europeans were more alike than they were different,” she acknowledges that the two did not “play by the 
same rales.” I would add that parallel experiences with diplomacy did not translate into parallel 
assumptions about how the alliance should be negotiated and carried out.
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remained neutral. By September 1778, however, their relations with the Americans had 
become strained. Having followed Congress’s counsel for three years, they expected 
reciprocal assistance in the form of trade goods, especially since Fort Pitt officials tended 
to interpret any fraternization with British traders as a violation of neutrality. Morgan 
and past treaty commissioners had promised a reliable supply, but it still had not
* 77materialized.
Even more troubling than the colonies’ failure to provide adequate wares was the 
fact that several Delawares had fallen victim to settler violence and had also been the 
target of a military expedition conducted under General Hand in February 1778. “You 
told me that all the Nations should see what a lasting Friendship we have with one 
another,” White Eyes reproached Morgan in April, “but instead of proving this you struck 
the Tomhawk in my Head.” This threat was doubly harmful because the Delawares had 
heard reports that the Wyandots and other western Indians were preparing to attack them 
because of their refusal to take up arms. Faced with danger from all sides and frustration 
that the Americans had not fulfilled their trade obligations, the Delawares hoped that a 
good conference would repair the damaged relationship with Congress and perhaps
<ye>
secure some military protection from other menacing nations.
Meanwhile, the colonists were developing their own plans for the upcoming 
meeting. Rumors had swirled around Fort Pitt that some Delawares were abetting raiding 
parties that passed through their towns, causing some friction in the supposedly friendly
27 Calloway, Revolution and Confederation, 127-30, 134-36; Morgan Letterbooks, 1: 52, 89,2: 5-
6 .
28 Frontier Defense, 215-23; Morgan Letterbooks, 3: 38, 70 (at 38); Hermann Wellenreuther and 
Carola Wessel, eds., The Moravian Mission Diaries o f  David Zeisberger, 1772-1781 (University Park, PA: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2005), 373-411,438-39.
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relationship. Despite this tension, the commissioners who headed westward in late 
summer 1778 focused on other issues. They hoped to receive consent for marching an 
army through Delaware territory either to attack Detroit or to chastise the nations who 
had terrorized the frontiers for the past two years. If this attempt succeeded, they aimed 
to jettison their earlier call for neutrality and to ask some Delawares to join them on their 
expedition.29
Considering the Delawares’ and Americans’ disparate goals, it is no surprise that 
the treaty was fraught with miscommunication. At first, everything seemed to go 
smoothly: commissioners Andrew and Thomas Lewis condoled with the Delawares for 
their recent losses and promised to conduct a “well-regulated trade,” while White Eyes 
assured them that his people would “Rejoice” to have the army march through their 
country and would provide “as many.. .Warriors as can possibly be spared.” In the 
ensuing months, however, it became clear that the Delawares were not satisfied with 
what had transpired in September.30
When Morgan returned to Fort Pitt in late December after an extended time in the 
East, Killbuck, the leading Delaware spokesman after White Eyes’ death in November, 
complained that upon further consultation, he discovered that the articles of the treaty 
were “wrote down false, & as I did not understand the Interpreter what he spoke I could 
not contradict his Interpretation.” His primary point of contention was that instead of 
being viewed as a neutral party, he was now “looked upon as a Warrior.” “The 
Tomhawk was handed to me at Fort Pitt,” he conceded, “but not in a Warlike manner, we
29 Frontier Defense, 95-96; Moravian Mission Diaries, 389,416-17,436,438.
30 Calloway, Revolution and Confederation, 164-65,168; Moravian Mission Diaries, 469-70.
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all standing, & at no Council Fire, neither did I understand the meaning of it.” The 
people were very confused by the abandonment of neutrality, especially since the 
American army had constructed Fort Laurens near their towns, which seemed to be 
drawing the ire of most western nations and threatened to cast them in a negative light as 
well. “I neither desired any Implements of War,” Killbuck clarified, “all what I agreed to 
was to pilot the Army ‘till beyond our bounds, & my great Capt. White Eyes with several 
others to go before the Army & convey them to the Enemy in order to be of use to both 
Parties, in case they should desire to speak or treat with one another.”31
Morgan could do little more than invite the Delawares to visit Congress (where 
they returned the hatchet in May 1779) and grumble that “there never was a Conference 
with the Indians so improperly or so villainously conducted as the late one at Pittsburgh.” 
Although his charge of deliberate deception is difficult to prove, it seems clear that the 
two sides left Fort Pitt with different ideas about how the latest treaty had redefined their 
relationship, probably because they approached the event with entirely dissimilar 
agendas. The commissioners had accomplished their specific military and strategic 
goals, not realizing or not caring that they had further undermined the Delawares’ trust in 
American promises. Rather than mending their fragile friendship as leaders such as 
White Eyes had hoped, the treaty resulted in a steady drifting away of Delaware loyalties 
until the nation declared outright war three years later.32
31 Morgan Letterbooks, 3: 148, 150-51 (at 150-51). Both David Zeisberger and John Heckewelder 
record the official report that White Eyes died o f  smallpox. According to a 1784 letter o f Morgan’s, 
however, he was “treacherously put to death.” “Morgan to unknown, May 12, 1784,” George Morgan 
Collections.
32 Morgan Letterbooks, 3: 156, 162-64 (at 156).
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While Andrew and Thomas Lewis, Lachlan McIntosh, Daniel Brodhead, and 
other military personnel contrived to attain their momentary objectives at Fort Pitt in 
September 1778, Hamilton pursued a different means of building alliances at Detroit. 
With the admonition to “keep the Indians in the King’s interest” echoing in his head and 
the urgency of western affairs now that Clark had captured Kaskaskia, Cahokia, and 
Vincennes pressing upon him, he set out to strengthen his connection to the Lake Indians 
and other nations near Detroit and to use them against his enemies. He met individually 
with the Ottawas, Chippewas, and Potawatomies as an initial recruiting drive, entertained 
Wyandots and distant Chippewas who arrived later, and sent presents and speeches to the 
Shawnees and Miamis. Despite the ultimate failure of his expedition, the trip reinforced 
the already strong bonds he had been forging for several years. Hamilton’s successor, De 
Peyster, practiced a similar strategy for the remainder of the war, doling out presents to 
most parties who came to Detroit and listening to a variety of native grievances, all with 
an eye toward winning the Indians’ favor and demonstrating British superiority to the 
Americans.33
This formula for securing native alliances resonated more clearly with most Ohio 
Valley Indians than the colonists’ efforts to accomplish pre-determined goals, but it did 
not ensure that British-Indian relations would be harmonious. Unlike the Americans, the 
British and the Indians shared the same ideas about the purpose of a treaty (solidifying a 
relationship), but they held different expectations for what their renewed friendship 
would require of them. Leaders such as Haldimand and Hamilton assumed that they
33 MPHC, 9: 345,479,482; Barnhart, ed., Journal o f  Henry Hamilton, 104-05. For De Peyster’s 
almost constant meetings with the Indians during the last few years o f the war, see RG 10, vols. 12-13.
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could compel their allies to do whatever best served British interests. Most Indians 
resented such presumptuousness, frequently disregarding British instructions as a 
reminder that though they relied on Detroit for supplies, they were equally indispensable 
to an empire dependent on the fur trade. In turn, many chiefs and warriors believed they 
would receive military assistance and protection from their sworn associates, only to 
discover that British loyalty extended no further than its own political and economic 
considerations.34
After the colonists and their former sovereign signed a peace treaty in 1783, both 
the British and the Americans adopted new perspectives on Indian alliances. Watching 
their allies disregard advice about making peace and actively resist the rapid American 
expansion forced English officials to acknowledge their inability to dictate or control 
native policies. Maintaining Indian friendships assumed even greater urgency, however, 
because the crown’s position in North America had suddenly become much more 
tenuous. For the struggling Continental Congress, who had never had much success in 
aligning with the Ohio Valley Indians, the postwar years were dominated by a need to 
settle a peace agreement rather than to procure allies in the struggle against a European 
foe.
As the conflict between the federal government and the Indians escalated during 
the 1780s and early 1790s and peace grew increasingly elusive, the Americans returned 
to their pursuit of alliances in a desperate bid to rein in the western nations. Having 
signed an early (and coercive) treaty with the Six Nations, Congress frequently sought to
34 MPHC, 9: 410,427-29, 535-36, 639,10: 402,408-10, 534-35, 547; Shoemaker, A Strange 
Likeness, 85.
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use the Seneca chief Complanter to convince the Shawnees, Miamis, and other 
belligerent nations that they should acquiesce to the United States’ demands. Complanter 
capitalized on this arrangement, using his visits to Philadelphia to complain about the 
fraudulent 1784 treaty, contending that the commissioners had forcibly taken “a great 
country.. .as if our want of strength had destroyed our rights.” To address this problem, 
he asked for a tract of land to be returned, thinking this a reasonable expectation for a 
political partner. In turn, he promised to “persuade the Wyandots and other Western 
nations to open their eyes, and look toward the bed which you have made for us.”35
Before Complanter or his people could act on this agreement, their confidence in 
American sincerity had begun to erode. Several Senecas were killed while trading at 
Pittsburgh, vast armies invaded the Ohio Country with seeming disregard for friendly 
Indians, United States officers tried to recruit them for military service against the 
western tribes, and settlers, army bases, and farms continued to creep onto native land.
As the relationship deteriorated, Congress eventually had to worry more about the 
Senecas joining the hostile nations than how to encourage them to direct those warriors 
toward peace. Throughout this entire process, the Americans also attempted to lure 
Joseph Brant into their camp. But aside from one trip to Philadelphia and several vague 
assurances of friendship, he avoided any alliances with the government he had so 
staunchly opposed during the Revolution.
Quelling Indian violence either on its own or through allies was important to 
Congress because it had grand plans for the West, which it now considered its rightful
35 LDC, 23: 257-58,271-72; Pennsylvania Archives, Ser. 2 ,4: 527-37 (at 529, 537); ASPIA, 139-
44.
36 Pennsylvania Archives, Ser. 2,4:476-523, 546-47; ASPIA, 145-46; PCC, reel 164, item 150, 
vol. 2,397; LDC, 24: 372.
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domain, according to the terms of the 1783 Treaty of Paris. The first goal was to ease 
unrest among veterans by fulfilling the United States’ pledge to reward “their courage 
and fidelity” with “uncultivated lands” along the Ohio. When these bounties had been 
delivered, the next step was to encourage the general expansion that had blossomed 
during the final years of the war. “The increase of domestic population and emigrations 
from abroad” meant that the East was becoming crowded, thus necessitating settlement in 
the newly acquired territories. Furthermore, Congress had assured the public creditors 
that the West would be “speedily improved into a fund towards the security and payment 
of the national debt.”37
To accomplish these objectives, several criteria needed to be in place and 
operating effectively. Speed claimed highest priority. Neither destitute veterans nor 
greedy creditors were willing to wait long for their problems to be corrected, so the 
sooner surveyors could be dispatched to the Ohio Country to mark out land, the better. 
Haste also facilitated the second component for meeting American goals, preventing 
illegal settlement. Despite active Indian resistance to all United States forts and 
homesteads in the region, settlers continued to flood downriver from Pittsburgh. Most of 
these newcomers found land in Kentucky, but an increasing number squatted on tracts 
across the Ohio, usually near other Pennsylvanians and Virginians, who sought to 
capitalize on the lax law enforcement outside of state boundaries. Not only did these 
trespassers infuriate the Indians who hunted on those lands, they also angered the local 
military establishment and the federal government. Commander Josiah Harmar 
justifiably worried that these interlopers would make peace with the Indians an even
37JCC, 25: 681-92 (at 682-83).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
222
more remote possibility, prompting him on several occasions to order his men “to make 
diligent search for them and destroy their dwellings.” Members of Congress feared that 
their presence would make it harder for potential buyers to gain clear title to the land, but 
removing them would cost more than the profits from the sale. Since Harmar seemed to 
be losing ground in his displacement efforts, government officials concluded that the best 
thing to do was simply sell the land as quickly as possible.38
Even if every illegal settler had been uprooted, American designs for the West 
still depended upon peace with the Indians. With an empty treasury in the 1780s, 
Secretary of War Henry Knox and many legislators believed that war was too expensive 
and adequate compensation for the Indians impossible. So he advocated a series of peace 
treaties, each one succeeding only in further provoking the Ohio Valley nations.
Incensed Shawnees and Wabash tribes pounced upon Kentucky communities, which 
produced loud demands for federal assistance and authorization for expeditions intended 
to extirpate any potentially hostile Indians. Knox responded with the assertion that both 
whites and Indians were equally responsible for depredations on the frontier, arguing that 
“deep rooted prejudices, and malignity of heart... will ever prevent their being good 
neighbors. The one side anxiously defend their lands which the other avariciously 
claim...Either one or the other party must remove to a greater distance, or Government 
must keep them both in awe by a strong hand, and compel them to be moderate and just.” 
This opinion perpetuated the East-West conflict that had begun during the Revolution,
38 St. Clair Papers, 2:3-5, 12, 14 (at 14); LDC, 22: 389-90,435,480-82, 24: 342; “Josiah Harmar 
Journal, March-April 1785,” Letter Book A, vol. 46, “Harmar to John Dickinson, May 1, 1785,” Letter 
Book A, Harmar Papers.
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eventually spilling into the 1790s and complicating American maneuvers even when the 
two sides agreed on an appropriate military response to the native threat.39
Having a backcountry population that directly opposed its agenda annoyed many 
members of Congress. In their quest to prove to the world that they could govern 
effectively, they resented confrontational settlers and Indians who refused to 
acknowledge their superiority. But they also contended with some in their own ranks 
who had begun to view the West as a liability. Pennsylvania representative Samuel 
Meredith believed that far from erasing the national debt, selling the new territory would 
actually incur additional governmental expense. “It would prove a happiness to all the 
settled parts of the Country if the Ohio was to be the boundary for a Number of Years, as 
well as be a means of quieting the Indians and Spaniard[s],” he stated in November 1786. 
Less than two years later, New Hampshire delegate Paine Wingate expressed similar 
sentiments, pointing out that the expenses of conducting treaties, surveying, and selling 
land had increased the national debt. He also feared that the new land would attract too 
many good men from the East and thus retard the country’s manufacturing potential. 
“Upon the whole I doubt whether, in our day, that country will not be a damage to us 
rather than advantage. We seem to be overstocked with lands and I believe it had been as 
well for the Indians to have kept their own territory,” he concluded. The Ohio Valley 
nations could not have agreed more.40
While the Americans bickered about the merits of expansion and the means of 
pacifying the Indians, the British focused their attention on maintaining the status quo. In
39 JCC, 25: 681-92; PCC, reel 69, item 56, 279-82; LDC, 24: 341-42 (at 342).
40 LMCC, 8:513,745-46.
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the postwar United States many easterners were eager to explore the implications of their 
altered relationship to the West; but in Canada, English officials labored hard to create 
the impression that the Revolution had changed nothing. Their first concern was to retain 
“possession of the Upper Country and the Fur Trade.” Refusing to evacuate Niagara, 
Detroit, and Michilimackinac significantly aided this endeavor, but Haldimand and others 
recognized that ultimately the fate of the trade and the western posts depended on native 
friendship. “You will assure the Chiefs upon every Occasion of the King’s Parental Care 
and regard,” Superintendent John Johnson instructed the Indian department as the war 
neared its conclusion, “and you will likewise recommend to their Warriors, and Young 
Men, Fidelity & a firm attachment to their Father, the Great King.” Assiduous attention 
to Indian affairs, he hoped, would make the Americans irrelevant even if they sent traders 
into the Ohio Country.41
As fighting between the western nations and the United States intensified 
throughout the 1780s and 1790s, British designs upon the region became increasingly 
complicated. On one hand, the traders clamored for a cessation of hostilities because war 
caused the Indians to “totally neglect their hunt.. .and be thrown into a general 
consternation.” Since the warriors were also “the best & in fact the only hunters among 
their respective Tribes,” trade threatened to grind to a halt if combat persisted. Many of 
these merchants operated vulnerable posts deep in native territory, so they also feared that 
they would be easy targets for American armies. On the other hand, leaders such as Gov. 
John Graves Simcoe worried that if the Indians made peace with the Americans, Britain’s
41 “Haldimand to unknown, 1782,” reelA-686, Haldimand Papers', DAR, 18: 125-27; MPHC, 11:
349.
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fur trade would be lost and the two previously inveterate enemies might combine to 
attack Canada. The Indians would be motivated to such an action out of anger that the 
British, fearing to be viewed as open allies with their native neighbors, had been lax in 
supplying and supporting them. The United States would be eager to punish the British 
for holding the western posts in violation of the peace agreement.42
In addition to stewing about the pros and cons of encouraging the Indians toward 
peace, the British prepared themselves for the attack on their posts that many believed the 
Americans intended to launch at any moment. Observers of Harmar’s, Arthur St. Clair’s, 
and finally Anthony Wayne’s armies concluded that each of those forces was too large to 
simply chastise Indians; surely they planned to assault British strongholds as well. The 
best defense against this projected offensive was to equip their native allies, who had 
proven themselves capable of warding off entire armies with only minimal British 
support. This plan would also have pleased the Indians, who frequently requested 
increased assistance; but it was firmly rejected by London authorities because it would 
have thrust the British into visible alliance with the United States’ enemies, thereby likely 
renewing war between the king and his former colonists. “In this case it will be 
extremely difficult so to manage as not to lose the affections of the Indians and yet not to 
give that pretext to the Government of the United States for the commencement of 
hostilities in this Country, which I am persuaded is in the contemplation of their Leaders 
(when circumstances shall be ripe),” Simcoe confided to Secretary of State Henry 
Dundas 43
42 MPHC, 24: 144-45,160-61,169,324, 599-605 (at 144, 161); Simcoe Papers, 1:19, 30,132, 
141-42,2:55.
43 MPHC, 12: 44 ,24: 161, 165, 309-13, 545, 550, 658-60 (at 550); Simcoe Papers, 1: 19, 66-67,
119,131-32,2: 55,247; “Joseph Brant to Dorchester, Aug. 14, 1791,” Ser. 2, lot 693, SLAP.
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Faced with these pressing dilemmas, British officials decided that their best hope 
for a satisfactory resolution rested upon inserting themselves as mediators. If they could 
broker a peace between the Indians and the Americans, both sides would be dependent on 
them and less likely to join together to threaten Canadian settlements. The Indians would 
return to their hunting with greater appreciation for their “Father,” who had turned away 
the United States’ troops. The Americans would be thankful for the opportunity to carry 
out their agenda without violent interruption. Despite timing this proposal so that it 
circulated in Philadelphia shortly after the western nations had obliterated St. Clair’s 
army, Foreign Affairs Secretary William Grenville and Simcoe watched their improbable 
scenario disintegrate instantly. Alexander Hamilton, on behalf of Washington’s 
administration, rejected the idea immediately, claiming that submitting to British 
interposition would compromise “the honour and interest of the United States” and 
“disgrace this country in the eyes of the Indians,” while granting Great Britain “a decided 
ascendancy over their gratitude, affections, and services.” Consequently, Ambassador 
George Hammond discontinued his persuasive efforts, suggesting that the only 
circumstances capable of bringing the issue back to the table were another American 
defeat or the “desire of the Indians to obtain our mediation.” Simcoe and McKee 
scrambled to induce their native allies to make such a request, but nothing decisive ever 
occurred.44
Although scheming and worrying about diplomatic affairs consumed considerable 
British energy, several domestic issues and initiatives demanded attention as well. The
44 Simcoe Papers, 1: 58-59, 66-67,130,176-77, 188-89,267-68, 326-27 (at 176); MPHC, 20: 310-
11.
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first was the financial health of the posts, especially regarding the continuation of Indian 
presents. During the war Haldimand had griped incessantly about the excessive 
expenditures at Detroit, Michilimackinac, and Niagara. He complained about the 
“indolent” nations, who gathered around the posts in great numbers and expected the 
British to supply their needs, and railed against the fort commanders and Indian agents 
who catered to every native whim. As the Revolution’s end forced the crown to rethink 
its western policies, Haldimand and other distant authorities recommended curbing 
Indian presents and restricting distribution to the Indian Department. Both of these 
measures elicited protests. Michilimackinac commander Daniel Robertson reported in 
May 1784 that several Ottawas threatened to “cutt off’ his fort after their visit to Detroit 
yielded paltry gifts. A few months later, Detroit’s Lt. Gov. Jehu Hay squawked about 
being held accountable for abuses in the distribution system without having the authority 
to monitor dispersal himself.45
Feuding over Indian presents persisted during the 1780s and 1790s, but it was 
often overshadowed by the necessity of maintaining good relations with the surrounding 
Ohio Valley and Great Lakes nations. If quality gift-giving virtually ensured friendship 
with these neighbors, disputing over land went a long way toward erasing any previous 
harmony. In the turbulent postwar years, encroachment on native lands came from a 
variety of sources. The usual suspects were traders and Indian Department personnel, 
who hoped to make a fortune by investing heavily in the region, but government officials 
charged with resettling loyalists were culprits as well. Despite Haldimand’s strict
45 MPHC, 9: 639, 10: 399,402,408-10,416,431,444-45, 534-35,11: 413-14, 442,444 (at 414),
24: 200.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
228
injunction that “claims of individuals.. .are invalid” and that every purchase had to be 
made “at some general meeting at which the Principal Chiefs of each Tribe claiming a 
proportion in such lands are present,” speculators circumvented these rules and used any 
means to pry territory from the Indians. Before the Greenville Treaty in 1795, Joseph 
Brant lamented that “a swarm of Land Jobbers at Detroit,” principally composed of that 
area’s “first people,” were providing the Lake Indians with a steady supply of rum and 
then buying land from the intoxicated consumers. “The poor Indians must lose their 
Country at all Events,” he mourned.46
A final concern for the British during the last two decades of the eighteenth 
century mirrored one of their Revolutionary preoccupations: the loyalty of their French 
associates. For most of the postwar years, this issue lay dormant because the Indians 
were largely on good terms with the English. After the Battle of Fallen Timbers, 
however, nations began to trickle into Fort Wayne, seeking peace with the United States 
and inciting rumors about French attempts to discredit the British. In November 1794, 
word spread that French traders were announcing that the king of France was preparing to 
rise again to support and protect his Indian children. The English and “the Americans 
were as one man and neither of them friends to the Indians,” they allegedly proclaimed. 
When Collin and Antoine Lasselle escorted several formerly belligerent nations to 
General Wayne in 1795, the priest Edmund Burke accused them of not only supporting 
the Americans now, but of sabotaging the Indian army at Fallen Timbers by preventing 
“the great majority of the Indians from coming into action.” Although these charges 
were overstated, the Americans also acknowledged that “the French traders, who were so
46 MPHC, 11:409-10,435-36 (at 409-10), 12: 173; Simcoe Papers, 4: 50 (quote).
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many machines to the British agents, can be bought.” Ultimately, though, the British 
could do little more than complain about this perceived treachery and rue the 
vulnerabilities of their Indian Department.47
As weak as this department might have been on occasion, London authorities, 
Canadian officials, and local residents relied on it to implement British plans for the 
region during and after the Revolution. Maintaining alliances, protecting the fur trade, 
and negotiating land deals for the government often devolved upon Indian agents, whose 
schedules also typically included many hours of discussing current affairs around 
numerous council fires and reporting on the Indians’ disposition to their waiting superiors 
at Niagara, Detroit, or Quebec. In short, if the primary English goals were to unite the 
western nations against the Americans during the war and to preserve the status quo 
afterwards, the Indian department was essential to their fulfillment.48
For the British, John Butler among the Six Nations and Alexander McKee in the 
Ohio Valley served as the best examples of Indian agents who made themselves 
completely indispensable to their sovereign’s cause. Having worked for the Indian 
Department before the Revolution, McKee was an especially valuable addition to the 
British retinue when he defected from Fort Pitt in 1778. Hamilton proclaimed him to be 
a “man of good character,” who “has great influence with the Shawanese is well
47 MPHC, 20: 385 (quote), 34: 734-37 (at 735); Simcoe Papers, 3: 272 ,285-87 ,290 ,294 ,4: 19-23 
(at 21), 5: 112-13, 117-18. See also, Colin G. Calloway, “Beyond the Vortex o f  Violence: Indian-White 
Relations in the Ohio Country, 1783-1815,” Northwest Ohio Quarterly, 64 (1992), 16-26.
48 Robert S. Allen, His M ajesty’s Indian Allies: British Indian Policy in the Defense o f  Canada, 
1774-1815 (Toronto, Dundum Press, 1992); Colin G. Calloway, Crown and Calumet: British-Indian 
Relations, 1783-1815 (Norman, OK: University Press o f  Oklahoma, 1987); Reginald Horsman, Matthew 
Elliott, British Indian Agent (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1964); Larry L. Nelson, A Man o f  
Distinction Among Them: Alexander McKee and the Ohio Country Frontier, 1754-1799 (Kent, OH: Kent 
State University Press, 1999)
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acquainted with the country & can probably give some useful intelligence.” Indeed, 
McKee was on the job even before he reached Detroit, consulting with several nations 
and sending information about a rumored American militia attack ahead of him. During 
the war he led native troops into battle, recruited more to oppose Clark’s advances, 
attended countless Indian conferences, urged entire nations to remain loyal to the king, 
distributed provisions and ammunition, passed intelligence to British commanders, and 
generally smoothed over Indian grievances. Following the Revolution he jettisoned his 
military contribution, but continued to provide goods and acquired considerable 
responsibility for achieving the delicate balance of keeping the Indians tied to the British 
without provoking the Americans to attack. Simcoe attested to his success in this area in 
1792 when he said, “our Connexion & Command [of the Indians] rest upon the personal 
tenure of the frail lives of Butler or McKee.”49
Part of McKee’s success stemmed from the fact that there were many interpreters, 
traders, and other agents who also operated in the region, a luxury the fledgling American 
Indian Department did not share. Although no colonial counterpart matched McKee’s 
influence, Richard Butler and George Morgan most closely approximated his level of 
service for the United States in the Ohio Valley. As a trader among the Shawnees before 
the Revolution, Butler had gained enough favor to be protected during Dunmore’s War 
when angry Mingos sought to kill him in retaliation for the loss of their relatives. For the 
next two years he served as de facto Indian agent until Congress appointed Morgan as its 
official representative in the West. After the war he again assumed a leading role in
49 MPHC, 9: 435-36; Simcoe Papers, 1: 246. For more on McKee’s life, see Nelson, A Man o f  
Distinction Among Them; Walter R. Hoberg, “Early History o f Colonel Alexander McKee,” Pennsylvania 
Magazine o f  History and Biography, 58, no. 1 (1934), 26-36; and Walter R. Hoberg, “A Tory in the 
Northwest,” PMHB, 59, no. 1 (1935), 36-41.
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negotiations with the Indians, acting as a commissioner and principal spokesman at the 
Fort McIntosh and Fort Finney treaties in 1785 and 1786. But in October 1787, Congress 
passed him by again when they assigned most of his Indian affairs duties to newly- 
installed governor of the Northwest Territory, Arthur St. Clair. Despite this 
disappointment, he stayed involved in frontier dealings until 1791, when he was killed in 
the Indians’ victory over the United States.50
Like Butler, Morgan made his living through trade before the Revolution. Upon 
accepting Congress’s position, he moved to Fort Pitt and immediately traveled to the 
Ohio Country, meeting with the Shawnees, Mingos, Delawares, and Wyandots and 
encouraging them to remain neutral in the war. Ironically, McKee accompanied Morgan 
on this journey, but apparently he failed to impress upon his new boss that Indian 
friendship required face-to-face cultivation because Morgan never set foot in a native 
village during the remaining three years of his tenure. Despite spending more time in the 
East than at Pittsburgh, he did manage to build a solid relationship with the Delawares 
and conducted a regular correspondence with their leaders at Coshocton. He certainly 
considered himself their advocate and regretted his absence at the troublesome 1778 
treaty; but he invested more time in his commissary job and land speculation than he did 
in ensuring that American goals for the West would be accomplished.51
50 Pennsylvania Archives, 4: 569-70; “George Morgan to Commissioner for Indian Affairs, 
Northern Department, May 16, 1776,” “Morgan to Lewis Morris, May 16,1776,” George Morgan 
Letterbook, MG-19, Accession File, Folder 1, Pennsylvania State Archives; Richard Butler, “Journal o f  
General Butler,” The Olden Time, 2: 33-64,481-531; PCC, reel 165, item 150, vol. 3,27-29, 31-34.
51 For Morgan’s trip into the Ohio Country, see the 1776 Morgan Letterbook. For his relations 
with the Delawares, see Morgan Letterbooks, vols. 1-3. For more on his life, see Max Savelle, George 
Morgan, Colony Builder (New York: Columbia University Press, 1932) and Randolph C. Downes, “George 
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Although McKee earned greater recognition from his government than Richard 
Butler or Morgan did from Congress, both countries expected their agents to execute their 
varying schemes for the Ohio Country. Compared to McKee’s success, the Americans’ 
efforts seemed paltry, but the three shared many experiences as well. Each of them 
forged close ties with at least one native group, each attempted to frame his message in a 
palatable way, and each recognized that the Indians expected visible tokens of good will 
before alliances could be struck. Despite these marks of friendship, they just as 
frequently acted as enemies to the western nations. For all of McKee’s fretting that “the 
distressed situation of the poor Indians” would be neglected in the 1783 Peace of Paris 
and the 1795 Jay Treaty, he cared more about the state of the British economy and fur 
trade than whether his allies would “be left to shift for themselves.” Likewise, Morgan’s 
apparently protective suggestion that Virginia refrain from attacking Pluggy’s Town in 
1777 was nullified a year later when he advocated that the “Senecas...be exterminated &
c'y
the Wiandots, etc...made Slaves of.”
When trusted counselors such as McKee and Morgan betrayed them, the Ohio 
Valley Indians recognized even more acutely that their enemies assumed a variety of 
forms. Settlers and hunters directly impeded native lifestyles by frightening away game, 
taking land, and restricting access to waterways. Traders cheated them of valuable peltry 
and precious territory, often by controlling the stream of rum during negotiations. 
Soldiers, militiamen, and rogue scouting parties killed their relatives and decimated their 
villages. Indian agents and other representatives of both the British and American 
governments threatened their sovereignty by treating them as pawns to be controlled at
52 MPHC, 12: 166; Morgan Letterbooks, 3: 79.
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will, drawing maps to legalize their dispossession, and at least tacitly sanctioning the 
manipulative activities of trespassers and dishonest merchants.
Pressed by this growing list of enemies in many guises, Indians often disagreed 
with each other about how to respond. When the Delawares chose neutrality during the 
Revolution, believing it to be the best means of protection from the nearby Americans, 
the Wyandots accused them of becoming “to[o] great with the Virginians.” In 1778 
Clark captured Illinois and seemed poised to overrun Indian country from the west, while 
McIntosh penetrated from the east, prompting the Shawnees to complain that the threat 
on their front (Fort Laurens) should have commanded the same attention as the invasion 
on the Wabash, which attracted Hamilton, artillery, and an army of British regulars and 
native auxiliaries. At other times the Indians differed over whether the king or the 
colonists menaced their land and sovereignty more powerfully. Three parties of 
Potawatomies from St. Joseph, convinced that the British were a more reliable ally, set 
out to “kill the Rebels” at Illinois and Vincennes in June 1780, only to be repulsed by the 
Miamis, who operated under Clark’s intimidating influence.53
During the 1780s and 1790s the disputes continued. After the Six Nations signed 
the 1784 Treaty of Fort Stanwix and the Wyandots agreed to the Fort McIntosh treaty in 
1785, both groups felt the displeasure of their neighbors, who felt that they had violated 
the confederacy and caved to the wiles of the enemy. A similar fissure developed in 
1793, when the vast assembly of nations at the Maumee Rapids disagreed about whether 
or not to insist on the Ohio River as the boundary between Indian and American territory. 
Feeling direct pressure on their villages and hunting grounds, the Shawnees, Wyandots,
53 Frontier Retreat, 219-20 (at 219); MPHC, 9: 427-29, 10: 406,444 (at 406).
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Miamis, and Delawares argued for a firm stance against encroaching settlers. Joseph 
Brant and his Iroquois, along with the Ottawas, Chippewas, and Potawatomies, believed 
that native political sovereignty could actually be better sustained by sacrificing some 
land and drawing a compromise boundary line. While many reasons contributed to these 
dissimilar perspectives, certainly one factor was that the two sides perceived the enemy’s 
strengths and designs differently.54
Although unification was difficult when multiple and complex threats lurked at 
every turn, the Ohio Valley nations found ways to thwart many American and British 
objectives. The easiest one to nullify was the United States’ desire for a secure frontier. 
Scouting parties and temporary forts were no match for warriors, who could slip 
unnoticed into settlements and quickly dispatch or kidnap heedless residents. Larger 
forts such as McIntosh, Harmar, or Jefferson failed to protect more than their immediate 
vicinities, and smaller ones like Martin’s and Ruddell’s stations in Kentucky capitulated 
before a sizable native force in 1780. Retaliatory expeditions meant to “Cover the 
Settlements” and chastise the tribes often inflicted considerable damage on Indian 
property, but they rarely acted as a deterrent to future raids, generally provoking 
increased attacks instead. Travel to distant places such as Kentucky proved even more 
dangerous than living there because the Indians patrolled the Ohio River and became 
adept at ambushing the slow and vulnerable flat-bottomed boats.55
The Ohio Valley nations were also successful at preventing the Americans from 
launching a genuine attack on Detroit. At the beginning of the Revolution, when the idea
54 Butterfield, ed., Journal o f  Capt. Jonathan Heart, 51; “Shawnee and Mingo speech, March 20, 
1785, Wakitomike Council, May 18, 1785” Ser. 1, lot 713-14, SIAP\ MPHC, 24: 560-73, 577-609; Simcoe 
Papers, 1: 401-09,2: 5-22,25-36.
55 MPHC, 19: 528-34, 538-46; Frontier Retreat, 270 (quote).
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arose and most tribes were on friendlier terms with the colonial government, the Seneca 
chief Kayashuta declared unequivocally that he and the Six Nations “would not suffer 
either a British or American army to be marched through their lands, and desired that no 
expedition against Detroit be undertaken.” Defying this declaration promised to ignite a 
general Indian war, something the upstart colonists desperately wanted to avoid at the 
moment. As the fighting continued and the Americans found themselves with virtually 
no allies between Fort Pitt and Detroit, they realized that instead of one battle, they would 
have to engage numerous nations along the way. With supply tenuous and geography 
murky, the Indian threat provided the final convincing argument for Washington to 
abandon a Detroit campaign.56
Despite protecting British strongholds by controlling the Ohio Country, the 
various nations rejected English efforts to command them, which was the crown’s 
primary objective for the region. As much as Hamilton and De Peyster liked to think that 
they were dictating strategy, the Indians consistently chose their own path. For example, 
McKee and Capt. Henry Bird believed they were leading native troops against the 
Kentucky settlement at the falls in 1780, but the Shawnees redirected the mission to 
successfully attack the forts on the Licking River. Other nations refused to join this army 
altogether, preferring to conduct their own private raids. British instructions also 
specified that the Indians were to deliver all prisoners to Detroit, an injunction that many 
war parties ignored. Beyond the military realm, several villages protested when British
56 Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 172; Frontier Retreat, 101, 123.
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authorities removed their traders and hinted that perhaps their allegiance could also be 
uprooted.57
Although the Ohio Indians frequently forced the British and Americans to 
abandon, rearrange, or reprioritize their goals for the West, they were never able to halt 
the most ominous aim of all: expansion. Long before the Revolution or the 1768 Treaty 
at Fort Stanwix, Great Britain had established an expansionary culture that prized western 
development. Even the politicians who tried to regulate the flow of emigration and 
settlement beyond the Appalachians assumed that in time all of the land would be 
brought under their control. For many potential migrants, the Revolution offered new 
opportunities and less resistance to their resettlement. Despite the persistent Indian 
attacks throughout the entire Ohio Valley, movement to the Pennsylvania and Kentucky 
frontiers increased dramatically during the second half of the war and continued in even 
greater numbers during the 1780s and 1790s. If local authorities wanted to emphasize 
their distressed conditions and impress their need for supplies and reinforcement upon 
their eastern governments, the most effective tool at their disposal was to give evidence 
of people fleeing the frontiers and warn that the area would soon be a wasteland.58
The Indians protested this unchecked growth militarily and diplomatically, 
repeatedly emphasizing that they resented settlers’ indiscriminate trespassing as well as 
the government’s failure to uphold past treaties guaranteeing them their land. Most 
Americans ignored these grievances entirely, but even those who paid attention were
57 MPHC, 9: 400,437, 584, 10: 299, 11: 385, 19: 528-34, 538-46; Frontier Retreat, 296-97.
58 Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 255; Frontier Advance, 284-85; Frontier Retreat, 170-71,184- 
88; George Rogers Clark Papers, 8: 215, 584; Pennsylvania Archives, 4: 344, 741-42, 6: 3, 68-69, 506, 8: 
282-84. See Hinderaker, Elusive Empires, for more on the unwavering British commitment to western 
expansion in this region.
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either unable or unwilling to acknowledge that the entire expansionary agenda lay at the 
heart of the problem. Because they “believed themselves superior to Indians” and 
entitled to the territory in question, they could not recognize native sovereignty and 
sacrifice their own interests without compromising their foundational principles. The 
result was a costly war and a continued legacy of distrust and miscommunication.59
59 Shoemaker,^ Strange Likeness, 85.
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Braving the “excessive rainy weather” that drenched the Ohio Valley in the early 
summer of 1782, a band of Cherokees traveled to Detroit from their principal town of 
Chote. Commander De Peyster was already overwhelmed with large delegations from 
the Wabash and Illinois countries and the fear that the American army advancing toward 
Sandusky would easily defeat his Indian allies, but he squeezed in a council with these 
new visitors on June 15. They quickly stated their concerns: they worried what would 
happen to their lands if the rebels succeeded in the war, and they asked for supplies in 
keeping with those received by local Indians who were willing to fight for the British, 
even though they had come from afar.1
After delivering these early speeches, they presented a message on behalf of their 
women “from whom all Warriors spring forth from the beginning of things.” The women 
reminded De Peyster that “Tho’ we do not go to war yet it subjects us Women to many 
Misfortunes, such as loosing our Relations and friends, notwithstanding our Misery and 
the darken’d Clouds which Warriors bring on us our hopes is in the giver of Life and 
whenever he bids war to cease we shall be thankful, till then we join our father in 
encouraging the young men to arms against the Enemy. Father! If we women put our 
hopes in Heaven it is because we have no consolation on earth, all we experience here is 
care and trouble,” they said. These words apparently failed to prompt De Peyster to open 
his storehouses because the Cherokees left Detroit much displeased by the inadequate 
supply. Three weeks later they returned, accompanied by some Shawnee and Six Nations
1 MPHC, 10: 591-92 (at 592); RG 10, 13: 99-137.
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representatives, who presented their case to the commander and succeeded in securing
•  •  'ymore goods for the southern immigrants.
Although De Peyster was unmoved by the Cherokee women’s plaint, it offered a 
poignant glimpse of the Revolution’s impact on native communities. Families grieved 
for missing fathers, sons, and brothers just as they did in British and American 
households. War jeopardized every aspect of life, leaving women and children longing 
for its end so they could return to their routines. At the same time, however, they 
encouraged active resistance against the “Enemy,” and endorsed the participation of their 
young men in hostilities aimed at protecting their society from encroaching Europeans 
and Americans. In the midst of this upheaval, they managed to sustain their independent 
existence and preserve their nations’ customs, even if their lives included much “care and 
trouble.”3
Focusing on the Indians’ home front rather than diplomatic maneuvering or 
military raiding highlights two significant themes for the entire 1768-1795 period. The 
first recalls their twin objectives of retaining land and sovereignty. While holding their 
place at the negotiating table fell largely under diplomacy and protecting their land 
seemed to be the warriors’ responsibility, both goals existed to ensure that community 
life would remain vibrant and continue to give meaning and identity to future 
generations. The second emphasizes that despite changing political circumstances during 
these three decades, the dominant threats to local affairs remained basically the same. 
Dunmore’s War, the Revolution, and the battles during the late 1780s and 1790s all
2 RG 10, 13: 136-45 (at 136-37).
3 Ibid., 136-37.
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produced similar hardships and fears in Ohio Valley villages, undoubtedly causing many 
Indians to view these years as one continuous struggle.4
By far the most devastating “Misfortune” to cloud native towns as a result of the 
Indians’ conflict with intruding settlers and governments was the demise of “Relations 
and friends.” Although warriors usually avoided battlefield scenarios that produced 
many casualties, the accumulated deaths over twenty years weighed heavily upon nations 
already declining in population and occasionally hard-pressed for experienced leaders. 
Communities mourned each loss and noted particularly when their mortality exceeded 
that of their British allies. “We Indians are the only sufferers [in] this War, as we dayly 
loose our people while you are quietly in your fort,” the Mahican Silver Heels reproached 
De Peyster in May 1782. Two weeks later, in response to De Peyster’s urging them to 
join the Indian defenses at Sandusky, the Wyandots, Ottawas, Chippewas, and 
Potawatomies reluctantly agreed to go to war, but one Wyandot chief reminded the 
commander that “one half of my people are already killed by the Enemy.”5
If George Rogers Clark had persuaded his superiors to pursue his military 
strategy for the West, the death toll might have been much higher. In January 1780, he 
complained to his brother that “Carrying out armies and destroying their Town is little or 
no use when they Can get four fold for what they loose from the English.” Consequently, 
he reasoned that killing Indians and reducing British garrisons were the only ways for the 
Americans to gain an advantage in the region. The warriors he spared would have to
4 Other authors have also made the case for viewing the second half o f the eighteenth century as 
one complete struggle for land comprised of several smaller conflicts, most notably David Curtis Skaggs in 
his edited volume, The Sixty Years ’ War fo r the Great Lakes, 1754-1814 (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State 
University Press, 2001).
*RG 1 0 ,13: 102-08,136-37 (at 136, 102, 108).
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make peace on his terms, one of which would be a complete ban on arms and 
ammunition in native territory.6
Fortunately for the Indians, Clark’s bold proposition was not embraced by federal 
or state governments, but their hesitancy to adopt his grand agenda did not hinder them 
from endorsing several of his militia expeditions across the Ohio River. Eight months 
after he downplayed the destruction of Indian towns, he marched a thousand men to the 
cluster of Shawnee villages on the Little Miami and Mad Rivers and burned Chillicothe 
and Piqua. The Shawnees were prepared for this assault, abandoning Chillicothe, hiding 
their women and children, and summoning distant warriors before the Kentuckians 
arrived; but their spirited defense against Clark’s artillery could not save two o f their 
towns or prevent an estimated forty-two native fatalities. In November 1782, Clark 
targeted the Shawnees again, despite American and British calls for a ceasefire, this time 
killing ten and taking seven prisoners. Four years later, Benjamin Logan continued the 
Kentucky militia’s war on the Shawnees. Unlike Clark, he managed to surprise his foes, 
but the majority of the men were hunting at the time, thus reducing the number of 
casualties. Although the eleven deaths might seem numerically insignificant, the veteran 
trader Simon Girty reported that there were several chiefs and leading men among that 
number.7
6 George Rogers Clark Papers, 8: 382-83.
7 George Rogers Clark Papers, 8:451-53,476-84,19: 150-53; MPHC, 10:418-20, 659-60, 11: 
323-24, 336-38, 342, 350-51, 360,24: 34-38; “Meeting o f the Six Nations with British officers, Dec. 11, 
1782,” reel A-686, Haldimand Papers; “Haldimand to Carleton, Feb. 17,1783,” reel M-360, BHP;
“Harmar to Hutchins, Dec. 5, 1786,” Letter Book B, Harmar Papers; William Lytle, “Personal Narrative of 
William Lytle,” Quarterly Publication o f  the Historical and Philosophical Society o f  Ohio, 1, no. 1 (1906): 
12-21. As with every sizable Indian battle, the number o f native casualties from the August 1780 clash is 
difficult to determine. Participant Henry Wilson claimed that he and his men brought home seventy-three 
scalps. Clark thought the Kentuckians had killed at least three times as many Indians as his army had lost. 
The Indians never cite any figures, although in describing the event to the British, they suggest that the 
number was small.
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The Shawnees were not the only nation to suffer at the hands of American armies. 
Blundering soldiers commanded by General Hand slew several Delaware women along 
with an elderly man and a boy in the winter of 1778. Several years later, when Colonel 
Brodhead was convinced that the Delawares had abandoned neutrality, he flattened their 
capital, intentionally exacting a heavy toll on human lives. Senecas, Munsees, Weas, 
Kickapoos, and Miamis also encountered campaigns specifically conducted to eliminate 
their homes, friends, and relatives. In addition to these focused operations, the 
Americans engaged in several large-scale battles with multi-national Indian forces 
between 1774 and 1794. The battle at Point Pleasant in 1774, the defeats of Josiah 
Harmar and Arthur St. Clair in 1790 and 1791, and the fight with Anthony Wayne at 
Fallen Timbers in 1794 all caused many funerals in native villages. While estimates of 
the actual number of victims in these clashes varied widely, even conservative figures 
suggest considerable impact on nations whose populations ranged in the hundreds rather
o
than the thousands.
Although official expeditions claimed many lives, probably an equal number of 
Indians died in smaller skirmishes. Nearly every time a party of warriors raided frontier 
settlements, the local residents mounted some kind of resistance, especially after 
Pennsylvania began offering a scalp bounty “as an Inducement to the young Fellows.. .to 
turn out against the Indians” in 1780. Sometimes the Indians anticipated this pursuit and
8 Frontier Defense, 215-223; Frontier Retreat, 55-66, 376-82; ASPIA, 129-35. For a general idea 
o f Indian population in the Ohio Valley between 1768 and 1795, see the following enumerations: Tanner, 
Atlas o f  Great Lakes Indian History, 66 (1768); William Wilson, “An Account o f  the Indian Towns & 
Nations in the Western Department,” Virginia Magazine o f  History and Biography, 23 (1915): 345-46 
(1778); McKee, “Enumeration o f Indians living near Detroit, 1782,” Ser. 1, lot 704, S1AP; Thombrough, 
Outpost on the Wabash, 80 (1788); MPHC, 20: 305-07 (1789); Wallace, Thirty Thousand Miles, 331-33. 
Unfortunately, these data are difficult to compare because some compilers counted only warriors, and they 
all varied in the specific communities under consideration.
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successfully ambushed their enemies, as they did at Grave Creek in September 1777, 
where they scattered a scouting party captained by William Foreman, or, on a bigger 
scale, at Blue Licks in August 1782, where they decimated the Kentucky militia, killing 
an estimated seventy-seven men, including many officers. But on other occasions, they 
were the ones who succumbed to their pursuers. Pennsylvania Capt. Lt. Samuel Brady 
made a name for himself in the Pittsburgh area by hunting down small groups o f Indians. 
The crafty scouts near Yellow Creek in August 1780 watched some Wyandots “Crossing 
the River on Rafts” and proceeded to slaughter ten of them when they landed.9
While warriors risked their lives when they took the war across the Ohio, women 
and children faced more danger from marauding bands of militia. Larger troop 
movements usually generated enough commotion to give war chiefs time to protect their 
families, but smaller, stealthier parties, such as the group of Kentuckians led by Patrick 
Brown in August 1788, proved to be more destructive. Brown’s party killed nine 
peaceful Piankeshaw and Miami villagers living near Vincennes, a move slightly 
reminiscent of the more famous Gnadenhutten massacre in the spring of 1782. This 
tragic episode occurred when 160 Pennsylvanians and Virginians ventured up the 
Muskingum River and slaughtered approximately 95 men, women, and children at three 
Moravian towns. Like Brown’s victims, these Christian Indians generally sympathized 
with the Americans, a position that prompted the Wyandots, Lake Indians, and British to
9 Pennsylvania Archives, 7: 505-06, 8: 218,250,283, 378-79 (at 218); Frontier Defense, 106-12; 
George Rogers Clark Papers, 19: 89-99; Frontier Retreat, 245 (quote). County lieutenants in western 
Pennsylvania began agitating for scalp bounties as early as 1777. Archibald Lochry of Westmoreland 
County even sent five scalps to Pennsylvania’s president in December 1777, hoping they would be 
subsidized and thereby encourage frontier settlers to join the militia. President Joseph Reed eventually 
passed the request to Congress, but when the federal government was reluctant to authorize it, Pennsylvania 
acted on its own. Pennsylvania Archives, 6: 69, 7: 268, 362,466, 506, 569, 8: 218, 250,283, 301.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
244
cart them to Sandusky in September 1781 to prevent their ability to pass intelligence to 
officers at Fort Pitt. To avoid starvation during the winter and spring of 1782, the 
Moravians had been granted permission to return to their homes on the Muskingum and 
to gather any remnant food supplies. Instead, they encountered backcountry rage, despite 
having “furnished Col. Brodhead & his party with a large quantity of provisions when 
they were starving” during the expedition against Coshocton the previous year.10
Indeed, settler vindictiveness often contained little logic. In the immediate 
aftermath of Brodhead’s campaign into Delaware territory, Col. John Gibson at Fort Pitt 
lamented that three hundred men from Monongahela and Ohio Counties were preparing 
“to cut off the Moravian Indian towns,” even though “the Moravians have always given 
us the most convincing proofs of their attachment to the cause of America, by always 
giving us intelligence of every party that came against the frontiers.” These men were 
apparently diverted to join Clark’s 1781 attempt on Detroit, but a year later they 
accomplished their objective in horrific fashion, launching waves of fury and fear across 
the Ohio Country.11
Just as the deaths of friends and family rocked the Indians’ world, many 
communities witnessed the dissolution of village life because of the capture o f  a 
significant segment of their population. Brodhead’s 1781 attack on Coshocton yielded 
“upwards of twenty odd men, women, and children prisoners.” Clark seized several 
Shawnees in his duplicitous 1782 raid. Logan’s forces carried off thirty-two residents 
from the towns he burned in 1786, and Scott and Wilkinson brought home a combined
10 Thombrough, Outpost on the Wabash, 114-17; Pennsylvania Archives, 9: 523-25; RG 1 0 ,13: 
70, 76-89; Darlington, Fort Pitt and Letters from the Frontier, 238-41; MPHC, 10: 523, 538-41, 545-46; 
Frontier Retreat, 399-401 (at 400).
11 Frontier Retreat, 399-401 (at 400).
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ninety-two prisoners from their 1791 campaigns against the Kickapoos, Piankeshaws, and 
Miamis at Ouitanon and L’Anguille on the Wabash River. The numbers would have 
been even higher had Scott and Wilkinson not elected to leave some of the feebler
19women and children behind.
Logan, Scott, and Wilkinson attempted to use their captives to coax compliant 
behavior from their enemies. In his ransom note, Scott informed the Wabash nations 
where they could recover their people if they came “with true hearts, to bury the hatchet, 
and smoke the pipe of peace.” If they persisted in resisting American expansion, 
however, they could expect that “the sons of war will be let loose against you, and the 
hatchet will never be buried until your country is desolated, and your people humbled to 
the dust.” Logan and Wilkinson both hoped to arrange a prisoner exchange in addition to 
convincing the Indians that the reasonable course of action was to “submit to the 
protection of the United States.” Despite these threats and the various nations’ deep 
concern for the welfare of their imprisoned people, many leaders refused to bend to the 
interests of their attackers. Captain Johnny, Shawnee leader after Logan’s company 
commander, Hugh McGary, dispatched Moluntha, the previous chief, in 1786, secured 
the release of most of his compatriots without returning all of the American captives. 
Likewise, the Wabash chiefs managed to get their people moved from Fort Washington 
to Vincennes and subsequently freed by agreeing to an uncharacteristically lenient (and
12 Frontier Retreat, 399; MPHC, 11:336,24: 34-38; George Rogers Clark Papers, 19: 152; 
“Intelligence, Nov. 14, 1786,” “Harmar to Hutchins, Dec. 5, 1786,” Letter Book B, Harmar Papers', 
ASPIA, 131-36.
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consequently unratified) treaty, even though Colonel Hamtranck and his associates at
1 3Vincennes believed them to be insincere.
While the detention of sizable groups of their inhabitants certainly disrupted 
native life, many nations found that the Revolution altered their patterns of taking 
prisoners as well. Most Ohio Valley Indians were accustomed to adopting captives into 
their nations as a means of replacing those who had died, thereby augmenting their 
population and symbolically assuaging their grief. Often, this need to acquire individuals 
to strengthen their numbers proved to be their primary motivation for going to war.14 
During the Revolution, however, the British insisted that warriors who relied on them for 
supplies must turn over all colonial detainees to crown officers at Detroit.
The Hurons at Detroit and their Wyandot relatives at Sandusky protested this 
injunction the loudest. After losing a chief at the falls of the Ohio in 1781, they asked De 
Peyster if they could keep some of their prisoners as a substitute, arguing that their 
sorrow resulted from “espousing your quarrel.” Furthermore, they contended, the former 
governor, Hamilton, had permitted them to retain their captives in addition to his promise 
o f protection against American armies. De Peyster agreed to check with Indian 
Superintendent Guy Johnson, but he doubted that Johnson would budge because of his 
opinion that the English should not be asked to conform to native customs. Two years 
later, when the British tried to persuade the confederated nations to embrace the Peace of 
Paris (from which they had been excluded), T’sindatton again objected on behalf of the
13 ASPIA, 132-35,238 (at 133, 135); Faragher, Daniel Boone, 253-59; Wallace, Thirty Thousand 
Miles, 282-84.
14 James Axtell, “The White Indians o f Colonial America,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 
32, no. 1 (January 1975), 55-88; Daniel K. Richter, “War and Culture: The Iroquois Experience,” WMQ, 
40, no. 4 (October 1983), 528-59.
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Hurons, “asserting that when the Hatchet was put into his hands he was told that all the 
Prisoners they took during the War Should be kept to strengthen their nation,” a practice 
that had been “confirmed by his Father at Detroit.”15
Although the British formally forbade the retention of American settlers, 
T’sindatton and his fellow Indian leaders undoubtedly recognized that they were ill- 
equipped to enforce their own rule. Consequently, most nations defied the law by simply 
turning over some of their captives and keeping the remainder hidden in their villages. 
Some bolder groups openly flaunted their refusal to deliver prisoners. A group of 
Ottawas from the Mackinac region traveled to Sandusky in the spring of 1782 to assist in 
the defense against William Crawford and his army, returning home shortly thereafter 
without surrendering their prizes of war. In July they followed the call to arms again, 
passing through Detroit en route and asking for a range of supplies. De Peyster believed 
their demands to be unreasonable since they lived so near Michilimackinac and refused to 
grant them more than a few necessities. Angered by this snub, the 147 Ottawas 
purposely paraded their captives at Detroit on their return trip in September. They 
announced that because “their father’s door was shut,” their young men had ventured out 
on their own and seized a number of “blacks which we mean to deliver to our wives for 
to fetch them water.” They agreed to leave half of their prisoners at Detroit, but the rest 
they marched back to their homes.16
If adopted captives could mitigate the personal sting and collective hardship of 
population loss, they could do little to prevent the destruction of property that plagued
15 RG 1 0 ,13: 64-67 (at 64); MPHC, 11: 385 (quote).
i6RG 10, 13: 151-57, 165-68 (at 165).
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many Ohio Valley communities between 1768 and 1795. Despite Clark’s belief that 
burning Indian towns was useless for the American war effort, it quickly became the 
most popular method of striking their enemies. The Shawnees watched their homes go 
up in flames five times between 1779 and 1787, in part because their towns, situated on 
the Scioto River and the upper tributaries of the Great Miami River, were the closest to 
angry Kentuckians. Colonial armies also forced the Delawares and several Wabash 
nations to abandon their residences, and almost every Ohio tribe suffered when Anthony 
Wayne torched the Glaize and the Maumee River region in 1794.17
In addition to finding new shelter, the Indians also faced the urgency o f 
replenishing their food sources, another favorite target of American pillagers. During 
Brodhead’s 1779 expedition against the Seneca, Delaware, and Munsee towns on the 
upper Allegheny River, his men devoted three days to “destroying standing com and 
burning houses,” altogether cutting down nearly six hundred acres and either throwing it 
in the river or tossing it in “heaps to heat & destroy.” Being warned of this devastation, 
the Seneca towns to the northward “Buried their com and venisons under the ground” in 
case the army should continue its march. Nevertheless, these precautions were not 
enough to support the displaced residents of ten towns, including a group of seven 
villages containing 130 houses.18
Following this example, Clark boasted that his army had mined eight hundred 
acres of com and a great quantity of vegetables as part of his 1780 attack on the 
Shawnees. Logan reported the same kind of devastation in 1786, and Harmar frequently
17 Tanner, Atlas o f  Great Lakes Indian History, 71-73, 80, 85, 88-91.
18 Frontier Retreat, 55-66 (at 55, 62,65).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
249
cited the two thousand bushels of com he destroyed near the Miami towns in 1790 as 
some consolation in an otherwise decisive victory for the Indians. No military 
commander caused more desolation than Wayne in 1794. When he reached the juncture 
of the Auglaize and Maumee Rivers, the center of native life in the region since 1792, he 
pronounced it a “grand emporium,” pointing out the “very extensive and highly 
cultivated fields and gardens” as evidence of “the work of many hands.” “The margins of 
those beautiful rivers.. .appear like one continued village for a number of miles, both 
above and below this place; nor have I ever before beheld such immense fields of com, in 
any part of America, from Canada to Florida,” he wrote to Knox. Two weeks later he 
had destroyed it all, along with villages and com fields for fifty miles on both sides of the 
Maumee River between the Glaize and the Maumee rapids. The destitute refugees 
huddled on Swan Creek, relying on food and supplies from Detroit to survive the coming 
winter.19
Indian property that escaped incineration usually made its way back across the 
Ohio with the plundering troops. Despite being chased off by Shawnee defenders, John 
Bowman’s militia captured £31,666.14 of goods at Chillicothe in 1779. Brodhead 
claimed to have taken booty worth $30,000 during his Allegheny campaign, loot that 
included approximately thirty horses, thirty brass kettles, and a number of beef cattle. 
Horses were by far the most valuable acquisition, and the promise of returning with these 
prizes actually lured many men to volunteer. Other frontier settlers refused to wait for a 
sanctioned expedition into Indian country in favor of illegally venturing out with a few
19 George Rogers Clark Papers, 8: 452; MPHC, 24: 38; “October 16-19, 1790” Harmar Journal, 
“Harmar to Hamtranck, Nov. 29, 1790,” Letter Book H, Harmar Papers', ASPIA, 490 (quote); Knopf, 
Anthony Wayne, 354-55.
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neighbors and stealing horses on their own. Colonial authorities denounced such 
clandestine activities, but the tense climate of war shrouded the perpetrators from
<y/\
effectual punishment.
Of course, the Indians engaged in horse stealing as well, exacerbating the back- 
and-forth theft that became a means of waging war on both sides. In June 1794, Wayne’s 
men captured two Shawnees returning from hunting along the Wabash River just across 
the Ohio River from Kentucky. They had become separated from their party of twenty, 
but together, the group had pilfered fifty horses from the American settlements. The two 
captives held five of those horses, heavily laden with deer and bearskins, the fruit o f their 
spring labors. Perhaps hoping to retain some of their goods, they divulged plenty of 
intelligence about native war preparations and even mentioned that they had just 
encountered a group of three Delawares and one Potawatomi heading for Big Bone Lick 
to steal horses.21
While stealing horses and peltry (another favorite for thieves) affected the 
populace on both sides of the Ohio, it was especially galling for the Indians because it 
represented yet another attempt by invaders to wrest their property from their grasp.
Little by little, colonists had advanced onto their land: first “making a number o f beds in 
[their] hunting country... south of the Ohio; as if  to sleep there,” followed by hunting 
extensively and importing livestock, both of which greatly reduced the amount o f game 
in Kentucky, animals that the Indians believed had been “given to [them] by God, to feed
20 George Rogers Clark Papers, 8: 332, 19: 83-84; Frontier Retreat, 55, 59; Palmer, Calendar o f  
Virginia State Papers, 3: 529.
21ASPIA, 489-90. For more on the back and forth nature o f  horse stealing, see Jared C. Lobdell, 
ed., Further Materials on Lewis Wetzel and the Upper Ohio Frontier... (Bowie, MD: Heritage Books, 
1994), 13,65,71-72.
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our women and children upon.” Next came forts and soldiers and finally settlements 
north of the Ohio. After this series of American perfidies, most Indians directed their ire 
against the colonies and later the United States, but many also criticized the British for 
encouraging a defensive posture, which resulted in most major battles being fought on 
native soil and consequently greater disruption in native communities. On numerous 
occasions war chiefs begged for artillery to take the fight to the encroachers, but the
'J'JBritish rarely agreed to these proposals.
Living in a state of war also taxed Indian property even when it was not being 
directly threatened by the enemy. In January 1792, Alexander McKee reported that the 
Shawnees, Miamis, and Delawares were particularly short of com to last them through 
the winter. The previous fall these three nations had hosted more than a thousand Indians 
from the Ohio Valley and upper Great Lakes regions, who were gathering to oppose 
Arthur St. Clair and his sizable American army. Having successfully routed these 
invaders, most warriors returned home, leaving the Shawnees, Miamis, and Delawares 
with empty pantries. When combined with “the loss of great part of their crop by the 
over flowing of the River,” they were in desperate straits. Even in victory, the war had 
found a way to haunt them.23
An easy solution to this food shortage problem might simply have been to hunt 
for their sustenance, but the exigencies of war made that increasingly difficult. While 
some warriors certainly did trek to their hunting grounds “for the support of their
22 Minutes o f  Debates in Council.. .on the Ottawa River.. .November, 1791,” Early American 
Imprints, Ser. 1, nos. 24-25 (American Antiquarian Society and NewsBank, 2002), 7-19 (at 12, 15);
MPHC, 9: 347, 361,414,10: 364-65; RG 10, 13: 71,146-47; “Jehu Hay’s Journal o f  Indian affairs, Nov. 
23, 1776,” Ser. 1, lot 687, 78, SIAP; Stephen Aron, “The Significance of the Kentucky Frontier,” Register 
o f  the Kentucky Historical Society, 91, no. 3 (1993), 298-323.
23 MPHC, 24: 366.
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Families,” others felt that defense demanded their utmost attention and energy. In the 
wake of their trouncing of St. Clair, many Shawnees, Miamis, and Delawares believed 
“their services were wanted by the other nations to reduce the forts which were built by 
their enemies as they advanced.” Only a strong contingent comprised of as many 
available bodies as possible would be able to accomplish this task.24
When the Indians were able to devote time to the hunt, they tended to range 
farther afield than they had in the past because settlers and soldiers had driven away the 
game in areas nearer to their homes. This expanded distance made it even more difficult 
for warriors to balance hunting and fighting, since worthwhile hunting would leave their 
families and villages unattended for many months. During the first half of the 
Revolution, when the Ohio Valley nations were primarily on the offensive, war chiefs 
could plan their attacks around hunting season, but in the war’s latter years and again in 
the 1790s, they struggled with the almost constant threat of American armies and 
encroaching settlers invading their territory. Although they frequently managed to repel 
these intruders, they often did so at the expense of their hunting.25
With the decline in hunting came the concomitant reduction in peltry for the 
international market. For the British, whose existence in the West was dependent largely 
on the fur trade, this potential hit to their economy caused considerable upheaval.
Traders begged to be allowed to establish operations in Indian country rather than at 
established posts, reasoning that Indians might be disinclined to travel to Detroit or 
Michilimackinac if such a trip would take them away from the war effort for long
24 Ibid, 10: 537,24: 366 (quote).
25 Ibid., 12:90,24:144, 161.
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periods. These trading stations benefited local warriors, often outfitting them for war 
even though they contributed fewer furs, but they were also subject to the destructive 
power of American forces. Clark “laid in ashes” the store of influential trader Louis 
Lorimier during his 1782 strike against the Shawnees. Harmar ruined large amounts of 
the Miami traders’ com in 1790, and McKee’s outpost met the same fate as Lorimier’s in
1794  26
Reduced hunting and trading, coupled with the devastation of native property and 
neighborhood storehouses, forced most Ohio Valley Indians to depend upon the British 
for survival. By 1780, after fraternizing with Clark at his Wabash or Illinois 
encampments only to discover that the Americans were ill-equipped to supply their 
needs, nations began to turn up at Detroit in droves, declaring their allegiance as well as 
their hunger. Fmstrated by rising costs, British officers complained about lazy Indians, 
but they also knew that without native warriors, their western agenda would be pointless, 
so they usually offered some food and ammunition. In return they expected the Indians 
to fight for them and not simply use them as a free warehouse. When a number of 
Kickapoos, Mascoutens, Ouittanons, Piankeshaws, Miamis, and Peorias arrived in June 
1781 bearing furs as a sign of good will, De Peyster scolded them, calling their beaver 
skins “marks from the women and not from warriors.” Marks of true loyalty could only 
be acquired if they fought the Americans at Sandusky.27
Despite British efforts to exploit the war’s circumstances to make the Indians “as 
Subservient as possible to the Kings Service,” most nations became adept at getting what
26 Simcoe Papers, 1: 141; George Rogers Clark Papers, 19: 153 (quote); Pennsylvania Archives, 
Ser. 2 ,4: 540; Knopf, Anthony Wayne, 354. For more on Louis Lorimier, see Stevens, Louis Lorimier in 
the American Revolution, 1777-1782.
27 RG 1 0 ,13: 14, 133 (at 133); MPHC, 9: 383.
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they wanted, even though their lack of resources generally placed them in a vulnerable 
position. Recognizing that the crown needed their military services, Indians did not 
hesitate to demand ample compensation for their labor. Haldimand complained in 
September 1781 that they expected “a Succession of Presents... upon even the most 
trifling Excursion—the Petit Guerre [“little war,” a reference to Indian raids] is now 
become a Lucrative Profession, their ease and Luxury is gratified by it.” A few months 
later De Peyster also lamented that he could not control the Indians. “I assemble them, 
get fair promises, and send them out, but when once out of sight the turning of a Straw 
may divert them from the original plan,” he said. “The Indians in this Country must be 
looked upon as a large body of Irregulars, Fed and cloathed to prevent the inroads of the 
Virginians into this Country, and, who must be delicately managed, to prevent their 
favoring those rebels,” he continued. Although De Peyster prided himself on his 
“delicate management” of native allies, in many instances they were managing him: 
protesting inadequate supplies, pursuing their own military agenda, ignoring commands 
that interfered with their cultural practices, garnering provisions for their communities, 
and masking their allegiance enough to induce the British to actively court their favor.28
For all of these manipulations, however, many Indian communities still struggled 
to survive during two decades of almost continuous warfare. As if population and 
property loss and the disruption of regular patterns of hunting and trade failed to create 
enough turbulence in native lives, most nations transplanted their villages multiple times 
between 1768 and 1795, usually in pursuit of a means to protect or restore community
28 “Haldimand to Guy Johnson, Sept. 5, 1781,” reel A-683, Haldimand Papers (Haldimand quote); 
MPHC, 10: 547-48 (De Peyster quote at 548).
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vitality. In some instances these migrations reflected a desire to avoid anticipated 
conflict. A group of 170 Shawnees left the Scioto River in 1773 rather than “be Hemmed 
in on all Sides by the White People, and then be at their mercy.” Similarly, the Turkey 
division of the Delawares abandoned eastern Ohio for new homes on the White River in 
1776, undoubtedly hoping to remain aloof from the rising tensions that accompanied the
i j  Q
onset of the Revolution.
This foresight probably spared them even more upheaval. Fighting between the 
British and Americans had barely gotten underway before nations such as the Shawnees 
and Delawares divided over how to respond. In October 1776, White Eyes and Killbuck, 
the Delaware leaders most committed to neutrality, met privately with George Morgan 
and confided that they feared their countryman Captain Pipe was “not doing what is 
good.” They had heard rumors of a possible British attack on Pittsburgh while the 
current treaty was being conducted, and they suspected that Captain Pipe was privy to 
information that he was keeping a secret. When Morgan questioned him, he admitted 
that he had received a belt from the Wyandots, but it was “merely to clear the Road 
agreable to our Custom as it appeared lately to have been fill’d with Brush.” White Eyes 
and Killbuck remained unconvinced of his veracity, arguing that if the messages were 
good, “why keep them secret from us? Why did they hide their Wampum under their 
Cloathes when one of us approach’d their Camp,” they wondered. During the next year, 
Captain Pipe and his Wolf clan appeared even guiltier to his Turtle brethren when he 
refused to move closer to the Delaware capital at Coschocton, opting instead to relocate
29 Calloway, American Revolution in Indian Country, 161; Tanner, Atlas o f  Great Lakes Indian 
History, 81.
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toward Cuyahoga. A year later he settled among the Wyandots at Upper Sandusky, 
perhaps in response to that nation’s call for the Delawares to remove themselves from the 
influence of the Americans.30
As the war proceeded and colonial commanders pressured the Delawares to join 
their side, quarreling at Coshocton grew sharper. Moravian missionary David Zeisberger 
noted in March 1779 that “murmuring” about the disputed September 1778 conference 
was “a primary cause of the split” among them and a likely reason for some residents to 
be contemplating a southwestward move to Assinink, an old Delaware town on the 
Hocking River. This internal strife was magnified by zealously militant Wyandots and 
Shawnees who came to the area to attack the recently erected Fort Laurens. All of this 
unrest spilled over into the nearby Moravian Delaware communities, inciting death 
threats against the outside missionaries and ultimately prompting the Moravians to leave 
their Lichtenau village adjacent to Coshocton and resettle on their former site of 
Schonbrunn on the Tuscarawas River.31
Before their relocation was complete, Brodhead “insistently” requested that they 
move closer to Pittsburgh. Along with arguments about safety and isolation from 
“unpleasant” raiding parties, he told Zeisberger that as long as the Moravians lived 
among the other Indians, he had to spare his enemies for their sake. In response, 
Zeisberger called such a move “impossible” because his flock would be forced to “leave
30 “Private council with White Eyes and Killbuck, Oct. 24, 1776,” “Private council with Capt. 
Pipe, Checalese, Pukangehela, Oct. 24, 1776,” “Second private council with White Eyes and Killbuck, Oct. 
24,1776,” 1776 Morgan Letterbook; Morgan Letterbooks, 1: 48,70-80, 3: 54; Tanner, Atlas o f  Great 
Lakes Indian History, 80-81; Moravian Mission Diaries, 333. See also John Heckewelder, “An Account of  
the History, Manners, and Customs o f the Indian Nations...,” Transactions o f the Historical & Literary 
Committee o f  the American Philosophical Society, vol. 1 (Philadelphia: Abraham Small, 1819).
31 Moravian Mission Diaries, 491-512, 524-25 (at 499).
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behind all what they have.” “They are not like the rest of the Indians who can take their 
whole estate on their backs & go where they please,” he explained. “Our people have 
been travelling & moving from one place to another till we at last came to this place 
where we hoped to remain in possession of our settlements & enjoy the fruit of our labour 
at least for a good many years. I dare not think about moving nor even propose it to our 
people for it would quite discourage them unless there was great necessity.” During the 
next decade, the Moravians were uprooted six times.32
Internal divisions also plagued the Shawnees and forced a series of peregrinations. 
Since the 1768 Treaty at Fort Stanwix, a sizable contingent of Shawnees violently 
opposed the expansion of British American subjects into their hunting territory. 
Dunmore’s War exacerbated those tensions, so when the Revolution began, they were 
prepared to seize the opportunity to push back western settlement. A number of 
Shawnees, particularly of the Maquachake division, hesitated to engage in open 
hostilities after the defeat they suffered in 1774, creating some turmoil in the towns along 
the Scioto River. Cornstalk’s murder in late 1777 attracted more supporters for the 
warlike faction and encouraged the promoters of neutrality to emigrate to Coshocton in 
early 1778. Even this group could not be unified, however. After a year, a large segment 
returned to their relatives at Wakatomica. The remainder stayed with the Delawares until 
February 1780, when they also responded to a summons from their principal chief to 
return home. Meanwhile, approximately twelve hundred Shawnees abandoned the Ohio 
Valley entirely, eventually moving across the Mississippi River after the Revolution.33
32 Ibid., 522-23; Frontier Retreat, 162 (Zeisberger quote); Tanner, Atlas o f  Great Lakes Indian 
History, 84, 88-90.
33 Moravian Mission Diaries, 433, 437,443,493, 500-01; Frontier Retreat, 139; Calloway, 
American Revolution in Indian Country, 169-71.
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While the war’s circumstances influenced the Shawnees and Delawares to make 
several voluntary moves, both nations were forced to undertake involuntary journeys as 
well. Fear that their proximity to Kentucky would tempt reprisals encouraged most of the 
Shawnees to leave the Scioto River for new abodes on the Great and Little Miami Rivers 
and their headwaters during the late 1770s. Clark’s and Logan’s ravaging militias in 
1780,1782, and 1786 initiated more community relocations until in 1790 the Shawnees 
joined the cluster of villages around Kekionga, the principal Miami town where the St. 
Mary’s and St. Joseph Rivers met to form the Maumee. Many of the Delawares also 
ended up at Kekionga after Brodhead burned their capital in 1781. At first, they scattered 
to the Wyandots at Upper Sandusky or to their compatriot Buckonghelas on the upper 
Mad River, but by 1785 they were settling near the Miamis. After Harmar and St. Clair 
marched American armies uncomfortably close to Kekionga, most of the nations gathered 
there moved downstream to the Glaize in 1792. Following their defeat at Fallen Timbers, 
many Shawnees and their neighbors talked of completely forsaking the Ohio Country and 
crossing the Mississippi into Spanish territory.34
Despite Zeisberger’s implication that moving was easy for all Indians except his 
Moravian Delawares, it posed multiple problems, especially when repeated so frequently 
in a short, war-filled period. For native women, the challenge was to replant and 
cultivate new fields of com and vegetables, an increasingly important task as hunting 
became less reliable. For the men, the difficulty was gaining permission to settle on land 
that often belonged to another nation. Most tribes were usually hospitable, but if  the
34 Calloway, American Revolution in Indian Country, 169; Tanner, Atlas o f  Great Lakes Indian 
History, 80-85, 88-89; RG 10, 8: 8242-243; MPHC, 12: 11, \11\ASPIA, 529; Tanner, “The Glaize in 1792: 
A Composite Indian Community,” Ethnohistory, 25 (1978), 15-39.
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newcomers adopted a divergent military strategy or became overly vocal about 
controversial subjects, they could expect to be confronted. In March 1784, several 
Shawnee leaders apologized to the Virginians for the “hurtfull” behavior of some refugee 
Cherokees living among them. “Wee Discarged them froom our Land last fall But the[y] 
Obayd us not, therefore you may Depend wee will put a stop to them this Spring,” they 
announced. When the Delawares at Kekionga exasperated their hosts, the Miamis 
reminded them that “the Ground they occupied now is not theirs.”
Notwithstanding these acrimonious episodes, growing multi-tribalism often 
positively affected native communities during the last two war-torn decades o f  the 
century. Perhaps its primary benefit lay in enabling groups with shared interests to 
strengthen and protect each other. Facing the ire of their belligerent neighbors and 
relatives, the Maquachake Shawnees clung to their neutral stance much longer because of 
their move to Coshocton than they likely would have among their kindred. Since most 
Americans viewed the Shawnees as Zeisberger did (“the worst people of all the Nations, 
who are truly ruled by the power of darkness”), having the Delawares vouch for them 
before Brodhead also shielded them, albeit for a short time, from officially sanctioned 
colonial attacks. Similar clusters of affinity groups formed along the Wabash. The 
Piankeshaws who supported Clark gathered near Vincennes, joined in the postwar years 
by the Miami chief Pacanne and others who favored making peace with the United 
States. In contrast, the Weas, Kickapoos, Piankeshaws, and Miamis who peppered
35 Palmer, Calendar o f Virginia State Papers, 3: 566; Milton Milo Quiafe, ed., “A Narrative of 
Life on the Old Frontier: Henry Hay’s Journal from Detroit to the Mississippi River,” Proceedings o f  the 
State Historical Society o f  Wisconsin, 6 (Madison, WI: State Historical Society o f  Wisconsin), 226.
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Kentucky with raids tended to encourage one another in towns along the upper Wabash, 
just as the Wyandots, Shawnees and Mingos did for each other in northwest Ohio.36
Congregating in the same area also aided diplomacy, particularly the ability to 
accommodate large numbers of Indians at “Grande Councils.” Since hashing out ideas 
and weighing the input from all chiefs in an effort to reach consensus characterized native 
politics, frequent meetings were necessary during wartime, especially when unification 
seemed to be the most effective and appropriate response to the advances of their 
enemies. Indeed, attempts to form a western confederacy to protect their land and 
sovereignty flourished in the 1790s, when most of the principal nations lived near each 
other and shared immediate concerns; in the 1780s, adherence to unification agreements 
faded quickly, partly because distance prevented the scattered tribes from experiencing 
the same threats and from keeping each other accountable.37
Although large international settlements could act as a magnet for invading 
armies, they also attracted indispensable traders and Indian agents. From his post at the 
Maumee Rapids, McKee could easily visit the nations assembled at the Glaize and supply 
them with necessary provisions. During the Revolution, Lorimier’s station served a 
similar function for the Shawnees, Mingos, Wyandots, and Delawares living on the Mad 
River. Kekionga, located next to Fort Miami, lured traders from the entire Great Lakes 
region in its heyday. Easy access to these merchants allowed some semblance of the
36 Frontier Retreat, 73-75; Moravian Mission Diaries, 501 (quote); Quaife, ed., “Henry Hay’s 
Journal,” Proceedings, 6: 223; Tanner, Atlas o f  Great Lakes Indian History, 80, 85, 87-88.
37 Quaife, ed., “Henry Hay’s Journal,” Proceedings, 6: 244.
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nations’ customary hunting and trading to persist, even though war demands suppressed 
much of their output.38
In addition to providing ordinary subsistence, these posts also outfitted the many 
multi-tribal expeditions launched between 1774 and 1794. These missions brought 
together Indians from the entire region, who sometimes educated each other about their 
particular religious and cultural practices and sought to understand the strange behavior 
of their European allies as well. When Hamilton traveled to liberate Vincennes in 1778, 
he was accompanied by Ottawas, Chippewas, Potawatomies, and Wyandots and joined en 
route by Miamis, Shawnees, and other Wabash nations. One freezing November night, 
the Miami chief Waspikingua addressed his comrades, instructing them that “should any 
dispute arise among you, or hasty words pass, recollect that your busyness is War and let 
it pass unnoticed.” “We are here mixed with the English, the French and several different 
tribes of the brown skins,” he continued, so “let us not take offence at any thing which 
may be said, since we are unacquainted as well with their language as their customs.”
For example, he reminded them that the English believed “only in one sovereign being 
presiding over all,” rather than in “the Deities of the woods and rivers, as well as in the 
supreme lord.” Furthermore, instead of “making war.. .by surprize,” the British pursued 
another method, so Waspikingua encouraged the Indians to be prepared for “shot to fall 
as thick as drops of rain.” After exhorting them to not be afraid of death, he wanted to 
conclude with prayer, but since “the various nations have different customs,” he opted
38 Nelson, A Man o f  Distinction Among Them', Stevens, ed., Louis Lorimer in the American 
Revolution', Quaife, ed., “Henry Hay’s Journal,” Proceedings, 6: 214-50.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
262
not to “implore all their Deities,” choosing to “pray for the protection of those o f our own 
Nation and ask of them victory for my followers.”39
Waspikingua’s motivational speech might have fostered good will on the banks of 
the Wabash in 1778, but on other occasions, international associations reflected inter­
tribal rivalries and bitter struggles for leadership. As encroaching settlers and war’s 
destructive effects increasingly touched village life, these tensions became even more 
pronounced. In the Ohio Country, the Wyandots and Shawnees subtly vied with each 
other for the most influence among their neighbors. Just after assuming the position of 
Indian agent in May 1776, Morgan circled through the Delaware, Shawnee, and Mingo 
towns, listening to grievances and encouraging attendance at a fall treaty. Both the 
Delaware council and the Shawnee chief Cornstalk recommended that he take the 
message to their “Elder Brothers” the Wyandots because they “are in strict Friendship 
with fourteen different Western Nations, [and] have more influence than we have.” 
Consequently, they would be better suited to set a reasonable time for the treaty and 
“whatever time they fix will be agreable to us,” the leaders insisted.40
For the Delawares, much of this deference resulted from their acknowledgement 
that the Wyandots had graciously allowed them to settle on territory south of Lake Erie. 
Other nations also benefited from this largesse, elevating the Wyandots to a position of 
leadership because of their generosity and likely because of their wealth as well. British 
Indian agent Jehu Hay commented in 1776 that they “lived much better than the other 
Nations many of them having from 30 to 50 pounds worth of silver works & wampum.”
39 Barnhart, e d Journal o f  Henry Hamilton, 121.
40 1776 Morgan Letterbook, 21, 34.
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In his estimation they were also better armed than the Detroit militia and generally quite 
well-dressed, all qualities that would command respect from other Indians.41
After a few years of living in a war zone, however, the Shawnees and Delawares 
began to challenge Wyandot supremacy. The Shawnees did so militarily, having 
considerably more warriors than their Sandusky neighbors. By 1780, Wyandot chiefs 
“spoke strong” to their people, telling them that “it was true they formerly were the 
greatest Warriors of all Nations, but that now the Shawnese were eager to gain that 
Name, that they were become the greatest Wariors of all Nations.” Because o f this new 
arrangement, the Wyandots grudgingly resolved to “leave all over unto them” and let 
them do their best with the situation, but they certainly did not intend to provide any 
assistance. When the Shawnees convened an international force for their attack on 
Martin’s and Ruddell’s stations in the summer of 1780, the Wyandots were 
conspicuously absent. Meanwhile, the Delawares at Coshocton and their Moravian 
relatives were openly rejecting Wyandot overtures to embrace the British as allies.42
The Wyandots also encountered opposition from an unlikely source: their 
relatives living near Detroit. Governor Hamilton reported that “the Hurons & those at 
Sandooske are Rivals and jealous, except when a common Indian interest engages them 
to unanimity.” In this instance, the war actually promoted reconciliation because it 
provided ample opportunities for the two groups to unite in common cause. Together
41 Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 86-87; “Jehu Hay’s Journal, May 15, 1776,” Ser. 1, lot 687, 30, 
SIAP (quote).
42 Frontier Retreat, 190-91; “Enumeration o f Indians living near Detroit, 1782,” Ser. 1, lot 704, 
SIAP; Moravian Mission Diaries, 310, 333, 368; Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 219,244; Frontier 
Advance, 94-95, 117-18. The Wyandots were not the only nation to recognize Shawnee military prowess. 
While Hamilton settled in at Vincennes during January 1779, he sent a group o f Indians out to monitor the 
falls o f the Ohio. Although the Miamis were generally closer to Hamilton, they “yielded the command to 
the Shawnese,” Barnhart, ed., Journal o f  Henry Hamilton, 164-65.
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they informed Hamilton that “they expected what Lands they should drive the Rebels 
from should be vested in them as by right of conquest.” Later they lobbied for official 
permission to retain their prisoners. Both issues curbed their rivalry, which probably 
strengthened the Wyandots’ international standing and perhaps even contributed to their 
becoming “head” of the 1780s western confederacy, responsible for keeping the wampum 
belts and having the power to send speeches on behalf of the entire group.43
Elsewhere in the Ohio Valley other inter-tribal friction developed under the war’s 
divisive influence. After the Sauks and Foxes (Mesquakies) embraced Clark’s rhetoric at 
Illinois in 1778-79, both the Potawatomies of Detroit and Wabasha, chief among the 
Sioux, offered to chastise them. The Potawatomies even went so far as to send “two 
collars and two Bostonian scalps” to the Illinois nations, threatening that if they refused 
to attack Clark, “war [would] be declared upon them by all the other nations and by the 
troops of the king.” Although the Sauks never attacked Kaskaskia or Cahokia, they 
seemed to have returned to the British fold a year later when they enlisted the 
Potawatomies to present a case before De Peyster. They hoped that he would be able to 
extricate himself from the business of war for a brief moment to mediate a dispute among 
the Wabash tribes involving a land sale by the Piankeshaws. De Peyster passed up this 
chance to unite the Wabash nations, perhaps fostering the Piankeshaws’ continued 
support for the Americans and thereby sealing the other tribes’ hatred of expansionary 
Kentuckians 44
43 MPHC, 9: 437, 11: 385; RG 10, 13: 64-67; PCC, reel 165, item 150, vol. 3, 135.
44 George Rogers Clark Papers, 8: 394 (quote); MPHC, 9: 384; RG 10, 13: 25-27.
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Meanwhile, the Chippewas continued their bitter feud with the Sioux, breeding 
consternation and trepidation in Michilimackinac commanders, who worried that 
necessary warriors would be unavailable for British missions in Illinois, or worse, that the 
Americans would exploit the conflict to draw one of those numerous nations to their side. 
To prevent this disaffection, De Peyster, who directed affairs at Michilimackinac before 
being transferred to Detroit in 1780, employed his only weapon: withholding supplies. In 
August 1779, he told Haldimand that he hoped to reestablish British authority in the 
region by setting the Winnebagoes and Menominees on the Illinois country. Not only 
were they “naturally more brave than the Ottawas,” they knew that “they are not to have 
goods sent amongst them unless they strike the enemy.”45
The inter-tribal rivalry that heated up the most under the Revolution’s crucible 
was the one between the Delawares and the Six Nations. During the seventeenth century, 
the Onondaga council had “made Women” of the Delawares and “appointed them as 
Head Counsellors in all Treaties.” Over time the appellation came to be particularly 
galling for the Delawares because rather than emphasizing the peacemaking aspect of 
their “womanhood,” many Six Nations chiefs chose to highlight Delaware dependence, 
eventually even questioning their right to dispose of land and to attend treaties. White 
Eyes seemed to be especially discontented with this arrangement and sought alternative 
allies to legally secure his people’s land from both the Six Nations and encroaching 
Europeans. Before the Revolution, he planned to travel to England to “straighten out the
45 MPHC, 9: 361, 392 (quote).
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matter of the Delaware’s land with the King,” but his schemes were interrupted by the
46war.
With his benefactor, Lord Dunmore, ousted from Virginia, he turned to  the 
Americans for promises of security. At the 1775 Fort Pitt conference with Congress’s 
representatives, White Eyes carefully tried to mediate between the crown and colonists, 
urging them to “think good untill we hear from him (the King),” but also assuring them 
that he was “very Much rejoiced [that] you offer me your hand to take hold of. I Gladly 
Accept it and shall not let it fall to the Ground.” Perhaps feeling emboldened by this 
support from the Americans, he also took a jab at the Six Nations. In a detailed 
description of the extent of Delaware land, he declared distinctly that the land had been 
given tb them by the Wyandots, not the Six Nations, as the Onondaga council claimed.47
The following year White Eyes became even more outspoken. When your 
ancestors “made women of us,” they “desired us to mind nothing but Peace and 
Friendship,” he reminded Kayashuta, Flying Crow, and other Six Nations ambassadors. 
“When you now talk of us you call us Women, and say you have cut off our Legs so that 
we can do nothing without your leave, you said we belonged to you and that you 
commanded all the Nations in the Woods,” he continued, pointing out that if the 
Delawares were truly dependent, they would not have been able to unilaterally grasp the 
chain of friendship as they had just done. In response for the Six Nations, Round Warrior
46 Calloway, Revolution and Confederation, 141 (quote); Moravian Mission Diaries, 24 n. 66,250  
(at 250); Revolutionary Virginia, 4: 40; Heckewelder, “History, Manners, and Customs o f the Indian 
Nations,” 51; Jay Miller, “The Delaware as Women: A Symbolic Solution,” American Ethnologist, 1 
(1974), 507-14. The Six Nations were not the only Indians to assign derogatory meaning to the word 
“woman.” Hamilton noted in 1778 that among the Lakes and Wabash nations, “to call a Man Woman is 
highly injurious, which they express by saying, You are only fit to wear a Machicotte or pettycoat,” 
Barnhart, ed., Journal o f  Henry Hamilton, 110.
47 Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 85-89 (at 86, 88).
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called upon the despised Fort Stanwix treaty to verify his people’s sovereign claim over 
the Ohio Country and its residents. The next day an incensed White Eyes called the Six 
Nations “Liars” and repeated his contention that their only valid land claims were in New 
York, punctuating his speech with the declaration: “I am no Woman, neither are my Legs 
cut off.”48
For the next year the Delawares feared an attack from the Six Nations or the 
Mingos because of these “severe” words, but the frequent rumors never resulted in a 
genuine assault. White Eyes continued to pursue revolutionary alliances that would 
secure his nation’s land and sovereignty. Just before his death in 1778, he had signed a 
treaty with the Americans that included the possibility of statehood for the Delawares in 
the future, although the article contained the large loophole of needing to be “conducive 
for the mutual interest of both parties.” The Six Nations seemed to simply ignore White 
Eyes’ outbursts, refraining from punishment but refusing to acknowledge his assertion of 
independence. When the Delawares severed their ties with the Americans and turned to 
the British for support, a delegation from the Six Nations traveled to Detroit “to take the 
Peticoats from off our Grandfathers the Delawares,” so they could participate in war.49
After the Revolution, tensions persisted between Ohio Valley nations, 
exacerbated by the clustering of their villages in several distinct locales. Usually these 
conflicts involved disputation over faithfulness to the western confederacy. By the 
1790s, however, most divisions occurred because of one issue: whether or not to insist on 
the Ohio River as the definitive barrier between Indian and United States land. Joseph
48 Calloway, Revolution and Confederation, 139-41 (at 139, 141).
49 Moravian Mission Diaries, 356, 364-65, 368,426; Calloway, Revolution and Confederation, 
169 (quote); RG 1 0 ,13: 117-18 (at 118).
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Brant and the Lakes Indians blamed the Miamis, Shawnees, and Delawares for 
eliminating the possibility of negotiations with the Americans because of their 
determination to protect the Ohio line. In turn, those three nations viewed Brant as an 
outside agitator and traitor, who was too ready to dispense with their possessions. The 
Six Nations had tried to give away their land in 1768 and seemed to be up to their old 
tricks. Wayne’s devastating attack brought the two sides closer together, but their 
quarrels stretched beyond the Greenville Treaty in 1795.50
While the desire to protect land and sovereignty fueled both native opposition to 
colonial encroachment and inter-tribal rivalries, chiefs often expressed these objectives in 
terms of protecting their women and children. British and American diplomats adopted 
this language as well, assuring dubious Indians that following their suggestions would 
enable them to appropriately care for their families. In addition to being a useful 
metaphor, familial security actually dictated the revolutionary responses of most nations. 
Whenever a community had enough notice of an approaching army, the leaders always 
removed the women and children to a place of safety. Such actions demonstrated more 
than mere sentiment. As Silver Heels explained to De Peyster in 1782, women were “the 
support of us Warriors as they mend.. .shoes, plant com and without their assistance we 
would not continue the war.”51
Although these behind-the-scenes tasks sustained village life, women also 
exercised their voices in political forums. As the Cherokee women reminded De Peyster 
in June 1782, the misfortunes of war, such as losing loved ones, homes, food supplies,
50 MPHC, 24: 592-98, 605-08, 614; RG 10, 8: 8442-478.
51 MPHC, 24: 106; Simcoe Papers, 2: 365; RG 1 0 ,13: 103 (quote).
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and possessions, affected them as much as it did the men. Rather than passively bearing 
these hardships, many women chose to respond to the war’s vicissitudes by sending belts 
to British or American personnel, protesting their current conditions or suggesting the 
political alternative they deemed most fitting under the circumstances. They also 
frequently addressed the women of other nations, encouraging them to be unified in their 
response to war’s devastation.
Some of the most common messages that Indian women sent to British or 
American authorities were pleas for assistance. In late April 1781, the Wyandot women 
dispatched a runner with “four Strings of Black Wampum and a piece of Tobacco tied 
thereon” to De Peyster, urgently appealing for “immediate relief.” Having sheltered “half 
naked” Delaware refugees fleeing from Brodhead’s attack on Coshocton, they were 
convinced that the Americans intended to target them next. While their warriors 
investigated these rumors, the women took it upon themselves to procure allies. Other 
requests for aid focused on the Indians’ destitute conditions. A 1781 delegation of Miami 
Indians told De Peyster that they were “deputized by the women of our villages” to seek 
provisions. The Mahican women represented by Silver Heels in 1782 asked for goods to 
support them as they moved from Niagara to live among the Shawnees. De Peyster 
tentatively promised to help them, but he said he needed to first check to make sure that 
he was not dispensing more goods than there were people. He delivered a similar empty 
answer to the fourteen strings from Creek and Cherokee women in July 1783, who 
petitioned not to be forgotten or neglected during the peace process. His assurance that
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he would not forget them came long after the Paris negotiations had concluded, and the 
British Indian Department had been instructed to curtail expenses.52
Women also lent their support to the military activities of their warriors. The 
same Cherokee women who lamented the “Misery and darken’d Clouds” brought on by 
the war, vowed to encourage “the young men to arms against the Enemy.” During 
Hamilton’s expedition to Vincennes, a Chippewa chief delivered a belt from the women 
of his nation and other Lakes Indians to the women of the “River Indians, exhorting them 
to work hard with their hoes, to raise com for the Warriors who should take up the Axe 
for their Father the King of England.” They likely reasoned that for an international 
campaign to be successful, a unified response from the women would be required.53
While Hamilton and his auxiliaries camped at Vincennes, another multi-tribal 
contingent formed at Detroit, where they prepared to advance against Fort Laurens. After 
condoling with their young men for their nations’ “Misfortune,” the women o f the Six 
Nations, Shawnees, Delawares, and Wyandots announced to the assembly that they were 
untying the warriors’ feet, preparing them for war, and sweeping out their council house. 
“To preserve you from all difficulties, we make your Mockasons of strong Buffaloe 
Leather, & Your Leggins of Wolf Skin, and we clothe you out in the best War dress. We 
have put new Strings to your bows, and straiten’d your Arrors. That when you see your 
Enemies at a great distance you may be able to shoot thro’ them,” they declared. They 
also appointed the “old men” to travel behind the younger, so they could follow in their 
footsteps. Finally, they addressed the Ottawas, Chippewas, and Potawatomies present,
52 MPHC, 10: 476 (Wyandot quotes); RG 10, 13: 63, 102-04,224-28 (at 63).
53 RG 10, 13: 136-37; Barnhart, ed., Journal o f  Henry Hamilton, 134-35.
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agreeing to cut their legs loose too and outfit them for war, assuming that their “head 
Women will assist us in doing of it.”54
Despite rallying behind their soldiers in multiple instances, many native women 
consistently worked for peace throughout the Revolution and its militant aftermath. At 
the 1775 Fort Pitt treaty, the Delaware women instructed White Eyes to convey to the 
commissioners that they were “very Much rejoiced to hear you and our Children 
renewing the freindship between you and them.” White Eyes dutifully obeyed, adding 
that “our paying Attention to them is the reason why we did not go to War with any 
Nation whatsoever as God Almighty did not Create us to War with one Another.” On 
behalf of the Delaware women, he also pressed the Americans to “Acquaint your Mothers 
our Elder sisters the White Women what we have said and when any of our Children 
shall be bom in future we will point to heaven and tell them these our sentiments.” By 
appealing to their fellow women, they hoped to secure peace in the present and the 
future.55
In September 1787, the leading or “Beloved” Cherokee woman made a similar 
entreaty to her American counterparts in a letter to the governor of Pennsylvania. Unlike 
the 1782 promise of support for the warriors, she hoped to “keep my Children in piece,” 
and “Keep the path clear & straight” between her towns and the United States.
Conscious of the fact that she was a woman, she urged the governor and Congress not to 
disregard her words, reminding them that “woman is the mother of All.” “Woman Does 
not pull Children out of Trees or Stumps nor out of old Logs, but out of their Bodies,” she
54 Frontier Advance, 218-19 (at 219).
55 Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 88-89.
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stated; consequently, the men should “mind what a woman says, and look upon her as a 
mother.. .1 have Taken the privelage to Speak to you as my own Children, & the same as 
if  you had sucked my Breast—and I am in hopes you have a beloved woman amongst 
you who will help to put her children Right if they do wrong, as I shall do the same,” she 
continued. By claiming political power by virtue of her recognized maternal authority, 
she connected her nation’s diplomatic maneuvers to its routine community life in an 
effort to strengthen its internal cohesion and protect against outside aggression.56
Although the war provided numerous opportunities for women to participate in 
the political arena, it also occasionally encouraged male leaders to subvert the established 
order and deny a voice to their women. While Wayne and his army advanced through the 
Ohio Country in 1794, John Adlum journeyed to the upper Allegheny River, where he 
hoped to survey disputed Pennsylvania territory. He also carried a message from 
Secretary of War Knox to Complanter and his disgruntled Senecas, inviting them to a 
treaty with Timothy Pickering at Canadaigua. Complanter and many of the other chiefs 
vigorously opposed the idea of meeting Pickering anywhere but their council fire at 
Buffalo Creek, and declared that if  they were unable to recover the small tract of land 
they sought, they would go to war. In contrast, Adlum found “the woemen invariably for 
peace and most of the old men,” a situation that he attempted to exploit whenever 
possible.57
Unfortunately for Complanter, going to war was not an option unless he received 
the support of the “great woemen” from all the Seneca towns. For a while he spoke
56 Pennsylvania Archives, 11: 181-82 (at 181).
57 Donald H. Kent and Merle H. DeardorfF, eds., “John Adlum on the Allegheny: Memoirs for the 
Year 1794,” Pennsylvania Magazine o f  History and Biography, 84, nos. 3 -4 (July and October, 1960), 294- 
324,440-80 (at 445).
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confidently that “when we are all assembled chiefs, warriors, and the great Woemen, at 
Buffaloe the woemen may change their minds, and join us in our wishes, as it is the only 
chance we shall ever have of getting back a part of our Country.” Perhaps he could even 
provide assistance to the western confederacy, which he had long opposed. Despite this 
optimism, when the time came to determine the Senecas’ course of action, the women 
were “obstinate and refused their consent to go to war,” even at the Buffalo council fire.58
An infuriated Complanter finally railed against the “superstition” that the “Great 
Spirit [would] not prosper them in War,” if the warriors marched without the women’s 
consent. He declared that he was “surprised that men of understanding, had so long 
submitted to this ancient custom handed down to them by their ancestors, and now was 
the time, for men to decide for themselves and take this power from the woemen.” The 
great women immediately admonished him, saying “the Great Spirit had given that power 
to their ancestors, and it was handed down to them from time immemorial, and they 
would not relinquish their right.” Furthermore, the authority had been given to them “to 
prevent madmen and fools from doing mischief.” If Complanter disregarded their 
advice, “the Great Spirit would punish them for it.” This confrontation ended abruptly 
when news of Wayne’s victory over the western Indians reached their council house 
while the head woman was still speaking. In a short span of time, the war had twice 
threatened to overturn the Senecas’ political system: first by encouraging Complanter to 
challenge women’s participation in the process, and second by silencing all intra-tribal
58 Ibid., 456, 465-66.
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proceedings when the magnitude of the Indians’ defeat and the British betrayal became 
apparent.59
While Complanter’s bold subversion of ancient political and gender orders and 
the defeat of their western friends and relatives simultaneously rocked their community, 
the Senecas soon rallied and developed new strategies for relating to the Americans. The 
same process of devastation and renewal occurred within other Ohio Valley nations 
between 1768 and 1795. Although losing beloved family members and associates, 
watching a season’s labor bum to the ground, erecting yet another home, or panicking at 
the rumor of an approaching army generated considerable grief, deprivation, and 
frustration in Indian towns, none of these acts or repercussions of war successfully 
decimated native cultures. Instead, many of the routine tasks, communications, and 
observances that gave meaning to their lives continued, even though they were 
occasionally altered by war’s inescapable effects.
An example of this persistence occurred in October 1776. Throughout the month 
George Morgan was immersed in discussions with various Delaware, Shawnee, and 
Seneca representatives, who had traveled to Fort Pitt for another conference to promote 
harmony. The Mingos and some Wyandots were already engaged in hostilities, and 
rumors abounded that some of the Shawnees and Delawares were inclined to join them. 
During the treaty’s official proceedings at the end of the month, Morgan received a 
wampum string from the head Shawnee queen, Coitcheleh. She informed him that her 
headmen were en route to Pittsburgh, where she had “exhorted them.. .to keep fast of 
your Friendship.” She also requested that Morgan inform her if  “the white people
59 Ibid., 465-68 (at 465-66).
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entertain designs to strike us,” so she could “remove out of danger with my Children.” In 
turn, she promised to provide him with intelligence of any “bad intentions” on the part of 
the Indians, fulfilling that pledge immediately by naming the Mingos as frequent 
perpetrators of frontier attacks. After reiterating the Shawnee determination to “preserve 
Friendship with our white Brethren inviolable,” she apologized for not coming to Fort 
Pitt in person. “I would come up myself but have been lately deliver’d of a Son,” she 
explained, adding that she hoped not to be forgotten in the “distribution of your Goods.” 
In the midst of wartime negotiations and fears, the rhythms of life still took precedence 
over politics for Coitcheleh and many of her Indian neighbors.60
Although prioritizing childbirth and economic exchange did not diminish the 
attention given to alliances and war, it proved that diplomacy was not the only means of 
preserving native cultures. Since threats to their land and sovereignty often affected their 
daily existence, many Ohio Valley Indians focused on neutralizing these external 
pressures by driving settlers away or manipulating foreign governments. Such actions 
certainly contributed to the maintenance of family networks and retention of native 
property, but it would be erroneous to conclude that their failure inevitably produced 
cultural disintegration. New leaders arose to replace battle-weary chiefs, villages 
instilled familiar religious and social values in their youth, and individuals continued to 
hunt, trade, and farm to supply their nation’s economic needs. Despite the changes and 
devastation wrought by two decades of continuous warfare, the Indians’ home front 
retained its familiar patterns.
60 1776 Morgan Letterbook, 75-76.
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Conclusion:
Ambiguous Outcomes
Six weeks after the Ohio Valley nations agreed to the Treaty of Greenville in 
August 1795, Secretary of War Timothy Pickering reported to President Washington that 
“the chiefs who signed the treaty are not numerous, but I observe among them the names 
of Blue Jacket, the great warrior of the Shawanoes,.. .Buckongelas, the great warrior of 
the Delawares, and of Augooshaway, the Ottawa.” Despite Egusheway’s recent criticism 
of the treaty and a similar denunciation from the Miami chief Little Turtle (not mentioned 
in the letter but sharing equal stature with the others), Pickering viewed their signatures 
as evidence of general good will among the Indians and as surety that the agreement’s 
provisions would be upheld. If these leaders were prepared to cooperate with the United 
States, he reasoned, their relatives and neighbors would follow their example.1
Pickering’s conclusions mirrored the diplomatic perceptions of most American 
dignitaries during the second half of the eighteenth century. Despite repeated 
explanations from native representatives that their authority structures did not include 
coercive measures, making it very difficult for them to control warriors who defied tribal 
councils, American ambassadors and politicians continued to view Indian affairs through 
the consenting signatures of recognized leaders at treaty conferences. Easterners were 
particularly interested in simplifying native diplomacy in 1795 because they had spent 
most of the past twenty years denying that the Ohio Valley Indians had been independent 
participants in the region’s warfare. Only in the past five years, when their armies had 
suffered resounding defeats at the hands of the Indian confederacy, had they reluctantly
1 John Sugden, Blue Jacket: Warrior o f the Shawnees (Lincoln: University o f  Nebraska Press, 
2000), 208.
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acknowledged that the belligerent nations collected on the Auglaize and Maumee Rivers 
warranted extensive foreign policy attention; now they were ready to heed other national 
matters. Westerners were less convinced that the Treaty of Greenville marked the end of 
their conflict with the Indians, regardless of how many influential chiefs attached their 
names to the document. They had witnessed too many destructive war parties during the 
past two decades to be firmly persuaded that the fighting was over. Even transplanted 
easterner Anthony Wayne recognized that discontent was still rampant among Ohio 
Valley Indians and feared that “a second Pontiac business” could be on the horizon if the
'y
army neglected appropriate military measures.
While Pickering’s observations about western affairs reflected his eastern 
sensibilities, frontier settlers and native people alike would have agreed with his 
assessment of the influence that Blue Jacket, Buckonghelas, and Egusheway held among 
the Ohio Valley Indians. Although these men occasionally squabbled with each other, 
they commanded respect from Indians, Americans, and Europeans for their oratory, 
diplomacy, and military prowess. Not only were they skilled war chiefs, they had 
weathered more than two decades of violent conflict, something that few revolutionary 
era chiefs could claim. Because of this experience, their lives serve as a useful review of 
many of this dissertation’s themes.
Blue Jacket was probably in his late twenties when the Fort Stanwix Treaty 
unleashed fresh grievances for the Shawnees. He likely participated in discussions about
2 Knopf, ed., Anthony Wayne, 523. Patrick Griffin explores the divisions between East and West 
in his recent book, American Leviathan. He argues that perceived neglect from eastern governments forced 
western settlers to become increasingly politicized and to develop a “self-sovereignty” that came to define 
what the American Revolution meant to colonists west o f the Appalachians. Westerners particularly 
complained about eastern governments who downplayed the severity or importance o f  the Indian war, an 
issue that encouraged western brutality toward the Indians and suspicion o f eastern intent. Griffin, 
American Leviathan, 125-26,133-34,147, 150, 173-75.
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pan-Indian unification and the importance of checking settlers’ advances during the 
ensuing years, issues that surfaced many times throughout his life. Nineteenth-century 
historians placed him at Point Pleasant along with Cornstalk in 1774, a battle that 
convinced both sides of each other’s strength. In the following years, Blue Jacket was a 
member of the Shawnee faction that worked for peace at the beginning of the Revolution, 
only to split from his elders, establish his own town, and launch attacks against the 
Kentucky frontier. When the Americans retaliated, he lost his home and was forced to 
relocate several times. By the 1790s, he became known for trying to sustain the western 
confederacy, but he also devoted considerable time to courting British favor, a strategy he 
duplicated with the Americans after the Greenville Treaty.3
Egusheway, Buckonghelas, and Little Turtle also became closely associated with 
the 1790s unification movement and the Indians’ successive victories over American 
armies. Egusheway was particularly outspoken about fraudulent behavior by Congress, 
using two centuries of European affronts to recruit warriors for his resistance movement. 
At the same time, however, he recognized the importance of cultivating alliances with 
these newcomers, pledging his support to Hamilton during the 1778 march to Vincennes 
as an indication of his commitment to their friendship. Buckonghelas defied Joseph 
Brant by urging the Ohio Valley nations to insist on the Ohio River as the only acceptable 
boundary line, perhaps enjoying the approbation of many of his fellow Delawares who 
had chastised him during the Revolution for rejecting the Americans’ plea for neutrality. 
Little Turtle pressured the British to fulfill their duties as allies and to provide assistance 
to the nations in Wayne’s path. Throughout the 1780s and 1790s, he also assumed
* Ibid., 38-45,52, 188-217.
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responsibility for airing his nation’s grievances in public and private council and led the 
combined Indian forces in the successful routs of Harmar and St. Clair.4
Despite their personal influence and the political and military efforts of their 
people, life had completely changed for each of these men during the revolutionary era. 
For Blue Jacket and Buckonghelas the most visible alteration was that they now resided 
far from their river valleys of the 1770s. Both men and their respective nations had 
repeatedly relocated during the period, but with the Greenville Treaty line severing native 
ownership of more than half of Ohio, the possibility of returning to their homes on the 
Scioto and Muskingum Rivers was erased. Living as refugees on crowded Wyandot, 
Miami, and Ottawa land prompted many Shawnees and Delawares to move westward. 
Those who remained struggled to survive on the slim returns they could secure from 
hunting and trading, livelihoods that became increasingly tenuous as competition and the 
diminution of British power in the region dampened the market.5
In addition to new homes, new neighbors, and new economic pressures, native 
leaders were required to reorient their political strategy in the wake of their negotiations 
with Wayne in 1795. Their bitter struggle to protect the Ohio River boundary, the single- 
minded goal propping up the 1790s western confederacy, had ended in defeat, forcing 
them to devise a new plan for dealing with outsiders. The tenuous unity that Egusheway, 
Blue Jacket, and Buckonghelas had managed to forge among Indians with disparate 
interests began to evaporate as soon as Wayne’s army withdrew from the Maumee River. 
Furthermore, the alliance with Britain that had seemed so secure during the second half
4 “Minutes o f  Debates in Council on the...Ottawa River.. .November, 1791,” Early American 
Imprints', Barnhart, ed., Journal o f  Henry Hamilton', RG 10, 8: 8447-449; Simcoe Papers, 2: 334; ASP1A, 
564-83.
5 Tanner, Atlas o f  Great Lakes Indian History, 80, 85, 88,156-57.
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of the Revolution had begun to unravel after 1783, as British officials consistently 
refused to provide the support the confederacy expected from worthy allies, making their 
extravagant promises seem deceptive. Now the British Indian Department was 
relinquishing its base at Detroit, further eroding the disintegrating relationship and 
leaving the Americans to be the dominant political force in the region. Unlike the 
British, who had valued native cultures for the profits to be gained through the fur trade, 
the Americans seemed to welcome Indians only if they could be transformed into frontier 
settlers, a change that western residents found unacceptable.6
The loss of the Ohio River boundary not only compelled the western nations to 
adjust their political objectives, it completed the collapse of the regional identity that had 
bound many tribes together for the past three decades. Linked by their common 
dependence upon the Ohio River and their common enemies to the south, nations from 
the Illinois country to the Allegheny River and Lake Erie possessed similar interests for 
much of the eighteenth century. In the 1760s and 1770s, Shawnee, Delaware, and Ottawa 
agents actively sought to foster formal unification in opposition to British and Six 
Nations’ efforts to control the area. At the same time, the region, particularly along the 
Upper Ohio, was becoming one of the most heterogeneous communities west o f the 
Appalachians. Shawnees, Mingos, Delawares, Wyandots, and Ottawas often shared the 
same territory, sometimes helping, sometimes hurting the drive for unity. Even though 
unification attempts and international villages did not always produce harmony, they did 
encourage the nations to consider the concerns of the region, rather than simply their 
local issues. As access to the Ohio River grew increasingly restricted and tribes began to 
look westward, however, the basis of this regional identity quickly dissolved.
6 White, Middle Ground, 434,468,474; Griffin, American Leviathan, 254-56.
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If physical loss and deprivation, political upheaval, and a compromised sense of 
community were not enough changes for the Ohio Valley Indians, there was another 
lingering effect of the revolutionary era that plagued nations for years. When the 
nineteenth-century historian C.C. Trowbridge attempted to piece together the Miamis’ 
history, they complained of gaps in their memory because several boxes of wampum 
belts and pipes were destroyed in Harmar’s 1790 attack on several of their villages. 
Although Little Turtle and the combined Indian forces routed Harmar shortly after his 
attack, the damage to the Miamis’ historical and cultural record was irreparable. Having 
endured the destruction of their villages three times in the 1780s alone, the Shawnees also 
informed Trowbridge that they had no belts to commemorate their history.7
Despite this relentless sweep of change, some nations experienced less upheaval 
than others. While the Shawnees and Delawares were forced to rethink nearly every 
category of their lives, most of the Potawatomies, Chippewas, and Ottawas returned to 
their lands behind the Greenville Treaty line, where they resumed hunting, planting, and 
trading. The Miamis shared in the personal devastation of having their principal villages 
destroyed, but because their territory lay just west of the new boundary, they were able to 
rebuild their homes and return to a subsistence economy. During the next twenty years, 
their population actually increased. This stability probably contributed to the Miamis’ 
retention of traditional religious ideas far longer than many other nations.8
7 C.C. Trowbridge, Meedrmeear Traditions, ed. Vernon Kinietz, Occasional Contributions from 
the Museum o f Anthropology o f the University o f  Michigan, no. 7 (Ann Arbor: University o f  Michigan 
Press, 1938), 10; Vernon Kinietz and Erminie W. Voegelin, eds., Shawnese Traditions: C.C. Trowbridge’s 
Account, Occasional Contributions from the Museum o f Anthropology, no. 9 (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1939), 9.
8 Stewart Rafert, The Miami Indians o f  Indiana: A Persistent People, 1654-1994 (Indianapolis: 
Indiana Historical Society, 1996), 19 ,65,78.
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Regardless of a given nation’s degree of cultural change, every village council 
faced the question of how to respond to the Americans. Just as the sudden removal of the 
French regime created the need to formulate a strategy for dealing with the British in the 
1760s, the abrupt disappearance of the British and the swaggering entrance of the 
Americans in the 1790s demanded some kind of reaction. The year between the Indians’ 
defeat at Fallen Timbers and the Greenville Treaty closely resembled their deliberations 
three decades before. Emissaries scurried from private council to private council, 
consulting with other nations, forming factions, and, generally seeking to make informed 
decisions. Although they eventually signed Wayne’s treaty, few representatives seemed 
to regard the occasion as the definitive benchmark it would become in later years.9
It did not take long for the Indians to be disabused of the notion that the United 
States might simply be interested in making peace and drawing a permanent boundary 
line. Almost immediately American agents began negotiating for more land, causing the 
need for a calculated strategy for dealing with these newcomers to grow more 
pronounced. By 1796 a new militant faction of restless young men was already on the 
rise, eager to challenge injustice with open hostility. With the sight of Wayne’s Legion 
still fresh in their minds, however, most tribal councils rejected violence. On the other 
end of the spectrum stood men like Little Turtle and Blue Jacket, who abandoned their 
adversarial approaches in favor of becoming American ambassadors. Perhaps they hoped 
that recognition from the United States would enable them to retain their tribal
9 MPHC, 20: 385-87,25: 63-64, 34: 734; Knopf, e d Anthony Wayne, 362, 369,379-81, 384; 
Simcoe Papers, 3: 275-76,288,294.
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leadership, but, in the case of Little Turtle, his accommodation of the Americans led to 
his rejection among the Miamis.10
Caught between the extreme responses of violence and outright alliance, yet 
repeatedly faced with decisions about the appropriate responses to aggrandizing 
Americans, most nations wrestled with the ambiguity of their position. The integral 
connection between land and sovereignty, so critical to their ability to bargain effectively 
with the British, now betrayed them, as the loss of sizable amounts of territory enabled 
the Americans to disregard their diplomatic viability. In time, however, the Indians’ 
inability to determine a specific response to the emerging United States proved to be the 
means of ensuring that resistance would continue and that native culture change would 
proceed along Indian trajectories rather than be dictated by outsiders. Instead of 
following a predetermined plan, village chiefs responded to each new political or cultural 
threat as they always had, weighing all sides of the issue and attempting to act in their 
people’s best interests. While dwelling in the zone between open hostility and 
subservient compliance irked native extremists, angered Americans, and taxed tribal 
councils, it ensured that Indians could defend their rights and property for many years to 
come.
10MPHC, 12: 195, 34: 739; Simcoe Papers, 4: 247; Knopf, ed., Anthony Wayne, 514-16, 522-23, 
532-33; Sugden, Blue Jacket, 208-32; Rafert, Miami Indians, 50.
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